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Foreword 
The Productivity Commission convened a roundtable on Promoting Better 
Environmental Outcomes at Old Parliament House in Canberra on 19–20 August 
2008. Participants included government officials, academics, consultants, journalists 
and representatives of environmental organisations and agencies. Keynote addresses 
were presented by Professor Gary Libecap from the University of California and 
Professor Robert Stavins from Harvard University.  
Over the past decade or so, the Commission has undertaken inquiries, prepared 
submissions and pursued its own research on a range of environmental policy 
topics. The focus has been on the efficiency and effectiveness of different policy 
options, the regulatory burdens they impose and the potential for unintended 
consequences.  In many cases, the projected benefits of policy intervention have not 
materialised, reflecting the difficulties of formulating effective policy instruments.  
The Promoting Better Environmental Outcomes roundtable sought to address two 
questions central to developing good environmental policy: 
• under what conditions can governments improve environmental outcomes?, and 
• how should governments intervene to ensure effective and efficient results?  
The roundtable proceedings are being published to enable a wider audience access 
to the information and insights that emerged. This volume includes papers by the 
speakers and a summary of the key points covered in the discussion sessions.  
The Commission is grateful to the speakers and other participants whose 
contributions made the roundtable such a valuable exercise. 
Gary Banks AO 
Chairman 
February 2009 
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1 Introduction1 
Gary Banks 
Chairman, Productivity Commission  
Environmental amenities like clean water and air, or natural attractions like the 
Great Barrier Reef or the Snowy Mountains, are fundamental to the Australian 
community’s quality of life and sense of wellbeing. There has been a tendency to 
take them for granted, as enduring features of our way of life. But increasing 
population and economic pressures are changing this, posing threats to some 
important environmental ‘services’. 
While climate change is the biggest and globally most pervasive issue currently 
receiving policy attention, many others of purely domestic origin and reach are also 
manifest. Their impacts are felt not just by sections of the community with a 
heightened sense of the value of the environment, but also by many households and 
enterprises whose activities and interests are affected in various ways. Reduction in 
available water in the Murray Darling basin, for example, impacts directly and 
indirectly on a range of industries, other than irrigated agriculture. Runoff from 
disturbed acid sulphate soils poses a threat to much of Australia’s coastline, 
including sections of the Great Barrier Reef. Dryland salinity is reducing arable land 
in many inland areas. The policy challenges loom large, as exemplified by the 
current problem in sourcing the environmental flows to revive World Heritage 
wetlands like the Coorong.  
As in other countries, governments in Australia are responding to threats to the 
environment in various ways, with varying effectiveness. The nature and extent of 
policy responses depend in part on the pressures brought to bear by the perceived 
consequences of inaction. They also depend on how strongly the community feels 
about environmental protection relative to other goals. The policy response must 
take into consideration how much is being achieved by individuals and the private 
sector, as well as the potential effectiveness and efficiency of policy interventions. 
Indeed, concerns raised about environmental policy measures often have less to do 
                                                 
1 Opening remarks to the Productivity Commission Roundtable, Promoting Better Environmental 
Outcomes, Old Parliament House, Canberra, 20 August 2008. 
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with their objectives than with their effectiveness, the regulatory burdens they 
impose and the potential for unintended consequences. 
This conference principally addresses two questions central to developing good 
environmental policy:  
• First, under what conditions can governments improve environmental outcomes? 
The answer to this question will determine what are feasible objectives for 
environmental policy.  
• Second, how should governments intervene to ensure effective and efficient 
results? The answer to this question will guide the choice of policy instruments.  
1.1 Why this conference? 
Over the past decade or so, the Commission has undertaken inquiries, prepared 
submissions, and pursued its own research on a range of environmental policy 
topics. The focus has typically been on the efficiency and effectiveness of different 
policy options rather than the objectives of policy, although the appropriateness of 
the objectives is sometimes brought into relief by the analysis.  
Environmental policy instruments have proven difficult to formulate. It is often 
easier to identify what is wrong with them than to design new ones with confidence 
in their efficiency and effectiveness. Coase’s insight that externalities create 
reciprocal costs and benefits highlights the need to account for the costs of actions 
to ameliorate externalities as well as the benefits of reducing harmful effects. And, 
as we know from experience, the efficacy and efficiency of measures to address 
externalities is complicated for a number of reasons including: 
• non-separability of many environmental services. The one resource, whether an 
area of ocean or of forest, often delivers multiple services to multiple users, for 
economic and other purposes  
• high cost of excludability from some if not all of the services. There will 
generally be potential for at least some free riders, and the transactions costs of 
excluding them will often exceed the costs their use imposes on others. This is 
particularly the case where the consumption is ‘non-rival’ (as for non-use 
benefits from a resource that derive simply from its existence) 
• considerable scientific uncertainty about the extent of the threat to some 
environmental services or the effectiveness of proposed actions to remove or 
abate it. This raises questions about the relative merits of a precautionary 
approach — moving to protect resources when the extent of a problem is 
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uncertain — versus delay, not only for the cost savings, but to enable 
development of better information and solutions that are more effective 
• equity concerns — whether traditional use of the resource has created an 
entitlement, or those using the resource are responsible for the deterioration in 
environmental services, the requirement that policy be seen to be fair is 
obviously important. This raises issues about compensation and how those who 
have not been ‘responsible’ users should be treated 
• institutional arrangements that are not aligned with the nature of the resource 
nor the ideal policy instrument. Australia’s federal system has considerable 
strengths, but at both the local and national levels institutional arrangements can 
hamper policy to address local or national environmental issues. For the biggest 
environmental challenge — abatement of greenhouse gas emissions — the 
adequacy of international institutions is also a key issue. 
These characteristics of environmental problems constrain and help define the 
policy instruments that will be effective and efficient. This conference is motivated 
by the need to learn from accumulating experience about what works and why. 
1.2 The effectiveness of current approaches to 
environmental issues 
The first session, therefore, provides a stocktake of current approaches to 
environmental issues and their relative effectiveness. Governments have a natural 
tendency to reach for regulatory command and control approaches. These have had 
mixed results, as some examples from Commission work demonstrate. 
Fear of prospective restrictions can have unintended consequences 
The Native Vegetation Inquiry (PC 2004) found that there had been considerable 
pre-emptive clearing in Queensland in anticipation of the imposition of restrictions. 
Total clearing rose from around 330 000 hectares a year over the 1991–1999 period 
to 758 000 hectares in 1999–2000, when forthcoming restrictions were signalled. 
Similarly, the Inquiry into heritage protection (PC 2006a) found that the regulations 
created a disincentive to maintain properties that could be listed.  
These experiences illustrate the importance of finding ways to protect socially 
valued natural and built assets that align the interests of owners with those of the 
wider community. 
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Prescriptive standards or approaches can also create perverse 
incentives  
The Native Vegetation Inquiry also found that landholders were clearing regrowth 
earlier than was efficient, whether from a production or a biodiversity perspective, 
in order to avoid the areas falling under the regulation (which applied to regrowth 
over 10 years old). 
In a different way, the ‘waste hierarchy’ adopted by most jurisdictions distorts 
incentives. The hierarchy puts in order of preference, avoidance, reuse, recycling, 
recovery of energy, treatment, containment and, only when all other possibilities are 
exhausted, disposal. The Commission’s Inquiry into Waste Management (PC 
2006c) argued that this approach failed to appreciate that other inputs were also 
employed for each of these management options, the costs of which will be context 
dependent. The neglect of other environmental impacts (such as greenhouse gas 
from energy consumption or water quality effects) can also lead to perverse 
outcomes. 
Taxes are sometimes levied on activities having little environmental 
impact  
A number of governments in Australia levy taxes on waste disposal to encourage 
reduction in waste generation and greater recycling, as well as to raise revenue to 
fund provision of environmental services in other programs. The Waste 
Management Inquiry found that the waste levies did not reflect the environmental 
costs imposed by the landfill, and that they were unrelated to the level of effort at a 
landfill site to reduce leakage and other environmental impacts. Indeed, these taxes 
were more likely to be levied at large metropolitan landfills that already complied 
with strict standards for environmental management. The levies also increased the 
incentives for illegal dumping. 
And even if the target is right, it may not be the most cost effective 
approach 
Our report on Rural Water and the Environment (PC 2006b) found that the on-farm 
incentives offered for water efficiency improvements (to release water for 
environmental purposes) were, by necessity, higher cost than buying the water in 
the market. (Otherwise farmers would have implemented them and sold the 
additional water generated.) Water saving can also be illusory where unused 
irrigation water would have been returned to the system. The Commission’s recent 
Urban Water study (PC 2008a) presented findings that few, if any, subsidies for 
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more water efficient appliances were cost effective, for example Crase and Dollery 
(2005) estimated that the subsidy on AAA rated dishwashers cost over $33 000 per 
megalitre of water saved. 
But there are some success stories — that got the incentives right 
The Waste Management Inquiry pointed to the effectiveness of financial assurances, 
such as those adopted by the Victorian Environmental Protection Authority, in 
providing an incentive for landfill operators to implement the most cost effective 
practices to deliver specified environmental outcomes. 
The threat of legislation can also be very effective. For example, in our report on the 
Great Barrier Reef (PC 2003), it was noted that the sugar industry in New South 
Wales has implemented a requirement for best management practice to reduce 
disturbance of acid sulphate soils. It is enforced by the mills requiring evidence of 
compliance as a condition of accepting cane for processing. The industry is reported 
to have implemented the scheme to avoid a regulatory approach. 
And imperfect solutions may still be better than not trying  
Despite their unintended consequences, the restrictions on land clearing have 
greatly reduced the loss of native vegetation. While the contribution to protecting 
biodiversity is somewhat uncertain, this has certainly helped Australia to meet the 
Kyoto target for greenhouse gas emissions. This raises questions of whether the 
good outcomes could be obtained without the bad — and what aspects of instrument 
design are essential and what are not. 
The first session will have contributions from John Freebairn from Melbourne 
University on the efficient allocation of, and investment in, the environment; Drew 
Collins from the BDA Group on environmental policies that are proving ineffective, 
due to poor design or practical difficulties; and Arlene Buchan from the Australian 
Conservation Foundation on market-based instruments and water recovery in the 
Murray Darling Basin.  
1.3 ‘Market’ and cooperative solutions and the role of 
government 
Market-based instruments have an important place in the toolbox of environmental 
policy. The second session focuses on these approaches. The Commission, which 
views policy issues primarily within economic frameworks, has a well known 
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predilection for market solutions. Our work has shown, however, that there are 
limits to their applicability and problems from poor system design. In particular, 
transactions costs, including measurement and monitoring, can be substantial. Then 
there are issues of equity and managing the potential market power that can be 
created.  
Restrictions on trade reduce the scope for cost effective solutions 
The National Water Initiative has established a number of ‘accountable 
environmental managers’ who have the mandate to provide water for the 
environment. Our study on Rural Water Use and the Environment found good 
prospects for achieving the desired environmental flows through rural water trading. 
However, the report found the scope to source water was limited by a number of 
impediments, including restrictions on the purchase of seasonal allocations (as 
opposed to permanent entitlements), and caps on interregional trade, as well as 
budget limitations. 
In this case the restrictions on trade are a response to farmers’ concerns about 
access to water for irrigation and the risk of stranded assets. In other cases, 
restrictions can relate to environmental services provided by a resource that are 
incidental to the primary use. Examples are recreational fishing in fisheries subject 
to quotas, or bush harvest in areas protected for biodiversity. Such restrictions or 
permissions can reduce the effectiveness of the market, raising questions of when 
they should be allowed. 
Cooperative solutions need a supporting legal framework  
Private markets for environmental services can be ‘created’ by government 
establishing a legal framework to enforce contracts and resolve disputes. It may also 
need to develop an information base to allow monitoring of service delivery where 
there are significant economies of scale or public good characteristics reducing 
incentives for private monitoring.  
The Commission’s Inquiry into the Impacts of Native Vegetation and Biodiversity 
Regulations reported on the Trust for Nature conservation covenant program in 
Victoria. This covers the legal costs to landholders of entering into a legally binding 
covenant on areas of their land to manage and protect in perpetuity. The program 
also provides advice on management action and periodic visits to assess the 
condition of the land, and is funded by community and government contributions.  
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Another approach used by Trust for Nature and similar philanthropic groups is to 
buy properties through a revolving fund, establish a covenant, and then sell each 
property to someone who wants a ‘private nature reserve’. Enforcement of the 
covenant restrictions is still essential. 
The cost of such voluntary covenant and purchase-resale programs depends on the 
competition in the supply of properties with the desired environmental 
characteristics. It also depends on the value that owners place on conservation and 
their use needs. The effectiveness of the market also depends on the buyer’s ability 
to estimate the environmental value of the area protected by a covenant. This can be 
difficult in diverse areas or where contiguous areas are required that fall outside 
property boundaries. 
The second session deals with the role of government in creating and supporting 
market-based approaches to environmental issues. When will markets work and 
what does government need to do to develop and support market-based solutions?  
Gary Libecap from the University of California will talk about promoting better 
environmental outcomes through property rights and markets, with a focus on 
opportunities and limitations. David Brunckhorst from Rural Futures at the 
University of New England addresses the right scale for policy development and 
initiatives and how to identify the confluence of community interest with 
environmental services at landscape scale. Suzie Kerr, from Motu Economic and 
Public Policy Research, will share experiences from New Zealand on consideration 
of environmental markets to deal with greenhouse gas emissions and nutrient loss 
into waterways. Dave Pannell from the University of Western Australia will discuss 
characteristics for policy to generate cost-effective environmental improvements.  
1.4 Institutions and incentives to enable better policies  
As noted earlier, institutional arrangements are crucial to the effectiveness of policy. 
The Commission is increasingly involved in tasks that assist the reform work of the 
Council of Australian Governments (COAG). COAG provides considerable 
opportunities for the cooperative approaches that can be so important for addressing 
many environmental issues. The constitution gives the states control of most of the 
environmental resources in Australia, but environmental planning is often delegated 
to the local government level. More recently, catchments have formed the basis of 
regions for environmental and natural resources management. The Commonwealth 
seeks to influence the states through various means — most notably access to 
programs funded by the Commonwealth — but also through various laws, and via 
international commitments under various environmental conventions. The 
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Commission has found that roles and responsibilities for environmental policy are 
not always as clear as might be desired. Confluence rarely occurs between the 
on-ground locations, areas of common community interest, legal responsibilities 
and capacity for funding.  
There is potential for policy inconsistency across and even within 
jurisdictions 
Mandatory Renewable Energy Targets (MRET) were initially established by state 
governments to raise the share of energy production from renewable sources in the 
absence of adequate price signals for non-renewables. The national MRET now 
requires energy suppliers to meet a larger target or face penalties. In doing so they 
can purchase from the lowest cost producers of approved sources of renewable 
energy. This is an improvement over the existing arrangements, which have 
involved differences across jurisdictions in the criteria for approval, reflecting 
perhaps the influences of different suppliers across the jurisdictions. However, as 
the Commission’s recent submission to the Garnaut Review (PC 2008b) noted, 
under an effective emissions trading scheme an MRET would be unnecessary and, 
if binding, would raise the costs of energy through the exclusion of lower cost 
technologies. 
Governments still have to set the rules of the game and are subject to 
lobbying 
Garnaut’s Draft Report and the Government Green Paper on an Emissions Trading 
Scheme have seen intense lobbying efforts from industry, consumer and 
environmental groups. From exclusions for petrol and trade exposed industries, to 
compensation for other labour-intensive activities, each seeks to influence policy 
design to their advantage. Such efforts will arise in any consultative process for 
policy making, and perhaps it is encouraging that so much is out in the open. Yet it 
does underline that policy design and governance need to be developed in 
recognition of the likelihood of ‘gaming’ and rent-seeking. This is a key practical 
issue, for example, bearing on the choice between ‘cap and trade’ and a carbon tax. 
(PC 2007) 
The third session explores the important role of institutions in achieving good 
outcomes. Rob Stavins from Harvard University will provide an international 
perspective addressing the institutional challenges for emission trading schemes. 
Wendy Craik, from the Murray Darling Basin Commission, will provide a domestic 
focus, drawing on considerable experience with cross jurisdictional institutions. 
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Henry Ergas, from Concept Economics, will talk about the institutional reforms 
needed to generate better environmental outcomes. 
1.5 Some implications for public policy 
Finally, this tour of the Commission’s foray into environmental policy issues would 
not be complete without mentioning the plastic shopping bag issue! A few pages on 
this issue in the waste management report caused much fuss, but ultimately 
demonstrated that a little analysis can go a long way. In short the Commission soon 
found that the evidence cited in support of banning plastic bags was not what it 
seemed; that in any case a ban would not address the alleged environmental 
problem, and that the costs of a ban would greatly exceed the benefits. Despite 
vigorous counter attempts by ban-supporters to ‘shoot the messenger’, COAG 
eventually chose not to implement a ban nationally. 
The plastic bags story illustrates the pressures on Government to respond to the 
loudest voices, without taking the time to understand all the dimensions of a 
problem and whether, with the policy instruments at its disposal, it can make a 
difference for the better. This of course is not confined to environmental policy. It 
has to do with the policy development process generally and, in particular, the need 
to entrench evidence-based foundations to enable political decisions to recognise 
the economic tradeoffs. 
The last session of the day will draw out the implications for public policy in 
Australia. Geoff Brennan, from the Australian National University, will start the 
session — as he has done so well at several other Commission events — and the 
three keynote speakers will then have a chance to reflect on the proceedings and 
draw their conclusions about what it all means for public policy. 
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2 Allocation of and investment in the 
environment 
John Freebairn 
The University of Melbourne 
Abstract 
The paper explores the case for, and the different forms of, government 
intervention in the allocation of the environment. Market failures associated with 
public goods, common property resources, and external costs and benefits are 
examined. The relative effects and pros and cons of different interventions, 
namely the creation of property rights, rules and regulations, and market based 
taxes, subsidies and tradable permits, are explored under different information 
states of perfect knowledge, probabilistic information and uncertainty. 
2.1 Introduction 
The environment provides benefits or utility to members of society as a provider of 
key production inputs, for example, agricultural land, minerals and energy; a place 
for disposal of wastes, for example, of domestic refuse, building materials and 
emissions from the combustion of fossil fuels; and the direct provision of 
environment amenity, for example, for recreation, clean air and water, and 
protection of flora, fauna and scenery. As is the general economic problem, wants 
of the environment exceed the limited supply, and allocation choices have to be 
made between the different uses at any point in time and of uses over time. Also, 
decisions to invest in protecting and augmenting environmental resources have to 
compete with other physical and human capital investment options for the limited 
supply of savings. 
In many cases, well-functioning markets can be used, and are used, to allocate 
scarce environmental resources and to choose investment options. Markets work 
well where property rights provide for rival consumption and low costs of 
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exclusion,1 and competition prevails. Examples in place include the markets for 
most minerals and energy, agricultural and urban land, while markets are being 
developed for uses of consumable water and, in a few cases, for the least-cost 
supply of environment amenity. 
In other cases, however, the allocation of and the investment in environmental 
resources, wastes and amenity encounter serious market failures. Important areas of 
market failure include the situations of public goods, where the environmental 
amenity services have non-rival and non-excludable properties; common pool 
resources, where the non-excludability property is important; and markets with 
external benefits and costs, where market buyers and sellers do not consider all the 
social costs and benefits of their production and consumption actions. The presence 
of a market failure provides a necessary but not a sufficient condition for 
government intervention to achieve a more socially efficient, and welfare-
increasing, allocation of the environment and associated investment decisions. The 
nature of the market failure also guides the choice of the form and level of 
government intervention to improve efficiency. 
Options for government intervention to correct market failures include the provision 
of better property rights; rules and regulations (sometimes referred to as ‘command 
and control’); market-based interventions using taxes, subsidies or tradable permits; 
and the provision of information (and usually information has public good 
properties which will be under-supplied by market forces) and jaw-boning. In 
Australia, and elsewhere, we find examples of the different policy interventions. Of 
particular interest are the relative merits of the different policy intervention 
instruments, and how the relative pros and cons depend on the type of market 
failure and on the available information. This paper will focus on the normative and 
economic efficiency arguments for the level of and form of intervention to correct 
market failures. 
While the focus of the paper is the criterion of efficiency, in practice consideration 
also has to be given to equity and political feasibility effects. Equity as a criterion, 
however, is given little consideration on the grounds that there are more direct and 
effective direct income transfer instruments to meet social equity goals than the 
instruments to correct market failures which affect product and input prices.2 
Another strand of the literature takes a positive mode of analysis and draws on the 
                                                 
1 The required property rights have the characteristics of: exclusiveness of the right; transferability; 
full appropriation of all the benefits and costs with ownership; and are durable and enforceable. 
2 More formally, we might invoke the first and second theorems of welfare economics. 
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private theory of regulation, as opposed to the public interest theory used here, to 
explain the predominance of regulations in environment policy intervention.3 
The rest of the paper is as follows. Section 2.2 sets out the underlying perfect 
knowledge and static models of market failure and their correction. A description of 
the different market correction intervention options in this simplified world is 
provided in Section 2.3, along with some caveats for second best and government 
failure. In the particular context of environmental external costs and benefits, 
Section 2.4 then considers how different forms or levels of imperfect and costly 
information alter the relative merits of the different government intervention options 
to correct an externality market failure. Section 2.5 concludes. 
2.2 Market failure and the environment 
Here we present the public finance and environmental economics text book models 
of market failure (for example, Stiglitz 2000, and Perman et al. 2003), together with 
illustrative environment examples, for a public good, a common pool resource, and 
an externality. Other possible market failures associated with the exercise of market 
power and asymmetric information can be found in the allocation of the 
environment, but in the interests of space they will not be considered. While both 
partial-equilibrium and general-equilibrium models can be used, for the most part 
the key messages about the cause of market failure, the required correction for 
economic efficiency, and the nature of alternative corrective government 
interventions can be obtained from the simpler partial equilibrium model. 
Public goods, as opposed to private goods for which markets work, have the 
combined properties of non-rival consumption and high costs of exclusion. 
Examples in the use of the environment include the preservation of flora, fauna and 
scenery. Often the amenity value includes not just contemporary consumption but 
also the option value of future consumption or just the knowledge of existence. 
With public goods, there is an incentive for individuals to free-ride, since 
                                                 
3 In practice, in almost all countries and examples of market failure with the allocation of 
environment resources we observe a much higher dependence on command-and-control 
interventions than on the market-type interventions proposed by economists and argued for in 
this paper. An alternative positivistic analysis of the supply and demand for intervention which 
places a high weight on equity effects and on political processes, for example, as discussed in 
Keohane et al. 1998, provides support for greater roles for the command–and-control 
interventions. While these models have been developed primarily for the USA context, and they 
place great importance on the independence of individual Congress representatives which seems 
less exercisable in the Australian political context of greater party power relative to individual 
independence, they suggest a valid alternative complementary paradigm for the study of policy 
in Australia. 
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individuals gain the benefits anyway (because of non-rival consumption) and an 
individual cannot enforce a charge on other users (because of non-exclusion). As a 
result, with a market as the allocative mechanism too little of a public good is 
produced and consumed. 
An efficient level of a public good, including the environment, defence and law 
enforcement, would seek a quantity which equates the sum of the individual 
marginal benefits with the marginal cost of supply (or, in a general equilibrium 
model, the sum of the marginal rates of substitutions across individuals with the 
marginal rate of transformation, and in both cases of the public good relative to 
other private goods).  
Application of the efficiency principle to measure the efficient supply and 
consumption of an environmental public good, such as a national park or a share of 
water for the environment, would involve the collection of biological and physical 
information to estimate increments of the quantity of environmental services 
provided, and then some form of stated preference technique such as contingent 
valuation or choice-modelling to ascertain individual valuations of the incremental 
changes in environmental services. In practice, either with or without attempts to 
measure the social marginal valuation of public goods, political processes as a form 
of collective or social choice often make the actual decision. 
In terms of policy instruments, governments generally would need to take an active 
role in securing and funding the efficient supply of a public good, including a share 
of the environment. The intervention could directly increase the supply or share of 
the public good, or it could operate indirectly by restricting the market-determined 
alternative private good use of a resource by using regulations, taxes or subsidies. 
A second set of market failures in the allocation of the environment is referred to as 
the common-pool resource. Common-pool resources have the properties of rival 
consumption and very high costs of exclusion, although exclusion costs depend on 
technology and, often, on the state of government-provided property rights. 
Examples of natural resources, and some built resources, which are accessible to 
anyone with these common-pool properties include the British commons and 
grasslands before fencing, fisheries, public motorways, some forests and public 
parks, beaches, etc. In effect, the common-pool resource problem results in a type of 
external cost as additional users ignore that their consumption draws on the 
common-pool resource stock and increases the costs faced by all other users of the 
limited resource stock. From a society-efficiency perspective, the common-pool 
resource is overexploited and any economic surplus is driven to zero. 
A society-efficient level of production and consumption of a common-pool resource 
would seek to equate the marginal social cost — which recognises both private 
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costs and the spillover costs on other users — with the marginal benefit. Marginal 
social costs can be found from the individual firm marginal private cost curve, and 
treating this as the society-average cost curve. Perhaps ironically, one solution is to 
provide for monopoly ownership of the common-pool resource; this works because 
monopoly ownership converts the non-exclusive property of the common-pool 
resource under a competitive market structure to an exclusive property. Other policy 
interventions available to government to reduce overexploitation of a common-pool 
resource include rules and regulations to reduce consumption or the market-based 
mechanisms of taxes and tradable permits. In each case, the different sets of 
interventions might be applied directly on the quantity, or indirectly on closely 
correlated and sometimes easier to measure inputs and production methods. 
The third set of situations where markets fail in the allocation of the environment is 
grouped under the heading of external costs and benefits. In effect, some of the 
costs and benefits to society are not recognised under existing market transactions 
between buyer and seller. Pollution associated with the disposal of wastes by 
households and businesses is the most important example. Other examples where 
external costs and benefits can arise include land-use choices, building and other 
structure designs. Within pollution examples, specific details can vary.4 While such 
differences clearly are important in the determination of the details of the efficient 
allocation of resources and investment decisions, and in the specific design of the 
corrective policy intervention, the general guideline for economic efficiency is to 
choose decisions which equate marginal social cost with marginal social benefit. 
Figure 2.1, which will be used again in the paper, provides one way of showing the 
externality problem. The horizontal axis shows the relevant measure of the pollution 
emission, for example the flow or stock of greenhouse-gas emissions. Output Qbau 
is the emissions output, or business-as-usual decision under a market, where for 
valued private goods and services, such as electricity and transport involving the use 
of fossil fuels, marginal private benefits (MPB) are equated with marginal private 
costs (MPC) at a market price. The horizontal axis can also represent in a crude way 
a measure of output of these valued goods and services. The vertical axis shows 
costs per unit of emission. The increasing cost curve MEC for marginal external 
cost shows the marginal cost to society of extra pollution, a cost ignored by a 
market, essentially because there is no property right to pollute. The function 
                                                 
4 For example, we can distinguish between local, national and global pollution (for example 
particulates and local visibility, acid rain, and greenhouse gases associated with the combustion 
of fossil fuels); between pollution associated with a flow or a stock (for example most 
household wastes and heavy metals in sewage disposal); between cases where the external costs 
have a roughly equal incidence across jurisdiction effect or diffuse external costs by geographic 
area, whether the externalities relate to production and/or consumption decisions; and between 
point and non-point forms of pollution (see further, for example, Perman et al. 2003). 
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increasing from Qbau is called the marginal abatement cost (MAC). The MAC 
reflects the fact that as pollution is reduced, producers have to choose more costly 
production processes that incur less pollution; and/or buyers shift their consumption 
mix to less pollution-intensive products which are less effective substitutes; and/or 
society invests scarce resources in R&D to help achieve at lower cost the former 
two options. In a crude sense, the MAC reflects the difference between MPB and 
MPC for the desired goods and services as less pollution is emitted. The efficient 
level of pollution, at Q*, and in turn the efficient choice of products and production 
processes with different pollution intensities, equates the MAC and MEC curves. 
This occurs also where MPC + MEC = MSC = MPB (which for completeness 
equals MSB), where MSC is marginal social cost and MSB is marginal social 
benefit for the private goods and services. 
A number of additional observations can be drawn from figure 2.1. First, a measure 
of the efficiency gain in shifting from business as usual to the efficient allocation is 
given by the triangle of economic surplus area ‘a’. Second, the optimal solution Q* 
involves consideration not just of the technical effects of the externality, but also the 
relative marginal costs and benefits of the externality. Third, and related, seldom 
will the efficient solution be one of zero pollution. Fourth, both the MAC and MEC 
curves of figure 2.1 are almost certain to shift over time, both in their position and 
in their slopes or elasticities. Then, the efficient level of pollution will change over 
time, and so will also change the quantity of production and consumption, and the 
production methods, of the goods and services producing the externalities as by-
products. 
Many arms of government policy intervention are candidates to reduce the level of 
externalities from the current or business-as-usual level, Qbau, to the socially 
efficient level, Q*. These include establishing property rights (for example, to 
pollute); command-and-control regulations on the quantity of emissions, outputs or 
key inputs; market-based interventions, such as a tax, tradable permits or subsidies 
to reduce pollution; and moral suasion to reduce pollution. In all cases the 
regulation, tax, and so forth, should be directed at the size of the marginal external 
cost at the efficient output level. 
Market failures that flow across countries involve additional policy challenges. 
Where the market failures affect households and businesses within a country, a 
national government has legal power to compel — although subject to various 
constitutional and democratic checks. By contrast, where the market failure crosses 
border boundaries — for example, for global pollution and some public goods —
there is no effective international government. In these cases, a solution requires 
cooperative agreements among the governments of the different countries. 
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Figure 2.1 Externality correction 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2.3 Intervention with perfect knowledge 
Suppose initially that we have perfect knowledge of the science and economics of 
the relevant marginal benefit and cost functions, and so we know the efficient 
allocation of the environment as well as the current allocation with its market 
failures. Then, in figure 2.1, for a pollution externality, for example, government 
policy seeks an instrument to change the allocation from Qbau to Q*. 
In principle, most of the potential instruments could be employed. A property right 
to pollute could be designed and managed. As argued in the Coase (1960) theorem, 
different initial allocations of the new property right, whether to the polluter or the 
polluted, would lead to an efficient allocation, if transaction costs are negligible. 
With many players, the low transactions cost pre-condition becomes untenable. A 
command-and-control strategy would simply require pollution at the efficient level 
of Q*. Given the likelihood that there is a less-than-perfect correlation between the 
pollution externality (for example, greenhouse gas emissions), and the desired final 
good (for example, electricity), or a key input (for example, coal), or a production 
process (for example, heat exchange), it is preferable to regulate the indicator most 
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highly correlated with the external cost product — namely the emission itself — 
rather than a final product, input or production process. If in reality measurement 
and monitoring costs are lower with the output, input or process indicators, such 
transaction cost savings might be traded off against errors in signalling the external 
cost. 
Different market-based instruments could achieve the efficient allocation. A tax set 
at the marginal external cost, namely Q*E of figure 2.1, would internalise the 
externality in the private costs. The shadow price, or opportunity cost, of a tradable 
permit set at the efficient level Q* would have the same price and quantity effects as 
the externality tax. Or producers could be bribed with a subsidy equal to the tax per 
unit of emission to reduce emissions to the efficient level. As was the case with the 
command-and-control policy instruments, in general it is better directly to target the 
tax, tradable permit or subsidy on the pollution source rather than the indirect 
measures of related, but not perfectly correlated, outputs, inputs or production 
processes, unless there are large compensating savings in transaction costs. 
In terms of redistribution effects, some to all of the costs imposed by governments 
to restrict pollution will be passed forward to consumers as higher prices under the 
different forms of corrective government intervention. With the exception of the 
subsidy, under other interventions the private opportunity cost of production of the 
externality-creating goods and services increases by the external cost to reflect its 
social cost. The more elastic is product supply relative to product demand, the 
higher is the share of the incremental cost passed on as a higher buyer price. Where 
the marginal cost function is perfectly elastic reflecting a constant returns-to-scale 
production technology, all of the cost increase will be borne by consumers.5 
The distributional effects among producers and government will vary with the 
instrument used to reduce pollution. Where governments initially distribute newly-
created property rights to pollute to producers, as is implicit with quotas or tradable 
permits, the producers (or more generally the other initial property-right recipients) 
receive a windfall surplus or rent. By contrast, if the permits are auctioned or a tax 
is imposed, government receives a windfall increase in revenue. A subsidy, by 
contrast, involves a loss of government revenue. Often regulations to restrict supply 
are seen by producer lobby groups as a way of creating rents and raising barriers to 
entry, so favouring the incumbent producers. 
Households, and in some cases businesses also, are the beneficiaries of reduced 
pollution. Importantly, and as noted in the previous section, overcoming market 
                                                 
5 While this result assumes perfect competition, it also is a good approximation, for the different 
market structures of monopoly, monopolistic competition and some of the oligopoly models, 
see Freebairn (2008). 
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failures is a positive-sum game where potentially, if not in practice, the losers can 
be more than compensated by the winners with some additional economic surplus 
left over. 
So far this paper has proposed a set of interventions which assume that the rest of 
the economy is acting in a first-best way with no other market distortions. This is an 
extremely strong assumption and in practice it is an invalid simplification. Where 
there are distortions elsewhere in the economy — for example, other public goods, 
monopolistic behaviour, or market failures with other environment choices —
adopting a market correction derived on the assumption of market perfection 
elsewhere will not be first-best. For example, if a product that involves external 
costs is also a monopoly, monopoly behaviour distorts the economy with too little 
production and consumption, but this may partly or more than fully reduce output as 
desired to counter excess production and consumption due to the externality. In 
principle, using a general equilibrium model, but also with much more information 
requirements, the appropriate correction in a second-best world can be derived. 
Recognising the limitations of information, Ng (initially in 1977 and in more recent 
texts such as 1990) argues that in most cases going for the first-best and ignoring 
other distortions (in what he terms the theory of third-best) will be close to the 
mark. 
A related consideration is the transaction costs of intervention. Transaction costs 
include the costs of policy development, and then the costs of administering, 
monitoring and enforcing compliance with the policy intervention. A net efficiency 
gain requires that the additional transaction costs exceed the gains to society of the 
reduced extent of market failure. 
In a realistic context of any modern economy and political processes for the 
determination of economic policy, against market failure has to be balanced 
government failure. As will be discussed in more detail below, information on the 
key parameters to correct market failure is imperfect, and costly to obtain. 
Inevitably the best-intentioned governments will not choose Q* of figure 2.1, and 
possibly they will choose a much smaller level of pollution that incurs even larger 
efficiency costs than area ‘a’ generated by the market. The reality of our political 
processes is that producer lobby groups are more effective lobbyists and suppliers 
of information cast in their favour than consumers. The objective of politicians to 
seek re-election need not coincide with maximising economic efficiency, and 
bureaucrats in part have a selfish interest in interventions that build the size of the 
bureaucracy and their opportunities for promotion. 
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2.4 Intervention with imperfect information 
Reality is that knowledge about the required functions to choose the level of, and 
the form of, government policy interventions to correct for market failures —
including allocation and investment decisions for the environment — is imperfect. 
Also, the relevant functions almost certainly change over time, and new information 
is collected and analysed with the passage of time. In this realistic context, we can 
draw some differences between the different policy instruments which were not 
found under the previous section’s assumption of perfect knowledge. This section 
will consider different forms or levels of imperfect knowledge. 
Consider first the case where policy makers have a good idea about the efficient 
allocation in aggregate, but not the details for individuals. For example, in figure 
2.1, there is a good idea of the required reduction of the aggregate level of pollution 
from Qbau to Q*, or of the marginal external cost Q*E; but policy-makers have 
much less information for the MAC of the many individual households and 
businesses. In contrast, individuals have private information on cost-effective ways 
to reduce emissions. 
To illustrate, in figure 2.2 we have two activities producing an external cost, and 
they have differently shaped MAC functions which are known (or knowable) to the 
firms but not to government; but government considers that the level of external 
cost production needs to be reduced x per cent, say a half of Qbau = Q*. A 
command-and-control regulation might set the same quota for both Activity 1 and 
Activity 2, namely output Q^1 and Q^2. Note that at these levels, the MAC at the 
regulated levels varies between the two activities at P1 and P2, respectively. 
Market-based mechanisms offer cost-effective ways, and associated efficiency 
gains, in meeting the aggregate desired pollution levels. In figure 2.2, if the quotas 
were made marketable transferable permits, it would pay Activity 2 to purchase 
quota permits (to increase pollution) from Activity 1 (who then would further 
reduce pollution), until the MAC was equated across the activities at a market 
permit price of P*. The same aggregate market level of emissions would be 
achieved with both parties gaining, namely area ‘a’ for Activity 1 and area ‘b’ for 
Activity 2, for a society efficiency gain of area ‘a + b’. 
That is, a tradable quota system is a cost effective way of allocating a limited 
resource, such as a common-pool fishery, or meeting a maximum pollution target, 
such as wastewater or greenhouse gas emissions. As an example, the tradable 
permit system introduced in the USA in the early 1990s to reduce emissions of 
sulphur causing acid rain arising from the combustion of coal in power stations was 
estimated to reduce the costs of emissions reduction by one-third to one-half of the 
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Figure 2.2 Least cost market instruments 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
costs under regulation (Shogren 1998). Alternatively, imposing a tax at rate P* on 
the pollution maximises the pollution reduction for a given per-unit pollution 
charge. In addition, the tax or permit price provides continuing incentives to invest 
in R&D and to seek better and lower-cost ways of using the environment. The self-
interest of different players in a market context has them revealing the private 
information which generally is not available to policy makers. 
Information will often be imperfect for the aggregate functions, too. Then, policy 
intervention in the allocation of the environment generally will not be first-best, and 
in some cases it will be less effective than leaving allocations to the market. 
Consider figure 2.3 for a pollution externality. We start at Qbau, for business as 
usual, with the true, but imperfectly known, MAC and MEC curves with a social 
optimum at Q*. Suppose that, under imperfect knowledge, the policy-makers 
choose a tradable quota at Q1 or an emissions tax at T1, which for simplicity are 
chosen to result in identical realised market outcomes. Relative to the no-
intervention state, economic welfare is improved by the trapezoid area ‘b’, even 
though an additional potential first best efficiency gain of triangle area ‘a’ is missed. 
But under imperfect knowledge, it is also possible that the policy intervention case 
is less efficient than business as usual; and for illustration suppose that the estimate 
is MAC2 rather than the true MAC (and with MEC true), so that the area ‘c’ 
between MAC and MEC and quantity Q2Q* exceeds area ‘a + b’. 
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Figure 2.3 Imperfect knowledge costs 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
In the context of figure 2.3, and using Weitzeman (1974), we can say something 
about the relative merits of choosing the tax instrument versus the tradable permit 
instrument under imperfect knowledge of the positions of the MAC and MEC 
curves; but with knowledge of their relative slopes, in terms of the relative sizes of 
the efficiency losses, namely the triangles ‘a’ and ‘c’. Where the MEC is flatter than 
the MAC, as illustrated in figure 2.3, comparable errors expressed as a percentage 
of T* in the choice of the tax rate will result in smaller efficiency losses than 
comparable errors in the choice of the quota or cap Q*; with the reverse of a 
tradable quota favoured if the MAC is flatter than the MEC. 
In most cases, the MAC (and in many cases also the MEC) curve will shift over 
time — for example, with economic growth, technology, tastes, climate and so 
forth. Also, the MAC will be more elastic with a longer length of run as there are 
more opportunities for substitution in production and consumption of the 
pollution-intensive inputs and outputs. In many cases, the long run will be decades 
given the long lives of equipment and buildings, and also with the endogeneity of 
investments in R&D. 
Figure 2.4 shows an example of three different positions for the MAC function. 
Suppose that initially with MAC2 a tradable quota Q* or a tax rate of T* is chosen. 
Shifts in the MAC2 to MAC1 or MAC3 with a tradable permit result in stability of 
the emission at Q*, but with volatility of the permit price of P1, T* and P3. By 
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contrast, with a tax, shifts in the MAC result in price stability at T*, but with 
volatility of the emission levels of Q1, Q* and Q3. Which of these sets of volatility 
is least preferred will vary with circumstances, such as the relative shapes of the 
MAC and MEC curves already discussed, and on the relative effects of price 
volatility versus quantity volatility for the effectiveness of decision-making by 
households, businesses and governments. 
Figure 2.4 Price versus quantity intervention 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Economists, and others, often distinguish problems of imperfect knowledge 
between risk and uncertainty. Under risk, the different possible states can be 
specified, and there is general agreement about the probabilities for each state. With 
uncertainty, the possible states might not be known and there are diverse views on 
the probabilities of each state or, in the case of radical uncertainty, no probabilities 
can be attached. 
For the case of risk, we replace the deterministic procedures of the 
perfect-knowledge model discussed above with expected outcomes for different 
actions if risk neutrality is assumed, or with expected utility comparisons if risk 
aversion is a more reasonable objective in choosing between different forms and 
levels of policy intervention. 
Some cases of market failure with the allocation of the environment will not have 
sufficient information to form even a rough consensus probability distribution 
function with which to assess the effects of different policy interventions. Such 
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uncertainty does not, of itself, nullify the statements of potential efficiency losses in 
the choice of level of intervention or the relative properties of the different 
instruments discussed above. But the reality of uncertainty has often given support 
to a number of regulatory interventions over market-based instruments, to different 
objectives such as sustainability and the precautionary principle, and to the more 
explicit and formal recognition of the need for flexibility to respond to new 
information. 
There are different variants of the precautionary principle or option-value approach 
to government intervention in decisions affecting the environment under uncertainty 
(see, for example, Weier and Loke, 2007). One interpretation is that where there are 
actions with a reasonable likelihood of both large and irreversible damage, such 
actions should not be taken in the framework of a type of a lexicographic-objective 
function or of a maximin solution to a game-against-nature model of the decision 
problem. Regulations based on available scientific levels, on safeguards for 
biodiversity survival, on weak or strong sustainability, and on minimum health 
safeguards are examples of applications of the precautionary principle. Wills (2006) 
and others question why the action of ‘protect the environment’, rather than the 
action of ‘reduce the economic opportunity loss’, should necessarily be the worst or 
maximin state. 
Often, complementary policy action involves further research, information 
collection and analysis to improve understanding, and then the option to revise 
decisions in the future in the light of the extra information, and investment in 
capacity to increase the resilience of the system to cope with possible adverse 
outcomes. 
2.5 Conclusion 
A mixture of markets and of government intervention to correct for such market 
failures as public goods, common-property resources and externalities will be 
required to achieve an efficient allocation of the environment and for investment in 
its development. When government intervention is likely to improve upon market 
decisions, then in most cases market-based instruments such as taxes and tradable 
permits offer more cost-effective ways of changing allocations and investments, 
because they induce firms and households to reveal information not available to 
governments about their individual preferences and constraints. 
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3 Threats to effective environmental 
policy in Australia 
Drew Collins1 
BDA Group 
Abstract 
Recent decades have seen the accelerated use of market-based instruments for 
environmental management in Australia. Not all instruments, however, have 
been well directed, appropriately designed or effectively implemented, leading on 
occasion to limited environmental gains and high regulatory costs. In this paper 
the use of market-based instruments for environmental management in Australia 
is canvassed ahead of a discussion on the emergence of a ‘sustainable 
consumption’ ideology which is gaining prominence in policy circles to the 
detriment of effective reforms. 
3.1 Introduction 
Recent decades have seen accelerated reforms in environmental policy, associated 
with increased resource scarcity, increased pressures on the environment and 
heightened community demands for environmental services and amenity. 
In many instances, policy reforms have benefited from the establishment of clear 
environmental goals, articulation of policy targets and increasing use of market-
based instruments (MBIs) to drive down environmental compliance costs and 
ensure that those who can benefit the most from access to resources are able to do 
so. On this latter point, Australia is a world leader in the development of resource 
and environmental markets such as in fisheries, water, water pollution such as 
nutrients and salinity, and with promising developments in relation to native 
vegetation and biodiversity. 
                                                 
1 Managing Director, BDA Group, PO Box 4022 Manuka ACT 2603, Email: drewcollins@ 
 netspeed.com.au Ph: 02 – 6282 1443.  
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But not all environmental policy reforms have been well directed, appropriately 
designed or effectively implemented. Notably, and as discussed in this paper, some 
MBIs have been poorly applied, and a raft of policies emerging under the banner of 
sustainable consumption are likely to have dubious benefits. These issues are 
discussed following a brief overview of developments across several environmental 
media, particularly water and solid waste management. 
3.2 Overview of MBIs for environmental regulation in  
  Australia 
Excluding greenhouse gases, air and water pollution control over recent decades 
have seen significant improvements in controlling point-source emissions, but the 
application of MBIs has been constrained in some States where regulated activities 
do not have mass- or load-based discharge limits. 
Pollution discharge fees have been introduced in many States, but are typically 
based only on cost-recovery of licence administration rather than environmental 
damage costs (as per a Pigovian tax). Some notable emission trading schemes have 
been established and there have been a number of investigations into more 
widespread water quality trading under the Australian Government’s Coastal 
Catchments Initiative. The more widespread use of these tools, however, is 
frustrated by the dominance of diffuse source emissions with associated 
measurement, enforcement and political difficulties. 
Climate change policy has seen the introduction of a raft of energy efficiency 
incentive programs as well as trading instruments, including the Mandatory 
Renewable Energy Target scheme (MRET) and the NSW Greenhouse Gas 
Reduction Scheme (GGRS). 
Most have been applied at the State level, but, as identified in the Parer Review 
(COAG 2002), State policies have generally been poorly targeted and 
uncoordinated; they compete with each other and create uncertainty. As a result, it 
is likely that cheaper abatement options exist but are not being taken up. 
Encouragingly, the current policy debate is focusing on a broadly-applied emissions 
trading scheme, but its central rationale — to maximise compliance flexibility so as 
to drive down costs — may be compromised by the multiplicity of policy 
instruments, ‘special case’ exemptions and the desire of governments to ‘pick 
winners’ under the guise of complementary programs. 
To this end, Garnaut (Commonwealth of Australia 2008) has warned that the role of 
complementary measures is to lower the cost of meeting emissions reduction 
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trajectories by correcting for market failures, such as in relation to R&D. Once an 
emissions trading scheme is in place, however, forcing adoption of some measures 
(such as via the MRET scheme) may displace other low-cost opportunities, 
increasing the overall cost of climate change responses. 
In the area of conserving native vegetation and biodiversity, regulatory limits on 
clearing have been established in most jurisdictions, although enforcement is at best 
mixed. The longer-term costs of these restrictions will depend upon available 
adjustment mechanisms to facilitate high value developments and the rehabilitation 
and expansion of high-value ecosystems. And MBIs are playing leading roles in 
providing these adjustment mechanisms, with offset schemes such as the NSW 
BioBanking and Victorian BushBroker schemes facilitating new development while 
‘new generation’ conservation tenders are, relative to old-style grants programs and 
input-based incentives (such as for fencing), providing performance-based, cost-
effective mechanisms for increasing conservation on private land. For all these 
adjustment mechanisms, sound metrics, performance auditing and enforcement will 
be critical. 
Water market reforms over recent decades have been substantial. Rural water 
markets in particular have significantly matured with the introduction of diversion 
caps, the unbundling of entitlements, inter-state trade, and so on, which have 
increased the efficiency of rural water use. 
More recently, the reform agenda has shifted to reducing the environmental impacts 
associated with water use and trade. Barriers to trade, however, such as exit fees and 
quotas, are impeding further economic and environmental gains, largely due to fears 
for the loss of irrigated production and flow-on impacts for attendant communities. 
But as noted by Watson (2008), ‘an implication of public interest in the 
environmental consequences of water use is that contraction of irrigation not just 
adjustment is the order of the day’. 
Watson and others have also noted that the costs of environmental water secured 
through ‘savings’ achieved by investment in infrastructure have generally exceeded 
the value of the water (as discussed further below), and many claimed savings are 
illusory when reductions in groundwater recharge and return flows are accounted 
for. 
But with the dire state of the River Murray, particularly the Lower Lakes, water 
buybacks have now taken centre stage. Following a successful pilot buyback of 20 
GL of water by the MDBC in 2007, the Australian Government purchased 35 GL 
on the lower-connected Murray in early 2008, has purchased Toorale Station on the 
Darling River with its 14 GL water licence, and in September is initiating a second 
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round of buybacks focussing on the Queensland and northern New South Wales 
areas of the Basin. 
While this market approach has considerable merit, its success will ultimately be 
judged on the environmental improvements it can deliver. In this regard, 
governments appear to be chasing water without clear implementation plans. That 
is, for many environmental sites where water is sought, such as some of the ‘Living 
Murray’ icon sites, there is a mismatch between water availability under the 
irrigation licences being purchased and the environmental watering demands of the 
sites (such as the need to top up medium-size flood events to deliver water ‘over 
bank’ to riparian forests and wetlands). 
For example, BDA Group (2006) noted that much of the water needed under the 
Living Murray First Step will be to meet irregular environmental watering demands 
both in frequency and size. As much of the water already recovered is of high 
reliability (notwithstanding climate change implications), the temporal profile of the 
outstanding water required is even more exaggerated (see figure 3.1). 
Figure 3.1 Stylised overview of water recovered and needed under the 
Living Murray Initiative 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Some of these problems will be overcome through a complementary works program 
that will improve the effectiveness of delivering environmental water. 
Otherwise there is a view that environmental water can be traded on water markets 
to rebalance holdings, perhaps through the use of derivative type instruments such 
as options contracts. As environmental water is, however, often needed 
opportunistically, early in irrigation seasons when announced allocations and trade 
  
 
 THREATS TO 
ENVIRONMENTAL 
POLICY  
33
 
volumes are low, trading on ‘spot’ markets will pose difficulties. In the case of 
options, difficulties in defining triggers that establish whether the environment or 
irrigator gets the water will be the problem. This is because environmental water 
demands are not necessarily well correlated with metrics around which irrigators 
would be confident to develop risk strategies — such as announced allocation, 
rainfall or dam storage levels.2 Ultimately, more fundamental property right reforms 
may be needed to ensure a robust sharing of water between the environment and 
consumers. 
In the case of urban water security, reforms are clouded by the relatively high 
capacity of households to pay, a lack of competition in supply and constraints on 
urban rural water trade. Collectively, these are resulting in unduly high budget and 
opportunity costs. As Watson (2008) notes, ‘recycling, desalination and rainwater 
tanks are put forward as universal solutions to urban water shortages in Australian 
capital cities when their application is manifestly location-specific’. 
The commissioning of a desalination plant for Sydney essentially as a drought 
reserve is contrary to the economics of the option, which to be competitive would 
be as a base load supplier rather than a drought reserve with expensive mothballing 
in between. The preference of the ACT Government for an enlarged dam, and large-
scale sewage recycling, to augment drinking water supplies ahead of purchasing 
cheaper and perhaps more secure water from irrigators sourced from the Tantangara 
Dam — given the extent of storage and ability to carry water between years —
provides another example. 
Related to this, and as saliently put by the Productivity Commission (2008), ‘there 
is effectively no market for water in Australia’s cities. The charging regimes of 
monopoly utilities reflect production costs, but not the scarcity value of water. 
Instead, restrictions are placed on particular water uses and these impose substantial 
hidden costs on many households’. 
With regard to solid waste management, policy in Australia is seemingly not 
premised on standard public policy intervention criteria of market failure and a net 
benefit test. This even appears the case where MBIs are used. A pertinent example 
here is a recent increase in the NSW landfill levy. 
In 2005, the NSW Government announced an increase in the waste disposal levy, 
almost trebling the levy in the metropolitan region, with no mention of its 
addressing landfill externality impacts (New South Wales Government 2005). 
Rather, the rationale was to raise revenue to fund environmental water buybacks, 
with any reductions in waste disposal to landfill viewed as a secondary benefit, as 
                                                 
2 See Scoccimarro and Collins 2006 for an empirical analysis of this issue. 
  
 
34 PROMOTING BETTER 
ENVIRONMENTAL 
OUTCOMES 
 
 
increased waste recycling was argued to provide ‘upstream’ resource conservation 
benefits. 
The Productivity Commission (2006) in its Waste Inquiry has already commented 
on the tenuous arguments that such upstream benefits may be significant and that 
they can be realised through policies such as a landfill levy employed late in supply 
chains. What has received little attention is whether such levies are sound policy 
instruments for revenue raising, given potential regulatory burdens. BDA Group 
(2004) argues: 
The use of charges or levies as fiscal instruments to raise revenue has received little 
attention in the economics literature directed at waste policy. This is because such 
instruments do not have an economic basis — they are not designed to promote 
behavioural change and ‘internalise externalities’. Indeed, taxation theory suggests that 
an efficient fiscal tax is one where behavioural changes are minimised, as this will 
impose less economic costs on the economy and ensure that the revenue base is not 
undermined. 
When using charges or levies on waste management practices to raise revenue for 
waste programs, the key economic question for government is whether or not 
established State fiscal instruments would be more efficient in raising revenue. (p. 73) 
The Business Roundtable on Sustainable Development (2006a) estimated that the 
total net economic costs imposed on the NSW community from the proposed levy 
increase are some $260 million in present value terms. This excludes the 
environmental costs associated with increases in illegal dumping and/or the costs of 
an enhanced anti-dumping enforcement program. 
3.3 Emergence of a ‘sustainable consumption’ ideology 
The emergence of a ‘sustainable consumption’ ideology appears to conflict with 
economic efficiency principles that have hitherto guided the rationale for and nature 
of government interventions. This is examined in this section of the paper, which 
draws on the work of Bennett and Collins (2008). 
The concept of sustainable development is widely recognised as an important goal 
of public policy and, to this end, many State and Federal statutes require 
sustainability principles to be incorporated into policy processes and administration. 
Sustainability has largely been interpreted as a capital3 stock issue where the 
challenge is to identify the optimal temporal path of using capital resources. But 
application is difficult at an operational policy level due to an inability to measure 
                                                 
3 Where capital can be natural, human or built. 
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capital stocks and rates of use, let alone to determine the use of the resources that 
will maximise resource-use efficiency within as well as between generations. 
In the light of prevailing views across some of the citizenry, therefore, that we are 
currently consuming ‘too much’, governments have adopted a pragmatic policy 
focus to reduce pressures on the resource base — so that we are at least moving 
toward more sustainable resource-use patterns, albeit towards an ill-defined goal. 
That is, sustainability policies have emphasised ‘doing more with less’. 
Governments have looked to apply this dogma across supply chains, with a long 
policy history of promoting technical efficiency in input use at the production stage 
and maximising resource recovery at the waste disposal stage. 
Promoting technical efficiencies 
Incentives for technical efficiencies (e.g., in water and energy) are being provided 
along supply chains, without due consideration of the relative efficiency of 
incentives and the extent to which they will be passed along supply chains. 
For example, urban water efficiency incentives are often narrowly applied with 
seemingly no relationship to resource values. Incentives selected from initiatives of 
the Australian and Victorian Governments demonstrate the range of cost-
effectiveness. The Australian Government’s Community Water Grants Program 
Round 1 projects averaged $3,297/ML, while Round 2 projects have averaged  
$6,170/ML. The cost-effectiveness of recent Victorian urban water efficiency 
initiatives ranges from $770/ML saved under the AAA shower head rebate, $9,069 
under the rainwater tank rebate, $23,061 under the high pressure rebate) to $33,395 
under the AAA dishwasher rebate.4 
Rural water savings have also come at greatly varying cost, and generally at a cost 
in excess of the market value of the water. For example, the cost of infrastructure 
projects under the Living Murray initiative has generally been around $3,000/ML 
and up to $5,000/ML, much higher than the purchase price of water entitlements 
under the MDBC 2007 Pilot Environmental Water Purchase Project, which was 
conducted in a period of low-water availability and higher entitlement prices 
(MDBC 2008). 
Similar experiences can be found with Australian Government initiatives. For 
example, included in their Water Smart Australia Program is the Wimmera–Mallee 
pipeline project at a cost of $4,864/ML and the Bendigo Bounty regional 
                                                 
4 Derived from Victorian Government 2004. 
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reclaimed-water project at a cost of $7,209/ML recovered. By comparison, water 
purchases have been much cheaper. Under Water for the Future the Australian 
Government has committed $3.1 billion to purchase water in the Murray–Darling 
Basin over 10 years. A public tender in the first half of 2008 yielded 35 GL of 
water, with the price of high-security water purchased averaging $2,124/ML and 
general security water averaging $1,131/ML.5 
Of perhaps greater concern is that technical production efficiencies are now being 
widely promoted through, at best, poorly-constructed partial productivity measures 
such as the ‘carbon footprint’, ‘food miles’, ‘virtual water’ (the volume of fresh 
water used to produce a product, including the sum of water use in the various steps 
of the production chain), and so on. These measures are being paraded in an 
evangelical manner to the community, using up the available goodwill and financial 
wherewithal that might otherwise be used to tackle genuine reforms. At least the 
previous generation of partial productivity measures — such as gross margin/ML 
which was wrongly used to vilify the rice industry — had some technical rigour. 
Maximising resource recovery 
The driving mantra of waste policy in Australia has been the ‘waste hierarchy’ 
which decrees that waste avoidance is preferable to reuse, which in turn is 
preferable to recycling, which is preferable to disposal. The hierarchy is premised 
on maximising material recovery without any regard to the societal costs of doing 
so, with its inevitable end-point of ‘zero waste’, which has been adopted as a policy 
target in several jurisdictions. 
The failure of the Productivity Commission’s Waste Inquiry (2006) findings to have 
any impact on the ‘religion’ of waste policy is rooted in the ‘sustainable 
consumption ideology’ that has gained prominence in the community. 
Its genesis is noted by the Business Roundtable on Sustainable Development 
(2006b): 
In the 1980s the creation of waste became regarded as ‘wasteful’ and a poor reflection 
on a consumption-driven society. Reducing waste disposal through recycling became a 
driving force across many communities in developed economies. Reducing waste was 
heralded as a further step in the move to sustainable economies. 
Communities were keen to embrace broader sustainability practices, and waste 
reduction was seen as a material way this could be done at an individual and household 
level with opportunities for everyone to contribute. The mantra ‘think global, act local’ 
had real relevance for the community when it came to waste and the environment. 
                                                 
5 www.environment.gov.au/water/mdb/entitlement-purchasing/overview.html (accessed 24/7/08). 
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Such community aspirations encouraged governments to broaden the rationale behind 
waste policy goals, beyond disposal externalities to include upstream life-cycle impacts 
associated with waste materials. (p. 3) 
Some governments are now questioning this policy rationale, as they face 
significantly increasing costs to realise ever-increasing levels of waste ‘recovery’. 
But governments which have promoted the concept of a ‘waste crisis’ and the 
benefits of recycling to the community now find they are captured by community 
demands for further waste reduction initiatives. Accordingly, sensible waste policy 
will continue to be elusive until more informed notions of sustainability are 
accepted by the broader community. And such cultural change must start with 
government. 
Sustainable consumption in a robust policy process 
From the perspective of a policy commentator, the critique of sustainable 
consumption policies will continue to be frustrated by the failure of governments to 
establish operational inter-generational equity goals, beyond the generalisations of 
the Brundtland Commission and other writers. 
That is, where sustainability policies are to go beyond correcting market failures 
that are impeding the economically efficient use of resources, and seek to promote 
inter-generational equity goals, effective policy requires those goals to be clearly 
articulated. Such explicit determinations of inter-generational equity trade-offs 
would appear well beyond the sophistication of the current sustainability debate. 
Therefore, these trade-offs should continue to be implicitly made on a case-by-case 
basis through an informed political process, rather than pursuing the nebulous 
notion of sustainable consumption. As noted by Bennett and Collins (in press):  
For governments to identify a specific consumption pattern that would align with an 
efficiency/equity optimal use of resources poses the same informational challenges as 
faced by the market. It requires knowledge of the full range of production possibilities 
across the economy, their technical conversion efficiency, knowledge of the nature, 
extent and location of production externalities ranging from environmental to public 
health to social amenity and so on. It necessitates similar knowledge in relation to 
transport, storage and distribution possibilities. Moreover it requires knowledge of 
consumer wants and relative preferences, the values they place on convenience, 
hygiene, fashion, etc., as well as knowledge of waste management, recycling and 
disposal opportunities. 
Given the information deficiencies and asymmetries that governments face in trying to 
determine a desirable consumption pattern for even a single commodity — given 
production and consumption substitution effects — a policy approach directed at 
identifying and promoting ‘preferred’ consumption patterns would appear doomed. 
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And even if it were possible, given the dynamic drivers behind resource conditions, 
production efficiencies and consumer demands, any identified consumption pattern 
would be but a snapshot in time. This would be as useful in setting resources policy as 
a single stock market index number would be to guide industry policy. 
So while observed consumption levels may be useful from an environmental reporting 
sense, indicating (possible) shifts in pressures on the resource base, they provide 
limited value to policy makers and should not be allowed to cloud sustainability policy. 
Meaningful sustainability policy must relate back to the underlying resource base, 
regardless of where in supply chains policy interventions are judged to be effective and 
efficient. That is, in some instances sustainability objectives may be best promoted 
through policies at the consumption stage of supply chains, but seeking to promote a 
specific consumption outcome in its own right is not only misguided, but may lead to 
perverse sustainability outcomes! 
Accordingly, policy principles that relate to sustainability in its broader sense of 
fostering the optimal use and allocation of resources are preferable to those based on a 
notion of fostering sustainable consumption per se.  
3.4 Concluding comment 
MBIs are being widely employed to promote environmental policy goals. They will 
only deliver cost-effective gains, however, when they are appropriately directed, 
designed and implemented. Narrowly-based incentives, particularly those directed 
at influencing specific consumption choices rather than underlying resource-
management problems, will rarely be the best policy intervention. 
Accordingly, environmental policies should not be based on narrow and simplistic 
premises such as ‘doing more with less’. Indeed, community goodwill is often being 
squandered on government promoted tokenism — change a few light bulbs, 
separate your recyclables, get a new showerhead — rather than garnering support 
for more fundamental reforms. 
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4 Letting markets work for the 
environment 
Arlene Buchan 
Australian Conservation Foundation 
Abstract 
Rivers, wetlands and floodplains are valuable ‘natural capital’ in Australia. They 
provide habitat for native flora and fauna, and their integrity underpins the 
quantity and quality of water available for drinking, and for supporting irrigated 
and dryland agriculture and other economically important industries including 
tourism and fishing. Overuse of water for irrigation undermines the long-term 
prospects of all these activities and water must be reallocated to the 
environment, especially in the context of climate change-induced shifts in rainfall 
and runoff patterns. Although planning is the primary tool for water allocation as 
set out in the National Water Initiative, and generating water savings through 
infrastructure investment is the preferred approach by governments, 
market-based instruments (MBIs) should be the most efficient and effective 
mechanism for achieving optimum water-sharing arrangements in the severely-
stressed Murray–Darling Basin. This paper explores the role of MBIs and 
administrative mechanisms for environmental water recovery, some institutional 
and regulatory impediments to water reallocation, and how these need to change 
so that markets work for the environment. 
4.1 Water — the lifeblood of a dry continent 
Rivers, wetlands and floodplains are valuable ‘natural capital’ in Australia. They 
host a diverse profusion of natural, cultural and economic values. In the Murray–
Darling Basin, they have evolved to be perfectly adapted to the ‘droughts and 
flooding rains’ that characterise much of southern Australia. Wetlands like Hattah 
Lakes on the Murray River provide refuges for native plants and animals during 
droughts when rivers can run dry. When rains return, plants and animals recolonise 
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the river channel and spill out onto the floodplain in a frenzy of biological 
productivity that continues until the cycle enters another dry spell. 
The rivers of the Murray–Darling Basin provided such an abundance of food and 
fibre that it supported one of Australia’s largest Aboriginal populations prior to 
European colonisation,1 and they underpinned an agricultural revolution as they 
were dammed, diverted, regulated and used to capture, store and provide water upon 
demand for irrigated agriculture. Seventy per cent of Australia’s irrigated 
agriculture takes place in the Basin, contributing greatly to the 40 per cent of 
Australia’s total agricultural output that originates there — an extraordinary feat, 
considering that the Basin receives only 6 per cent of Australia’s rainfall.2 The 
Basin supports an enormous amount of economic activity that depends directly on a 
healthy environment, including tourism, real estate and commercial and recreational 
fishing.3  
4.2 Decline of our natural capital 
Despite the importance of this natural capital, a legacy of poor decision-making has 
resulted in the waters of the Murray–Darling Basin becoming grossly overused, and 
the system is collapsing. Native fish, birds and trees, and indeed whole ecosystems, 
are in decline. Water quality is under threat from salinity and blue-green algal 
outbreaks, affecting its utility for irrigation and drinking water. Many wetlands and 
floodplains along the Murray have not seen water for more than a decade and are 
literally dying for a drink. 
Today, the average flow at the mouth of the River Murray is less that 25 per cent 
what it was before regulation4 and flow ceases 40 per cent of the time compared 
with 1 per cent of the time, pre-development.5 As the impacts of overuse are 
progressively compounded by the ongoing drought, Lakes Alexandrina and Albert 
and the Coorong wetland at the end of the Murray–Darling system may 
permanently lose the values for which they are internationally significant, and South 
                                                 
1 See chapter 2 in Sinclair, P. 2001, The Murray: A River and its People, Melbourne University 
Press. 
2 See Murray Darling Basin Commission at: http://www.mdbc.gov.au/about/basin_statistics  
3 ibid.  
4 Murray Darling Basin Commission 1995–2004, Water Audit Monitoring Reports,: 
http://www.mdbc.gov.au/naturalresources/the_cap/the_WAM_report.htm 
5 CSIRO (Commonwealth Scientivic and Industrial Research Organisation) 2008, Water 
Availability in the Murray, Murray-Darling Basin Sustainable Yields Project, Australian 
Government Water Fund, July, http://www.csiro.au/files/files/plos.pdf  
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Australians may be left dealing with the legacy of a toxic waste dump cause by 
acidification.6,7 
It is abundantly clear how we got into this situation and that the situation will only 
get worse as the impacts of climate change start to bite.8 In its most basic form it is 
also clear what needs to be done to fix the problem — reallocate a substantial 
amount of water back to the environment from irrigation. It is in the discussion 
around how much water should be reallocated, where it should come from, how 
quickly the reallocation should happen, and which policy tools should be used for 
reallocation that the pathway to a healthy Murray–Darling Basin and ecologically 
sustainable irrigation industries becomes less than clear. 
4.3 What the Basin needs 
A scientific study in 2003 concluded that returning 1500 GL (about three times the 
volume of water in Sydney Harbour) to the River Murray, combined with 
infrastructural and operational improvements, would give the river a ‘moderate’ 
chance of becoming a healthy working river.9 
In 2006, record low inflows to major water storages in the southern part of the 
Basin prompted the then Prime Minister, John Howard, to commission the CSIRO 
to undertake a ‘sustainable yields’ study. This study was to estimate the current and 
likely future (up to 2030) water availability in each catchment and aquifer across the 
entire Murray–Darling Basin, under best, worst and most likely climate-change 
scenarios and other activities that might reduce inflows, such as plantation forestry, 
farm-dams and groundwater extraction.10 Given that the most likely climate-change 
scenarios will see inflows reduce by 8–14 per cent and the worst-case scenario will 
see inflows halve, it is clear that a huge change in water use across the Basin is 
required. 
                                                 
6 South Australia Murray-Darling Basin Natural Resource Management Board 2008, Lakes 
Alexandrina and Albert Ecological Condition Progress Repor, April. 
7 Muller, K. 2008, A Blueprint for the Survival of the Lakes and Coorong Ecosystem, Indigenous 
Peoples and Farming Communities. Appended to: http://www.acfonline.org.au 
/default.asp?section_id=62  
8 Various CSIRO Sustainable Yields Project Reports at: http://www.csiro.au/partnerships/ 
MDBSY.html  
9 Ecological Assessment of Environmental Flow Reference Points for the River Murray System 
Interim Report prepared by the Scientific Reference Panel for the Murray-Darling Basin 
Commission, Living Murray Initiative, October 2003, http://www.thelivingmurray.mdbc.gov. 
au/reports/srp_reports  
10 See: http://www.csiro.au/partnerships/MDBSY.html  
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4.4 The National Water Initiative — Australia’s national 
blueprint for water reform 
The story of the Murray–Darling Basin is repeated across Australia: many of our 
rivers and aquifers show a marked ecological decline, driven by water overuse and 
exacerbated by drought. Governments first acknowledged that the problem required 
a national approach in the early 1990s and embarked on a pathway of reform 
through the Council of Australian Governments (COAG). This program of reform 
was expanded, refreshed and propelled up the national agenda in 2004 with the 
introduction of the National Water Initiative (NWI), a blueprint for water reform, 
signed by the Federal Government and all State and Territory governments.11 
Despite widespread support from stakeholders, the NWI failed to drive change at 
the scale and pace required, as exemplified by the initial failure of the subsidiary 
‘Living Murray’ program, an intergovernmental agreement involving the Federal 
Government and the governments of NSW, Victoria, South Australia and the ACT 
in agreeing to invest $500 million12 over five years to recover 500 GL of water for 
the environment.13 A focus on investing money in water infrastructure and on-farm 
efficiencies that would reduce seepage or evaporation and provide ‘water savings’ 
that would be returned to the environment resulted in very slow progress in water 
recovery — such projects have long lead-times and even when all cost-efficient 
opportunities are exhausted they will be able to secure no more than three fifths of 
the target 500 GL. 
This precipitated another historic landmark in water reform on Australia Day in 
2007, when Prime Minister Howard announced a $10 billion, 10-year ‘National 
Plan for Water Security’ (NPWS) intended to enhance and reaffirm the NWI and to 
provide adequate funding to drive it. The essential elements of that plan survived 
the change in Federal Government later that year and became further enhanced in 
the $12.9 billion ‘Water for the Future’ plan.14 This comprises a $3.1 billion 
‘Restoring the Balance’ program to purchase water entitlements from willing 
sellers,15 from which an initial $50 million was quickly spent in recovering 35 GL 
                                                 
11 See the full text of the Intergovernmental Agreement on a National Water Initiative and related 
resources at: http://www.nwc.gov.au/nwi/index.cfm  
12 Now $700 million after a further commitment by the Federal Government in the 2006 Budget.  
13 The ‘First Step’ of the Living Murray Initiative (LMI): More details see: http://www.theliving 
murray.mdbc.gov.au/home 
14 See: http://www.environment.gov.au/water/index.html  
15 Wong, P. (Minister for Climate Change and Water) 2008, Water for the Future, Speech to the 
4th Annual Australian Water Summit, Sydney Convention and Exhibition Centre, 29–30 April, 
http://www.environment.gov.au/minister/wong/ 2008/pubs/sp20080429.pdf  
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of water for the environment in early 2008,16 and a $5.8 billion ‘Sustainable Rural 
Water Use and Infrastructure Program’ to be spent in improving the efficiency and 
productivity of water use and management.17 
It also promises an independent Murray–Darling Basin Authority which will 
develop a ‘Basin Plan’ characterised by scientifically-credible, 
ecologically-sustainable diversion limits on water use combined with environmental 
watering plans, designed to secure the long-term needs of river and wetland assets 
and system-wide biological processes. 
Finally, it looks as if all the essential elements are in place to efficiently and 
effectively implement the NWI and most importantly to reallocate water to the 
environment and put the Basin onto a sustainable footing, at least as far as water 
extraction levels are concerned. 
4.5 Markets to the rescue? 
The NWI (Section 23) seeks to achieve a ‘nationally compatible, market, regulatory 
and planning based system’ for water management. In terms of planning tools for 
water allocation, however, the NWI essentially allows existing, State-based 
water-sharing arrangements to continue until their expiration dates, which for most 
of NSW is 2014 and for some Victorian rivers is 2019! A multitude of regulatory 
mechanisms exist relating to water extraction and use but none is directed squarely 
at addressing overuse and reallocating water from irrigation to the environment. 
This is unlikely to change, given the prevailing mood amongst governments and 
industry that regulation is not the preferred tool for achieving environmental or 
sustainability outcomes. That leaves the market as the key tool for water 
reallocation, consistent with the development of private property rights as enshrined 
in the NWI. 
Section 79(ii) of the NWI is very clear that acceptable mechanisms for recovering 
environmental water include ‘the purchase of water on the market, by tender or 
other market-based mechanisms’.18 This clause has generated a flurry of research, 
modelling and advice from government and non-government bodies, including the 
Productivity Commission,19 ABARE,20 the Business Council of Australia21 and 
                                                 
16 See: http://www.environment.gov.au/water/mdb/entitlement-purchasing/index.html  
17 Water Under Pressure. Australia’s Man Made Water Scarcity and How to Fix It. See: 
http://www.bca.com.au/Content.aspx?ContentID=100665  
18 See: http://www.csiro.au/partnerships/MDBSY.html  
19 Rural Water Use and the Environment: The Role of Market Mechanisms at: http://www.pc.gov. 
au/study/waterstudy/finalreport/index.html  
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Land and Water Australia,22 all of which concluded that MBIs are the most 
efficient and cost-effective way to recover water for the environment. 
Using the market to recover environmental water is fair to farmers, who are free to 
choose whether or not they wish to sell their water or enter into agreements to share 
water with the environment. They can sell their water during hard times to get out 
of debt, they can use the money to invest in more efficient irrigation technology or 
switch to dry land farming, or they can leave the land if that is what they want to do. 
4.6 Market-Based Instruments (MBIs) that are suited to 
water recovery 
MBIs that could be used for water recovery are many and varied. Some relate to the 
purchase of rights on a permanent basis (entitlements) or a temporary basis (annual 
allocations). The purchase of entitlements will be a key tool in redressing the 
balance of grossly over-allocated systems and providing base flow for rivers, but it 
may also be kept in storages and accumulated to provide ecologically-useful 
volumes. Buying annual allocations may provide opportunities to ‘top up’ available 
water on a case-by-case basis, but since the environment tends to need water quite 
early during the irrigation season, when allocations are low, the temporary market 
may be less useful and more expensive than might first appear.23 
Opportunities also exist to develop markets in partial rights such as options and 
derivatives, as well as attenuated licences that could provide water for the 
environment when it needs it most, usually in wet years, while leaving legal title 
and an agreed share of the water with irrigators.24,25 The development of options, 
derivatives and attenuated licences allows environmental managers to manage risks 
better, given that environmental water demand is highly variable and peaky.26  
                                                                                                                                                    
20 Various papers at: http://www.abareconomics.com/publications_html/landwater/landwater_06/ 
landwater_06.html  
21 Water Under Pressure. Australia’s Man Made Water Scarcity and How to Fix It. See: 
http://www.bca.com.au/Content.aspx?ContentID=100665  
22 See Collins and Scoccimarro 2006 at: http://products.lwa.gov.au/files/ER061225.pdf  
23 ibid.  
24 Analysis of a range of possible MBIs for water recovery at: http://www.acfonline.org.au/ 
uploads/res_market.pdf  
25 See: http://www.nwc.gov.au/agwf/wsa/docs/File/Murrumbidgee_River_Reach_A4_Final_1209 
07.pdf  
26 See Collins and Scoccimarro 2006 op.cit.  
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The variability of environmental water demand in terms of the magnitude, 
seasonality, frequency and duration of flood events and the different characteristics 
of existing and novel water products all point toward the need to secure a portfolio 
of water products tailored regionally to meet the water demands of environmental 
assets including discreet assets (including wetlands, floodplains, critical habitat 
areas) and system-wide processes (for example carbon and nitrogen flux throughout 
the system).27 
As well as a range of MBIs, there is a range of administrative methods that can be 
used to implement them which themselves affect some of the pros and cons for 
different sectoral interests. For example, voluntary purchase of permanent 
entitlements can happen in a number of ways: by the environmental manager 
standing in the open market; by the environmental manager making a public offer to 
buy a particular type of water product at a particular price; or by competitive tender 
or auction, where entitlement holders compete with each other to supply water to 
the environment. Environmental managers competing in an open market to buy 
water entitlements may have quite a different effect on water prices than entitlement 
holders competing with each other to sell water to the environment. As a result, 
careful consideration should be given to the choice of administrative method, as 
well as the choice of MBI used for water recovery.28  
Further, some non-market factors have a significant effect on the capacity to 
achieve environmental outcomes with a particular environmental water allocation. 
For example, the ability to carry over environmental water allocations in dams and 
let it accumulate until it reaches ecologically useful volumes of water must be 
considered as part of any environmental water recovery and management package. 
Studies have shown that, compared to a situation without carry-over, the ability to 
carry-over water up to a limit of 4.5 times the volume of entitlement held reduced 
by 70 per cent the amount of water needed to meet environmental demands 80 per 
cent of the time.29 
The best triple bottom-line outcomes will probably result from using a mixture of 
different market and non-market mechanisms for water recovery and 
management — principally investment in infrastructure improvement which 
generates water efficiency savings — put together as a package which reflects local 
environmental and socio-economic circumstances. Nevertheless, the market is the 
best way to address the core problem of over-allocated water entitlements. This 
                                                 
27 Analysis of a range of possible MBIs for water recovery at: http://www.acfonline.org.au/ 
uploads/res_market.pdf 
28 ibid. 
29 See Collins and Scoccimarro 2006 op.cit. 
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view appeared to be the wholehearted approach of the current ‘Water for the Future’ 
plan, given the aforementioned $3.1 billion designated for ‘purchasing water to put 
back in the rivers’.30 But there remains a catch. 
4.7 Impediments to market efficiency 
Section 60(iv)(b) of the NWI commits the parties to the agreement to ‘the 
immediate removal of barriers to permanent trade out of water irrigation areas up to 
an annual threshold limit of 4 per cent subject to review at a later date’.31 This is 
clearly a barrier to trade and likely to be a substantial impediment to the Federal 
Government’s ability to roll out its water purchase program, $1.2 billion of which is 
scheduled to be spent over the next four budget years. 
In 2007, the Murray–Darling Basin Commission’s ‘Pilot Environmental Water 
Purchase’ project had to delay finalising some water purchase contracts until the 
following year because it came up against the 4 per cent barrier. Last year, trading 
limits were reached in Victoria after just four months. This year, in the 
Goulburn-Murray Water irrigation district, the closing date for submitting 
expressions of interest in selling water was 4 July — four days after the start of the 
new water year. The outcome of the ballot will be known in mid-August, and it is 
likely that the 4 per cent cap will be reached in at least some districts at that time. At 
the time of writing the 4 per cent cap has already been reached in some districts 
including the Campaspe (Victoria) and the Loxton Irrigation Trust and Lyrup 
Irrigation Trust areas (South Australia). 
This is bad for the environment, and retards the pace of water reallocation because it 
limits the amount of water that can be bought in these areas and constrains the 
ability of the Australian Government to roll out its water purchase program. It is 
also bad for irrigators, because it constrains the ability of willing sellers and willing 
buyers to do business with each other in a way that promotes adjustment to 
prevailing drought conditions. This means that struggling irrigators — with large 
debts, facing another year of low or zero water allocations and a high degree of 
uncertainty, who might decide that it’s time for them to retire — will be unable to 
sell to irrigators who want to do everything they can to maintain their permanent 
plantings and improve their prospects in the future. As leading natural resource 
management economist, Dr Steve Beare, said recently in The Australian, ‘with all 
our championing of free trade at Doha, our international trading partners might 
                                                 
30 Water Under Pressure. Australia’s Man Made Water Scarcity and How to Fix It, op.cit. 
31 See: http://www.csiro.au/partnerships/MDBSY.html  
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wonder why we impose trading quotas on water with no more justification than 
privileging some local economic interests over others’.32 
Incredibly, the heads of government threw away the opportunity to redress this 
impediment to policy implementation at the COAG meeting on 3 July 2008, when 
Victoria championed the vested interests of the Victorian Farmers Federation and 
held the other governments to the 4 per cent cap. The heads of government stated 
nothing more than an ‘ambition to increase the cap from 4 per cent to 6 per cent by 
the end of 2009’.33 
It is hard to imagine why the Australian Competition and Consumer Commission 
(ACCC) made no comment whatsoever on the impact of the 4 per cent cap in their 
Position Paper, ‘Water Market Rules’, commenting only that ‘the water market 
rules should accommodate the outcomes of this agreement’34, in a discussion that 
otherwise promotes the removal of other barriers to trade. Acknowledging that the 
COAG agreement will stand is one thing, but failing to discuss the impacts of such 
an agreement objectively is another. 
The only justification for trade restrictions is where it is necessary to avoid market 
failure, such as environmental damage caused, for example, by erosion due to 
excessive, unseasonal water transfer downstream.35 
If vested interests continue to pressure governments to put barriers in the way of 
reform and constrain the use of the water market and exchanges between willing 
buyers and willing sellers, governments will eventually need to start looking at 
other options to fix the problem, including the unpopular option of compulsory 
acquisition. 
4.8 Where to from here? 
An excellent opportunity for governments, in particular the Australian Government, 
to deliver immediate and ongoing outcomes for the environment unconstrained by 
the 4 per cent rule, comes from specifically targeting water held by irrigators that lie 
outside defined irrigation areas. This would include large parts of the Darling Basin 
and could include giant water holders like Cubbie Station and strategically 
important land and water holdings which would deliver large amounts of water to 
                                                 
32 Opinion Piece ‘Buy Back Water to Let The River Run’, The Australian, 14 July 2008, p. 8.  
33 See: http://www.coag.gov.au/meetings/030708.index.htm  
34 See: http://www.accc.gov.au/content/index/phtml/itemId/834697/fromItemId/3737  
35 See: http://www.acfonile.org.au/uploads/res/ACF_Submission_to_ACCC_09_05_08.pdf  
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the environment if it were no longer captured and used for irrigation.36 Even within 
defined irrigation areas, if entire properties are purchased along with their water 
entitlements so that the entitlement remains in the water district, the 4 per cent cap 
is not breached. This option should be pursued vigorously. 
There are scheduling issues relating to the roll-out of the buy-back program and the 
infrastructure programme. The changing climate will render some parts of the 
Murray–Darling Basin no longer suitable for irrigated agriculture. Consequently, a 
thorough audit of future land and water capability must be done before taxpayers’ 
money is spent in creating world-class irrigation infrastructure if we are to avoid 
creating world-class stranded assets. The water buy-back should be accelerated to 
tackle the overuse problem but governments should not be pressured into 
simultaneously investing in infrastructure improvement until an audit is completed. 
Further, the Basin Plan must be informed by a detailed understanding of the 
hydrological needs of environmental assets across the basin: currently there is a 
huge information gap in this area. A first priority for the new Murray–Darling Basin 
Authority is to commission studies to address this so that water recovery can then 
be tailored to provide water of the characteristics that meet ecological needs. 
Likewise there are gaps in the socioeconomic information that is necessary to 
inform the tradeoffs that will be made in developing and implementing the Basin 
Plan. Much of this is tied to future land and water capability and should be front-of-
mind in conducting the audit mentioned above. 
4.9 Conclusion 
The NWI provides a good framework for water reform in Australia. It has the 
capacity to meet the needs of irrigators and the environment and accordingly was 
welcomed by farmers and conservationists.37 Its implementation programs for the 
Murray–Darling Basin in particular through the ‘Water for the Future’ plan provide 
the funding and set the pathway for the reform agenda, but governments must stop 
shying away from using the reform tools that the community and water users have 
already agreed upon. There are only so many roads to repair and restoration — we 
can’t block them all! Failure to recognise this and press on with the reform agenda 
will further delay the reallocation of water necessary to achieve a sustainable 
                                                 
36 See: http://www.acfonline.org.au/uploads/res/Opportunities_to_purchase_water_properties_in_ 
the_Darling_Basin_Aug08.pdf   
37 Press release by Australian Conservation Foundation, National Farmers Federation and the 
Australian Bankers Association, 23 June 2004, at: http://www.bankers.asn.au/default.aspx? 
ArticleID=569 
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balance. Delay reduces the time available for transition and means that we will have 
to deal with the double whammy of entrenched overuse and the impacts of climate 
change at the same time. 
Leaders must allow markets to work for the environment and fast-track the use of 
MBIs for water recovery. Market participation on behalf of the environment means 
that the Australian Government can secure multiple, lasting community benefits and 
further a major objective of the NWI by returning water extraction to sustainable 
levels and enable adjustment in the rural sector. Failing to do so is consigning our 
internationally significant wetlands and their wildlife to a future almost as uncertain 
as that of our important irrigation industries that must get themselves onto a 
sustainable footing or face the consequences of a declining natural resource base 
that will be unable to support the industries that rely on it. 
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General discussion  
An observation from one participant that ‘we are better at managing the economy 
than at managing our natural resource assets’ opened the discussion. In response, 
another participant countered that the economy and environment were intertwined 
and it was pointless to separate them. 
Professor Freebairn’s emphasis on economic efficiency was questioned by one 
commentator, who argued that resilience — that is, the ability to absorb shock —
was equally important. It was suggested that some industries, for example dairying, 
may have become more efficient, but in doing so, had become less resilient. 
In response, Professor Freebairn commented that where the market was working 
effectively, the private sector was better equipped than government to manage 
issues such as resilience. There was a role for government, however, in cases of 
market failure, but even when the case can be made, there is still a question as to 
what form the intervention should take, and what criteria should be used to measure 
its effectiveness. Arlene Buchan added that authorities charged with managing the 
environment should have clear objectives, adequate funding and be free to operate 
without political interference.  
Drew Collins was asked to elaborate on the disadvantages of a ‘sustainable 
consumption’ ideology. He replied that sustainable development was not 
necessarily about the amount of consumption per se, but overall stewardship of the 
economy including our environmental legacy. Approaches to sustainability, 
narrowly based on limiting consumption growth to that achieved from technical 
efficiencies, may only have a small overall impact on environmental sustainability. 
‘My concern is that we have a poorly defined sustainability goal in an operational 
context … what we are seeing is a belief within the community that there is an 
inherently correct level of consumption that if achieved, means the rest will look 
after itself.’ 
One participant commented that resistance to market-based reforms, noted by Drew 
Collins and Arlene Buchan, was actually resistance to government involvement in 
resource allocation in general — similar resistance would be experienced against 
other forms of government action (for example, planning or regulation). Drew 
Collins suggested that adjustment support policies, rather than constraints on 
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market-based instruments, should be used by governments to overcome any 
negative impacts of reform. 
In relation to the water buyback program, one participant asked what the recovered 
water will be used for, and whether there was adequate understanding of the 
environmental assets to be maintained. Arlene Buchan argued that although more 
information was needed about the ecological assets and hydrological needs of the 
Murray Darling Basin, the significant loss of environmental assets that has already 
occurred means that ‘no-one can run the argument that getting water back to the 
environment isn’t an absolute priority … at the moment, any water buyback, any 
water reallocation, is a good thing’. The $50 million that the Commonwealth 
Government has already spent on buying back water was specifically targeted to 
restoring ecological assets, she said. Professor Freebairn suggested that one area for 
further debate was the right to store water. 
 
S E S S I O N  2  
 
MARKET AND COOPERATIVE SOLUTIONS: 
STRENGTHS, LIMITATIONS AND THE 
APPROPRIATE ROLE OF GOVERNMENT 
 
  
 
 PROPERTY RIGHTS 
AND MARKETS 
57
 
5 Promoting better environmental 
outcomes through property rights and 
markets: opportunities and limits  
Gary D. Libecap 
University of California, Santa Barbara 
Abstract 
There is growing movement toward adoption of market mechanisms to address 
environmental and natural resource problems. Using US ocean fisheries and 
fresh water as examples, I make two key points: One is that despite the 
attractions of more definite property rights, they remain controversial, limiting or 
slowing their adoption. They generally are adopted only late, after conditions 
have deteriorated for many regulated resources. Allocation is one of the most 
controversial aspects. Accordingly, compensation to parties who expect to be 
made worse off must be considered in policy discussion. The form of that 
compensation, especially if it is in the form of preferential access privileges, 
however, must be designed carefully because it can influence the effectiveness 
of the property regime adopted. Second, because broader political and social 
values often are associated with resource use, common property, which involves 
more stakeholders, rather than narrower private property rights, can seem an 
attractive alternative. Important trade offs, however, must be kept in mind in 
policy design. As the number and heterogeneity of the parties increase, common 
property becomes much less effective. Indeed, it may offer little improvement 
over regulation. Hence, it may be preferable to adopt private property rights with 
use restrictions, rather than a more inclusive common property arrangement.  
Four direct policy implications are drawn from the main points of the paper: 
1. Because property rights institutions are costly and often controversial they 
often are best implemented late, after a resource crisis reveals their benefits 
clearly. 
  
 
58 PROMOTING BETTER 
ENVIRONMENTAL 
OUTCOMES 
 
 
2. In devising side payments to address the distributional concerns, 
where possible avoid constraining the property rights granted or 
providing preferential, but inefficient rights to certain parties with limits 
on transferability. 
3. Common property as an alternative to private property rights works 
best if: (a) the number of parties is small; (b) they are similar in the 
expected net gains of agreement; (c) there is little uncertainty 
regarding the size and distribution of costs and benefits (information, 
measurement, bounding, and compliance costs are small); and (d) the 
aggregate gains of taking action are large relative to the costs.  
4. Evaluate the tradeoffs of common property carefully. If too inclusive 
and complex, common property may offer no advantages relative to 
the assignment of private property rights with use regulations.   
5.1 Introduction 
In one way or another, most environmental and natural resource problems — too 
much air pollution; insufficient investment in natural habitat and biodiversity; too 
rapid drawdown of groundwater; and overfishing — arise from the incomplete 
assignment and definition of property rights. Under these circumstances, decision 
makers do not fully internalise the social benefits and costs of their actions, and 
hence overpollute, overextract, overharvest as well as underinvest in amenities and 
other public goods. These are classic externalities. 
Until fairly recently, the primary response to externalities has been command and 
control regulation of inputs and/or outputs in order to bring production to more 
socially optimal levels. Unfortunately, in many cases, the regulatory record has not 
been one of much success. For these reasons, there is an accelerated trend toward 
assigning property rights of some type to resources in order to mitigate the losses of 
the common pool.1 A recent survey found that tradable use permits were used in 
nine applications in air pollution control, 75 in fisheries, three in water, and five in 
land use control.2 These institutional innovations have taken place as the resources 
                                                 
1 See Stavins R.N., 2007, ‘Market-based environmental policies: What can we learn from US 
experience (and related research)?’, in Jody Freeman and Charles D. Kolstad (eds), Moving to 
Markets in Environmental Regulation, Oxford University Press, New York, pp. 19–47. 
2 Tietenberg, T. 2007, ‘Tradable permits in principle and practice’, in Jody Freeman and Charles 
D. Kolstad (eds), Moving to Markets in Environmental Regulation, Oxford University Press, New 
York, pp. 63–94, 69. 
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have become more valuable, as they have faced growing open-access losses, and as 
dissatisfaction has increased with existing centralised regulation.3 
There are multiple advantages to property rights and market arrangements, 
including flexibility, cost savings, information generation, migration to high-valued 
uses, and better alignment of incentives for conservation or investment in the 
resource. The more complete are property rights, the more the private and social net 
benefits of resource use are meshed, eliminating externalities and the losses of the 
common pool.4 
By contrast, centralised regulation — which typically relies upon uniform 
standards, arbitrary controls on access, constraints on timing of use, and/or limits on 
technology or production capital — suffers from a variety of well-known problems 
including high cost, inflexibility, ineffectiveness, and industry capture. Further, 
regulatory decisions take place in the absence of information about alternative uses 
that market trades generate. Finally, centralised state regulatory rules may or may 
not align with the incentives of actual users of the resource. Generally, no party 
involved — actual users, regulators, politicians — is a residual claimant to the 
social gains from investment or trade.5 
Accordingly, decisions about extraction, production, investment, and allocation are 
based on other factors that are apt not to be consistent with maximising the 
economic or social value of the resource or of conserving it. Indeed, the experience 
with many central regulatory regimes has not been satisfactory — fisheries continue 
to be depleted; air pollution abatement targets have not been achieved; and water 
has not been managed effectively. 
I make two points in this paper. One is that, despite the attractions of more definite 
property rights, they remain controversial, limiting or slowing their adoption. They 
generally are adopted only late, after conditions have deteriorated for many 
regulated resources. Allocation is one of the most controversial aspects because of 
                                                 
3 Stavins, R.N. 1998, ‘Economic incentives for environmental regulation’, in Peter Newman (ed), 
1998, The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics and the Law, Macmillan, London, vol. 2, 
pp. 6–13. 
4 Libecap, G.D. 1989, Contracting for Property Rights, Cambridge University Press, New York; 
Dahlman, C. 1979, ‘The problem of externality’, Journal of Law and Economics, vol. 22, 
pp. 141–62. 
5 Johnson, R.N. and Libecap, G.D. 1994, The Federal Civil Service and the Problem of 
Bureaucracy: The Economics and Politics of Institutional Change, University of Chicago Press, 
Chicago, pp. 156–71. 
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the distributional implications involved in moving from open access or central 
regulation to a property regime.6 
In many cases, at least some constituencies, including regulators, who benefited 
from the previous regulatory arrangement, will be disadvantaged under a new rights 
system. Some parties who previously used the resource will be denied access. 
Production under a property rights regime has a different composition of inputs and 
timing from what occurs under either open access or regulation, with negative 
impacts on certain groups of labour, input sellers, service organisations, and 
processors. These production changes are inherent in the efficiency gains of 
privatisation, but not all parties directly benefit from them. Further, as the resource 
rebounds and becomes more valuable, new owners have wealth, status, and political 
influence not available to those without access privileges. 
Accordingly, compensation of parties who are concerned that they will be made 
worse off must be considered in policy discussion. The form of that compensation, 
especially if it is in the form of preferential access privileges, however, must be 
designed carefully because it can influence the effectiveness of the property regime 
adopted. 
The second point is that, because broader political and social values are often 
associated with resource use, common property, which involves more stakeholders, 
rather than narrower private property rights, can seem an attractive alternative. 
Important trade-offs, however, must be kept in mind in policy design. As the 
number and heterogeneity of the parties increase, common property becomes much 
less effective. Indeed, it may offer little improvement over regulation. Hence, it may 
be preferable to adopt private property rights with use restrictions, rather than a 
more inclusive common property arrangement. 
To sum up, I offer four direct policy implications from the main points of the paper: 
1. Because property rights institutions are costly and often controversial, they are 
often best implemented late, after a resource crisis reveals their benefits clearly. 
2. In devising side payments to address the distributional concerns, where possible 
avoid constraining the property rights granted or providing preferential, but 
inefficient, rights to certain parties with limits on transferability. 
3. Common property as an alternative to private property rights works best if: (1) 
the number of parties is small; (2) they are similar in the expected net gains of 
agreement; (3) there is little uncertainty regarding the size and distribution of 
costs and benefits (information, measurement, bounding, and compliance costs 
                                                 
6 Definition and enforcement costs for mobile, unobserved resources are also issues, as discussed 
below. 
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are small); and (4) the aggregate gains of taking action are large relative to the 
costs. 
4. Evaluate the trade-offs of common property carefully. If too inclusive and 
complex, they may offer no advantages relative to the assignment of private 
property rights with use regulations. Other more detailed recommendations 
regarding common property also are provided in the text. 
The arguments of the paper are presented as follows: I briefly summarise the 
problems with command and control regulation that can arise and the benefits of 
property rights. I then turn to delay in the assignment of property rights to address 
environmental and natural resource concerns due to limited information, 
uncertainty, and distribution disputes. Finally, I discuss the conditions under which 
common property will be useful and when it might not be. I illustrate these points 
by reviewing experiences in US fisheries and water allocation controversies in the 
western United States. I conclude with a short discussion of the use of markets in 
addressing environmental and natural resource objectives. 
5.2 Regulation, property rights, and markets 
Command and control regulation 
The initial response to open access generally has been state regulation of entry and 
production to include: a) restrictions on access or time of use; b) equipment and 
other input controls; and c) extraction or production regulations. State regulation is 
the initial resort for a number of reasons. One is that it avoids the complex, costly, 
and controversial allocation of more definite property rights, which could directly 
address the problem of externalities. Second, state regulation may involve lower 
costs of measurement, bounding, and enforcement, and, if the resource is of 
relatively low value, more definite property rights may be too costly to be an 
option.7 Another reason is that state regulation is consistent with the notion that 
many natural resources are rightly ‘public’ with ownership reserved in the state 
rather than in private parties. Similarly, if there are important public goods 
associated with the resource, then state ownership and regulation of access may be 
optimal. Finally, state regulation can advantage certain influential political 
constituencies who mould regulatory policy in their behalf. While market processes 
                                                 
7 See Alston, L.J., Libecap, G.D. and Schneider, R. 1996, ‘The determinants and impact of 
property rights on the frontier: Land titles on the Brazilian frontier’, Journal of Law, Economics, 
and Organization, vol. 12, no. 1, pp. 25–61, for discussion of the emergence of property rights as 
resource values change. 
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are relatively transparent, political and bureaucratic processes are less so, 
facilitating preferential treatment to certain parties.8 This situation underlies the 
notion of regulatory capture. 
One of the constituencies in regulation is the bureaucracy itself, which develops a 
stake in the maintenance and expansion of state authority and resistance to property 
regimes where more decision making responsibility is granted to actual resource 
users. Agencies often are relatively insulated, especially when resource 
management requires scientific knowledge that may not be generally available to 
citizens. Hence, agency officials can manage the resource to maximise budgets and 
regulatory discretion, to advantage particular favoured constituencies, and/or to 
advance certain political, scientific, and professional views of resource access and 
use. Since neither politicians nor bureaucrats are direct residual claimants to the 
resource rents that are saved by mitigating the losses of open access, their 
regulatory decisions may or may not increase the social or economic value of the 
resource. 
For all of these reasons, when the costs of central regulation become large and its 
effectiveness in stemming open-access losses questioned, other options come to be 
considered. If the resource is of high enough value to warrant more definite 
property rights, then they can be adopted. But property rights arrangements are 
costly and often controversial, and how they are implemented affects their efficacy 
in addressing the losses of the commons. 
Advantages of property rights and markets 
Property rights are directly relevant in confronting open access because, if fully 
assigned, they close the externality directly and thereby link individual incentives 
with social objectives for resource use. With a single owner or a limited number of 
them, decisions about resource investment and use can be made quickly. When the 
rights structure includes the right to transfer the asset and transaction costs are low, 
adjustments to changes in price and cost can occur rapidly and flexibly. Optimal 
production sizes can be achieved. 
The sale or other exchange of property rights also generates valuable information 
regarding alternative uses and opportunity costs that promote efficiency in resource 
allocation and application. The asset flows to high-valued uses and thereby 
maximizes social benefits. Indeed, one of the most critical contributions of property 
                                                 
8 For discussion of the problem of oversight when information is limited, see: Johnson, R.N. and 
Libecap, G.D. 2001, ‘Information distortion and competitive remedies in government transfer 
programs: The case of Ethanol’, Economics of Governance, vol. 2, no. 2, pp. 1001–34. 
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rights is that they provide the basis for exchange or bargaining among parties to 
tackle open-access problems. The critical agents are identified as owners, the ones 
who bear the benefits and losses of taking action or not doing so. 
Allocation of property rights 
The allocation of property rights is contentious because of the associated 
assignment of wealth and political influence that comes with ownership. Property 
rights are political institutions and, as such, political negotiations influence the 
nature of the rights arrangements that are implemented and change their adoption 
times and effectiveness. 
Property rights allocation is also affected by other factors, including the physical 
nature of the resource, the number and heterogeneity of the parties involved, equity 
norms and precedents, and the legal environment. 
There are several allocation mechanisms: 
First-possession rules 
First possession is the dominant method of establishing property rights.9 It assigns 
ownership on a first-come, first-served basis or first-in-time, first-in-right. 
First-possession rules are attractive because they recognise incumbent parties, who 
have experience in exploiting the resource and hence may be the low-cost, high-
valued users. Incumbents also have a direct stake in access to the resource and will 
be important constituents in any property rights distribution. They are concerned 
about past investment in specific assets, which otherwise would not be deployable 
to other uses. Since first-possession rules recognize these investments, this security 
may encourage future outlays. Allocations that do not consider the position of 
incumbents will face opposition, raising the costs of rights assignment and 
enforcement. Accordingly, grandfathering in the initial allocation has been a 
necessary ingredient in building the political support necessary to implement the 
approach. 
First possession is criticised for possibly encouraging rent dissipation as parties rush 
to ‘capture’ the resource by establishing excessive use patterns. If the competing 
parties are homogeneous and ownership is short-term, then full dissipation is 
                                                 
9 See Libecap, G.D. 2007, ‘The assignment of property rights on the western frontier: Lessons for 
contemporary environmental and resource policy’, Journal of Economic History, vol. 67, no. 2, 
pp. 257–91. 
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possible. If, on the other hand, the parties are heterogeneous and use rights are long-
term, then first-possession assignments to a flow can mitigate rent dissipation.10 
First possession is also criticised for its equity implications. Its use can provide 
windfalls to past users instead of providing funds to the state that might be used 
under some circumstances to compensate losers from privatisation, and it 
discriminates against new entrants.11 
Uniform allocation rules 
Equal sharing rules avoid the distributional concerns associated with first 
possession and better reflect egalitarian goals. If there are no restrictions on 
subsequent exchange of property rights and transaction costs are low, there are few 
efficiency implications. The resource still migrates to high-valued users. Uniform 
allocations also avoid the measurement costs of verifying claims of past production 
or use or of documenting precedence claims that are part of first-possession 
assignments. They can also avoid the costly pursuit of property rights when first 
possession is known to be the allocation rule. 
Lotteries are examples of uniform allocations because each claimant is given an 
equal, random draw in the assignment of rights to the resource, and the allocation 
granted is generally partitioned equally among lottery winners. Uniform allocations 
via lotteries are most effective when applied to new resources where there are no 
incumbent claims and all parties are relatively homogeneous. They can also be used 
when the access and use rights granted are short-term and no long-term ownership 
is implied, such as with lotteries for annual hunting licences. 
Auction allocation 
A third allocation mechanism, often favored by economists, is auction. It can 
directly place assets into the hands of those who have the highest value for the asset. 
It thereby avoids the transaction costs of reallocation. Auctions also generate 
resources for the state and avoid the windfalls that might be considered unearned 
and divisive. Auction returns can be used to cover the costs of defining and 
enforcing property rights and other costs of resource management. As with lotteries, 
                                                 
10 Johnson, R.N. and Libecap, G.D. 1982, ‘Contracting problems and regulation: The case of the 
fishery’, American Economic Review, vol. 72, pp. 1005–22, show that heterogeneity among 
fishers limits rent dissipation even under open access and the rule of capture. 
11 Stavins, R.N. 1995, ‘Transaction costs and tradable permits’, Journal of Environmental 
Economics and Management, vol. 29, pp. 133–48, refers to grandfathering as a give-away. 
Inefficiencies would come through a race between homogeneous parties. 
  
 
 PROPERTY RIGHTS 
AND MARKETS 
65
 
auctions work best for new, unallocated resources where there are no incumbent 
claimants and where resource values are very high. By granting more of the rents to 
the state, auctions reduce the distributional implications of first-possession or 
uniform allocation. 
As with other allocation arrangements, there are costs to auctions. The state must be 
able to measure and enforce resource boundaries and individual allocations secured 
by auction. The terms of the auction may also be influenced by competing claimants 
who lobby for rules that provide them with specific advantages. 
Collective action issues and delay in the assignment of property rights 
The brief discussion of allocation mechanisms suggests that there is often an 
underlying collective action problem associated with the definition and assignment 
of property rights and, hence, why they generally are adopted late in resource use. 
For example, Scott Gordon wrote his classic article on waste in open-access 
fisheries in 1954.12 Individual Transferable Quotas (ITQs) were suggested by 
fishery economist Francis Christy in 1973, but it was not until 1986 (32 years after 
Gordon wrote his article) that New Zealand adopted the first rights-based 
approaches.13 Similarly, in air pollution control, the notion of tradable emission 
permits was put forward by Thomas Crocker in 1966 and by J.H. Dales in 1968 
when air pollution was becoming a growing problem in the United States, but 
adoption of such permits took another 30 years.14 
The main reason why formal property rights are adopted late in resource use (even 
after extensive periods of open-access losses) is that they involve high resource and 
political costs relative to their expected gains. These issues become even more 
problematic when there are multiple parties claiming a stake in the resource, a point 
that is addressed in more detail below. 
Property rights have formidable information and input requirements in allocation, 
measurement, bounding, and enforcement, and they can have substantial 
distributive effects when there is too much uncertainty as to the impact on key 
constituencies. These resource and political costs hamper the assignment of 
                                                 
12 Gordon, H.S. 1954, ‘The economic theory of a common-property resource: The fishery’, 
Journal of Political Economy, vol. 62, no. 2, pp. 124–42. 
13 Hannesson, R. 2004, The Privatization of the Oceans, MIT Press, Cambridge; Newell, R.G., 
Sanchirico, J.N. and Kerr, S. 2005, ‘Fishing quota markets’, Journal of Environmental 
Economics and Management, vol. 49, pp. 437–62. 
14 Crocker, T.D. 1966, ‘The structuring of atmospheric pollution control systems’, in Wolozin, H. 
(ed), The Economics of Air Pollution, W.W. Norton, New York, pp 61–8; Dales, J.H. 1968, 
Property and Prices, University of Toronto Press, Toronto. 
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property rights to address open access. As argued above, when the value of the 
resource or the cost of the externality is relatively low, prescriptive regulation to 
limit exploitation through uniform restrictions can be cost-effective and politically 
acceptable. Information demands are limited to the setting and administering of 
general rules and standards; it does not involve obvious redistribution; and reliance 
upon standardized regulations reduces uncertainty regarding the impact on 
constituencies. The various parties involved can generally predict how they might 
be affected, and their current political and wealth standings are unlikely to be 
significantly altered. At the same time, however, these policies incompletely 
address the externality, leaving many margins for rent dissipation unconstrained. 
Property rights are relevant because they address the externality directly and link 
individual incentives with social objectives for resource use. But they are typically 
adopted only when their costs are offset by the aggregate rents that are saved from 
overexploitation. Because these transaction costs can be quite considerable, the 
value of the resource and the nature of uncertainty determine the optimal time for 
introducing formal property rights. Crises that suddenly and sharply raise benefits 
and lower uncertainty accelerate this process.15 Crises here are events or spikes that 
dramatically raise the wastes associated with open access and at the same time 
lower the transaction costs of collective action by providing new information about 
the benefits of institutional change to combat the problem. 
Collective action, which may not be possible early, can become more practical after 
delay, as transaction costs fall. Additional information emerges regarding the 
severity of the problem, reducing uncertainty and measurement costs and 
eliminating information asymmetries; the resource becomes more valuable (perhaps 
due to greater depletion, raising the benefits of action); new technology or 
techniques are developed to lower the costs of closing the externality; and the 
number of parties declines as the private returns to exploitation fall. At this point, 
distributional concerns can become subordinate to the overall need to respond to 
open access, and successful group efforts become more likely. 
These problems are compounded, however, when the externality is larger, spreading 
across multiple groups or constituencies, so that its resolution requires broader 
government involvement and the associated efforts of politicians. When there are 
numerous constituencies affected differently by the problem and the costs of 
mitigation, politicians must balance constituent interests to maximise political 
support for taking action. 
                                                 
15 Libecap, G.D. 2008, ‘Open-access losses and delay in the assignment of property rights’, 
University of Arizona Law Review, vol. 50, no. 2, pp. 379–408. 
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When constituencies are heterogeneous in the net gains of collective action, 
politicians must devise side payments from high gainers to those who expect to do 
less well in order to build a political consensus. Transfers that seem too obvious and 
as unfairly rewarding particular groups can bring a reaction from general taxpayers. 
Accordingly, camouflaging transfers, linking them to popular public goods, and 
tying them to broad distributional norms can reduce their political costs. Their 
design, however, may lower the overall effectiveness of the government regulation 
of the externality. 
Uncertainty in predicting aggregate costs and benefits of addressing externalities 
and their distribution across constituencies complicates the crafting of side 
payments by encouraging disputes over the size, nature, and direction of 
compensation. These disputes increase political risk and reduce the expected 
politicians’ benefits from deal-making to address the externality. 
As a result, politicians select policies that lower uncertainty and raise expected net 
gains for key constituents. These policies include postponing any action; 
encouraging research in information about the externality; promoting new 
technology that lowers costs; investing in resource-stock enhancement, including 
restricting access by non-citizens or other politically-weak groups; and adopting 
standardised regulations that reduce the externality while appearing to remain 
neutral and not changing the existing distribution of wealth and political power. 
Politicians will support property rights only if it is politically beneficial to do so —
when command and control regulation has not worked, when they have the support 
of key constituencies, and when it is possible to construct side payments to 
influential groups that might be harmed. Accordingly, to build political support, 
politicians shape the assignment of property rights in a manner that achieves other 
distributional objectives or meets the demands of those who claim to be harmed. 
These adjustments, which, however, attenuate the property rights that are granted, 
also weaken the ability of the rights regime to reduce the losses of open access. 
Common-property regimes 
When private property rights seem to be too controversial to be adopted, more 
inclusive common-property options may be considered. Such institutions seem to be 
especially attractive when there are many divergent claimants or interests associated 
with a resource, as can be the case with ocean fisheries and related aquatic habitats 
as well as with fresh water. Both resources have public good aspects; are seen as 
inherently public by some; have many distributional implications from single 
ownership; and their fluid physical nature raises the bounding costs of assigning 
private rights. 
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In these cases, common-property regimes are often presented as a viable option that 
avoids the political conflicts associated with private property. While this may be the 
case, an extensive body of theory and empirical evidence regarding common 
property exists to illustrate when such institutions are likely to be effective in 
addressing open access and when they are not. If common property is to be 
considered as an alternative to private rights and markets for the reasons described 
above, the tradeoffs should be considered explicitly in public policy decisions. 
A number of points are worth making. First, any common resource must still be 
bounded in some manner, so that group members (perhaps citizens or other 
designated stakeholders) have access and set use rules so as to protect the resource 
and avoid rent dissipation. Non-group members are denied access. Hence, bounding 
and enforcement costs remain to be addressed by policy makers. Second, there is 
the critical issue of internal decision making and responsibility for resource use.16 If 
this process is impaired, common property can be costly, with misalignment of 
member incentives for maximising the social value of the resource. Cooperation 
within the group depends upon resource, group, and management characteristics. 
Resource characteristics 
1. The smaller, the more observable, and the less mobile the resource, the lower the 
transaction costs of bargaining within a group to address commons problems. 
These conditions allow appropriators to observe the waste of open access, to 
define accurate external boundaries for the resource, to evaluate the response to 
management efforts, and to police entry and use. All of these are issues of 
information. Changes in the technology of transportation, observation, and 
communication generate more information, allowing the resource size to be 
larger and less observable. A policy role for the state can be to provide credible 
scientific information about the resource, its character, and its boundaries to 
encourage collective action. 
2. Clearly-defined resource boundaries allow the group to police entry, allocate 
access among its members, monitor their compliance, and invest in the stock 
(conservation). Changes in bounding and enforcement technology, also possibly 
promoted by policy, can lower the costs of marking resource perimeters and 
thereby can promote group action. 
3. A well-defined commons problem or, alternatively, good information about the 
resource and the losses of open access, allows the group to agree on the 
significance of the problem and the benefits of addressing it. If the losses are 
                                                 
16 Baland, J.M. and Platteau, J.P. 1996, Halting Degradation of Natural Resources: Is There a 
Role for Rural Communities?, FAO and Clarendon Press, Oxford, p. 187 discuss these two 
problems in the use of common property to address resource issues. 
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controversial (as assessments vary) or small, then there is less pressure to take 
action. 
4. Similarly, the less uncertainty about the commons problem and the resource 
reaction to it, the greater will be the identification of the returns to cooperation 
and less disagreement among the parties. Accordingly, policies aimed at 
providing information about the commons problem and methods of addressing it 
can make common property (indeed, all property arrangements) more feasible 
and effective. 
5. Finally, all else being equal, more valuable resources will have more costly 
externalities and greater losses from open access. The gains from group action to 
address the problem rise. At the same time, rights and other management 
arrangements for more valuable resources have greater enforcement costs. The 
benefits of defection are greater. Indeed, high value and cheating are argued as 
reasons for adoption of private rights.17 Value may rise from exogenous price 
increases, changes in social values (greater appreciation of biodiversity, ecology) 
or new extraction technology. These factors could invite outside entry and raise 
the costs of cohesive group action. 
Group characteristics 
1. Clearly-defined membership in the group is important so that members can be 
identified for bargaining and enforcement and for avoiding open access through 
unlimited entry. 
2. Smaller groups are more effective. Olson (1965) emphasised the costs of 
bargaining, allocation, and enforcement as group size increases. It is more 
difficult to bring parties into agreement and to observe cheating as group size 
rises. Incentives to free-ride rise with group size, because enforcement is more 
difficult and the cost borne by each party from violating agreements on average 
falls.18 
3. More homogeneous groups are better able to address commons problems 
collectively.19 They are more likely to have similar consumption or use patterns 
and, accordingly, common objectives. They are apt to have comparable time 
horizons for resource management and, if relevant, similar extraction costs. 
Members of such groups also are more likely to have similar information about 
                                                 
17 Demsetz, H. 1967, ‘Toward a theory of property rights’, American Economic Review: Papers 
and Proceedings, vol. 57, no. 2, pp. 347–59. 
18 Olson, M. 1965, The Logic of Collective Action, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA; and 
Baland, J.M. and Platteau, J.P., op.cit. pp. 77, 298, ‘Small is beautiful’. 
19 Ostrom, E. 1990, Governing the Commons: The Evolution of Institutions for Collective Action, 
Cambridge University Press, New York; Baland, J.M. and Platteau, J.P., op.cit., p. 75. 
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the resource and the problem of over-extraction. These conditions lower the 
transaction costs of bargaining because they facilitate agreement on the problem 
and the allocation of benefits and costs that are inherent in any management 
solution.20 On the other hand, less homogeneous groups may face problems due 
to differences in the expected net gains of cooperation. 
4. A common understanding about the resource and the potential for open-access 
losses and how the resource system operates promotes action. This condition 
includes an appreciation of the link between harvest and depletion. Outside 
claims of potential losses that appear inconsistent with local experiences, or are 
difficult to verify, are unlikely to be considered credible. This is a key aspect of 
homogeneity. As such, government policies that limit entry into a 
common-property regime to similar groups may be worthwhile to make it more 
effective. At the same time, however, these policies reduce the ability of 
common property to be more inclusive. Even so, absent a common 
understanding or objective, the transaction costs of agreement will be higher. 
Asymmetric information about the problem and the costs and returns of various 
management options raise bargaining costs because the parties will have 
different views of how they will benefit from action relative to the status quo. It 
may not be possible to devise side payments to bridge these disagreements. 
Neutral, objective information provided by outside sources or government 
agencies, however, may promote agreement. 
5. Group dependence upon the resource and a history of past depletion raise the 
expected gains of addressing the commons problem. Crises provide information 
about the seriousness of open access, lowering transaction costs.21 
6. Effective communication within the group is another important characteristic of 
successful common property. This attribute is closely linked to group size and 
homogeneity. Greater communication makes agreement on a management plan 
more likely, and lowers the cost of monitoring. Repeated interaction builds trust, 
lowers the transaction costs of bargaining, and raises compliance. 
Communication can make contributions self-enforcing. 
7. Close proximity of group members and frequent interaction lower the transaction 
costs of bargaining and communication, increase information, and reduce 
enforcement outlays. 
8. Leadership also is important for group success. Although economists are not 
well equipped to model leadership, there is considerable empirical evidence that 
in cases where group members are not homogeneous and where some 
                                                 
20 Wiggins, S.N. and Libecap, G.D. 1985, ‘Oil field unitization: Contractual failure in the presence 
of imperfect information’, American Economic Review, vol. 75, no. 3, pp. 368–85. 
21 Libecap, G.D. 2008, op.cit. 
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disproportionately benefit from taking action, those parties are often leaders in 
implementing a management plan.22 They can make credible commitments, and 
have incentives to achieve effective action. 
9. Shared moral norms within groups promote cooperation.23 These norms are 
internalised rules of conduct that promote coordination though clear group 
identity, trust, and reduced free-riding. When moral norms are present, formal 
extraction rules are less necessary. Such customs are more likely to be found in 
small groups and less so in large ones where formal rules are more important. In 
small groups there can be continuous interaction which is observed and 
memorised. For larger, more heterogeneous groups, there may be no internal 
mechanism for lowering bargaining and enforcement costs. In this case, central 
regulation or private property rights are apt to be more effective solutions to 
open access. 
10. Group stability and tradition also matter. Stable groups have limited size and are 
more homogeneous. Further, they can rely on past customs to address commons 
problems. 
Management characteristics 
1. Observable indicators of management performance that are predictable are 
necessary to assess the results of group action. 
2. The distribution of the benefits and costs of resource management across the 
group should be proportionate. If this is not the case, then the net returns from 
management will vary among members, changing incentives. Those who benefit 
more from some actions and share less in the associated cost will naturally 
support those efforts, even if they are not optimal in the aggregate.24 
3. Appropriation or allocation rules that are consistent with local conditions are 
important. They blend with available knowledge, can be observed, and are 
consistent with group notions of equity. 
4. Local resource-use rules should dominate, so that affected group members 
participate in allocation and investment decisions.25 The alternative of 
                                                 
22 Baland, J.M. and Platteau, J.P. op.cit., pp. 79, 114, 337. 
23 Baland, J.M. and Platteau, J.P. op.cit., pp. 116, 119, 176. 
24 This is illustrated by experiences in oil field unit contracts when participants do not share 
proportionately in unit revenues and costs from certain investment and production decisions. 
These units are not successful. Prudhoe Bay is a prime example. See: Libecap, G.D. and Smith, 
J.L. 1999, ‘The self-enforcing provisions of oil and gas unit operating agreements: Theory and 
evidence’, Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, vol. 15, no. 2, pp. 526–48. 
25 See summary by Libecap, G.D. 2007, op.cit. 
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centralised regulation by bureaucracies involves problems of limited information 
as well as of incentives. Neither politicians nor bureaucrats are typically residual 
claimants in the benefits of cooperation, and they may have short time-horizons. 
5. Local monitoring and sanctioning of member compliance are generally more 
effective than are external regulations. 
6. Graduated sanctions that are deemed fair promote agreement. 
7. Low-cost local arenas for resolution of conflicts should exist to encourage group 
action. 
8. Group rules should be recognised by governmental authorities and not undercut 
by them. 
9. Economic incentives for conservation are provided by the state to the group. 
10. Nested enterprises are in place for rules regarding appropriation, provision, 
monitoring, enforcement, conflict resolution, and governance. 
Given all of these requirements, common property can be a helpful intermediary 
between regulation and private property rights, but the conditions under which it is 
effective must be kept in mind. 
Generally, collective action to address open access is promoted if: (1) the number of 
parties is small; (2) they are similar in the expected net gains of agreement; (3) there 
is little uncertainty regarding the size and distribution of costs and benefits 
(information, measurement, bounding, and compliance costs are small); and (4) the 
aggregate gains of taking action are large relative to the costs. 
Important deviations from these criteria, however, hinder group efforts. If aggregate 
net gains are limited — that is, the common resource is of low value and/or the 
transaction costs of addressing the problem are high — there are few incentives for 
action until values increase or costs fall. As group size grows, bargaining and 
compliance costs rise. If the aggregate benefit is a public good (having high 
bounding costs), while the costs of taking action are private, free-riding and 
defection are encouraged. 
With this background discussion of delay in the assignment of property rights, the 
allocation issues involved, and the conditions for successful common property, we 
now turn to two empirical examples in ocean fisheries and fresh water.  
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5.3 Fisheries 
Property rights: delay, potential benefits, restrictions 
The first government reaction to open access in fisheries has involved 
implementation of uniform restrictions on access and fishing effort. These 
regulations have minimised information requirements and avoided significant 
deliberate changes in status quo economic and political rankings among the parties 
involved. Uniform regulations, however, are unlikely to be fully effective because 
they do not align the incentives of the parties with the objectives of reduced harvest 
and conservation of the stock. 
Accordingly, if the fishery is sufficiently valuable, at some point there has been a 
turn to property rights of some type. But these have come late, generally only after 
the stock has collapsed and declining returns have made existing practices 
untenable. Even then, conflict over the nature of the rights to be granted and their 
allocation has slowed adoption of a rights regime, constrained the privileges 
assigned, and limited the overall benefits obtained. 
To illustrate these points, Rögnvaldur Hannesson, Ragnar Arnason, and Ross 
Shotton, among others, outline a common process of open-access losses, delayed 
regulation, and finally, a limited adoption of ITQs or Individual Vessel Quotas 
(IVQs).26 
Under ITQs and IVQs, regulators set the total annual allowable catch based on 
assembled biological information, anticipated environmental conditions, and 
expected harvest impacts. Each authorised fisher or vessel is granted a share in the 
annual catch based on the allocation rule, and the quotas generally can be traded, 
although with varying restrictions. The most common allocation rule is based on 
first possession or historical catch. Past investment in vessels and equipment is also 
often taken into account. The advantage of ITQs over regulation is that they better 
align the harvest practices of fishers with practices that protect or enhance the stock. 
The value of their quotas, which often can be major sources of wealth, depends 
upon the long-term health of the fishery. Hence, there are incentives for self- and 
                                                 
26 ITQs are the most widely applied form of property right in fisheries (Hannesson, R. op.cit. 
p. 56). See also Arnason, R. 2002, ‘A review of international experiences with ITQ’, Annex to 
Future Options for UK Fishing Management, Report to the Department for the Environment, 
Food and Rural Affairs, CEMARE, University of Portsmouth, UK; and Shotton, R. 2000, 
‘Current property rights systems in fisheries management’, in Shotton, R. (ed), Use of Property 
Rights in Fisheries Management, Proceedings of the FishRights99 Conference, Fremantle 
Western Australia, FAO, Rome, Fisheries Technical Paper 404/1, pp. 45–50. 
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group-monitoring of compliance; and importantly, ITQs, as a property right, are the 
basis for further contracting among fishers to reduce fishing pressure. 
The beneficial effects of ITQs are impressive. Many studies — among others, 
Grafton, Squires, and Fox (2002); Shotton (2000); Arnason (2002); Newell,  
Sanchirico, and Kerr (2005); and Wilen (2006) — report increases in fishery 
product value, improved efficiency, and enhanced stock conditions.27 
The adoption of ITQs in the United States, however, has been slow and contentious. 
ITQs are more limited and are a weaker property right in the United States than in 
many other major fishing countries.28 As late as 2002, after years of open-access 
losses and ineffective regulation, only four US marine fisheries operated under ITQ 
regimes: the Mid-Atlantic surf clam and ocean quahog fishery, the Alaskan halibut 
and sablefish fishery, and the South Atlantic wreckfish fishery, all adopted in the 
early 1990s. This situation compares with at least 20 ITQ-managed fisheries in 
Australia, covering about 34 per cent of the volume and 22 per cent of the value of 
the country’s fisheries and 40 fisheries in Canada, accounting for over 50 per cent 
of the value and volume of landings as of 2002.29 Two extensions of ITQs were 
under consideration in 1995 for the Gulf of Mexico red snapper and Pacific 
sablefish fisheries, but tabled in 1996. 
In these discussions, there has been an effort to preserve the relative position of 
regions, communities, fleets, capital, and crew by limiting the assignment and 
trading of ITQs. Some US ITQs are reserved for community development and not 
granted to individuals. There also are formal limits on the size of individual quota 
holdings and their transferability. 
In the Alaska halibut fishery, for example, only transfers from larger to smaller 
vessel classes are permitted, and no individual is allowed to own more than 0.5 per 
cent of the total quota.30 Other controls over share concentration are designed to 
                                                 
27 Grafton, Q.R., Squires, D. and Fox, K.J. 2000, ‘Private property and economic efficiency: A 
study of a common-pool resource’, Journal of Law and Economics, vol. 43, no. 2, pp. 679–713; 
Arnason, R. 2002, op.cit.; Shotton, R. 2000 op.cit., pp. 45–50; Wilen, J.E. 2006, ‘Why fisheries 
management fails: Treating symptoms rather than the cause’, Bulletin of Marine Science, 
vol. 78, no. 3, pp. 529–46; Newell, R.G., Sanchirico, J.N. and Kerr, S. 2005, ‘Fishing quota 
markets’, Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, vol. 49, pp. 437–62. 
28 Arnason, R. 2002 op.cit., pp. 52–7. 
29 Ibid., pp. 3–17. 
30 Ibid., pp. 54–5. 
  
 
 PROPERTY RIGHTS 
AND MARKETS 
75
 
limit holdings and maintain a targeted number of vessels in the halibut fleet.31 
Further, in 1996, the Magnuson–Stevens Fishery Conservation Act (Sustainable 
Fisheries Act, 16 USC 1801) placed a four-year moratorium on the adoption of 
further ITQs in US fisheries. 
Common property: Regional Fishery Management Councils 
The political push for adoption of the Magnuson-Stevens Act not only illustrates the 
distributional conflicts over assignment of ITQs, but also the pressures to broaden 
the number of stakeholders and interests to be included in any management plan. 
For the reasons described above, the increased scope of issues to be considered 
(multiple species stock conservation, provision of biodiversity, and ecosystem 
services) as well as the expansion of parties involved (commercial vessel-owners, 
crew, community leaders, processors, environmental groups), suggest that any 
institutional response to open access in fisheries is likely to be cumbersome at best 
and ineffective at worst. These actions include adoption of Territorial Use Rights to 
Fisheries (TURFs) and Regional Fishery Management Councils (RFMCs) as 
common-property regimes.32 
In the debate leading to enactment of the Magnuson-Stevens Act, vessel-owners and 
larger distributors generally backed ITQs, whereas representatives of fishing 
communities, part-time fishers, crew, and processors, typically were resistant. The 
provisions of the law also reflect the many issues at stake (reducing by-catch, 
conserving habitat, preventing overfishing) as well as opposition to further 
extension of private property rights to the stock: the Act ‘shall not create, or be 
construed to create, any right, title, or interest in or to any fish before the fish is 
harvested’.33 
                                                 
31 Singh, R., Weninger, Q. and Doyle, M. 2006, ‘Fisheries management with stock growth 
uncertainty and costly capital adjustment’, Journal of Environmental Economics and 
Management, vol. 52, pp. 582–99, 594–95. 
32 For discussion of the RFMCs see Hanna, S. 2006, ‘Will structural reform fix fishery 
management? Commission policy recommendations and the US Regional Fishery Management 
Council system’, Bulletin of Marine Science, vol. 78, no. 3, pp. 547–62. 
33 Some key provisions of the Sustainable Fisheries Act include: 
• Preventing overfishing, and ending overfishing of currently depressed stocks 
• Rebuilding depleted stocks 
• Reducing by-catch and minimizing the mortality of unavoidable by-catch 
• Designating and conserving essential fish habitat 
• Reforming the approval process for Fishery Management Plans (FMP) and regulations 
• Reducing conflict of interest on Regional Councils 
• Establishing user fees. 
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As argued above, as the number of stakeholders rises and as they become more 
heterogeneous in their objectives, the more difficult it is to reach agreements on 
fishing rights and collective action regarding habitat. Some RFMCs already are well 
known for being mired in debate.34 
The RFMC system was established by the Magnuson-Stevens Fishery Conservation 
and Management Act of 1976 for the purpose of managing fisheries in the 
newly-recognised exclusive economic zone between three and 200 miles offshore of 
the United States. The eight RFMCs are decision-making bodies and develop and 
recommend specific management measures in the form of fishery management 
plans. Unfortunately, the RFMCs generally are not viewed as successfully meeting 
conservation objectives, of providing for the long-term economic productivity of 
fisheries, or of protecting ecosystems.35 They face many divergent interests and 
ambiguous goals, and no single entity is responsible for ensuring that management 
objectives are met.36 It is likely that they are too large and too complicated for 
effective coordination.37 Even so, there are pressures to make them even more 
inclusive, for example through extension of the public trust doctrine that asserts the 
‘inherent’ common nature of the marine resource.38 
A key problem is that generally no party has property rights within the RFMC to 
internalise the benefits and costs of decision making. Indeed, the absence of 
property rights means that there is no basis for exchange among the parties 
regarding different fishery values. 
Where ITQs are implemented and other public good issues exist (by-catch, 
biodiversity), restrictions on certain actions, such as through use of marine 
easements in a manner similar to those applied to land–owners, could be considered 
                                                                                                                                                    
http://www.nmfs.noaa.gov/sfa/SFA-Report-FINAL7_1.pdf; NOAA ‘SFA Update’, 1997; 
http://www.nmfs.noaa.gov/sfa/juneup.pdf; Opposition to property rights: Source: STAT 3576-
3577;http://www.nmfs.noaa.gov/sfa/sustainable_fishereries_act.pdf. 
34 See Fluharty, D. 2000, ‘Habitat protection, ecological issues, and implementation of the 
Sustainable Fisheries Act’, Ecological Applications, vol. 10, no. 2, pp. 325–37. 
35 Engle, J., Newkirk, S. and Thompson, B.H. Jr. 2003, Taking Stock of the Regional Fishery 
Management Councils, Pew Charitable Trust, Washington D.C., pp. 1–2. 
36 Hanna, S.S. 2006, ‘Implementing effective regional ocean governance: Perspectives from 
economics’, Duke Environmental Law and Policy Forum, vol. 16, pp. 205–16, 211. See also the 
other articles in this issue. 
37 Ibid., p. 215. 
38 Fletcher, K.M. 2006, ‘Regional ocean governance: The role of the public trust doctrine’, Duke 
Environmental Law and Policy Forum, vol. 16, pp. 187–204, 200. 
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as an alternative to common property.39 Regulated private rights may be more 
effective than use of common property where all parties have a say in the provision 
of the many fishery services but no associated bearing of the opportunity and direct 
resource costs involved. 
5.4 Western US fresh water 
Water rights: delay, potential, limits 
In the face of rapid urban population growth, greater demands for recreational and 
environmental uses, and possibly more limited and/or variable precipitation with 
climate change, there are pressures to move water from historical uses in agriculture 
to meet urban and environmental demand. Currently, agriculture uses approximately 
80 per cent of the water and, on the margin, water values are much higher in urban 
and agricultural uses. For example, some farmers in southern California’s Imperial 
Irrigation District pay $20 per acre-foot of water while the City of San Diego has 
offered ten times that amount — $225 — per acre-foot for the same water.40 Even 
so, water markets have been slow to develop.41 
In the US west, the appropriative rights structure potentially allows for water 
markets to address some of these reallocation pressures. Under the appropriative 
doctrine, the first claimant can divert a certain amount of water from its natural 
course for private beneficial purposes on land remote from the point of diversion. 
Subsequent claimants can also divert water with lower priority rights. Because 
appropriative rights can be separated from the land, and sold or leased, they can be 
the basis for private water transfers in response to changing economic conditions 
and water values. But trades that change the location of water diversion, nature of 
use, and timing, especially if they are large relative to stream flow, are restricted by 
State law and regulated by State agencies. Some States have more restrictive 
regulations regarding transfers than do others. 
                                                 
39 Deacon, R.T. and Parker, D. forthcoming, ‘Encumbering harvest rights to protect marine 
environments: A model of marine conservation easements’, Australian Journal of Agricultural 
and Resource Economics. 
40 See Donohew, Z. forthcoming, ‘Property rights and western US water markets’, Australian 
Journal of Agricultural and Resource Economics; Brewer, J., Glennon, R., Ker, A. and Libecap, 
G.D. 2008, ‘Water markets in the west: Prices, trading and contractual forms’, Economic 
Inquiry, vol. 46, pp. 91–112. 
41 Young, R.A. 1986, ‘Why are there so few transactions among water users?’, American Journal 
of Agricultural Economics, vol. 68, no. 5, pp. 1143–51. 
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In a recent study, Brewer et al. (2008) detail the nature of water transactions over 19 
years across 12 western States. There is considerable variation in the extent of water 
trading and, of reported data, only about 2 per cent of water consumed is annually 
traded.42 Much of this activity is among farmers through one-year leases or 
between agricultural and urban users. Trades to environmental uses are rarer and 
usually due to court rulings and government mandates. 
There are a number of reasons for the comparatively limited movement of water 
through market processes.43 One is that surface water is difficult to bound, so that 
multiple parties might be affected from any privately-negotiated transfer. For 
instance, out-of-basin transfers may reduce recharge and stream flows and, hence, 
the amount of water available to lower-priority water claimants. 
A second, and more critical, factor is that water-rights owners have only usufruct 
rights and many parties (farmers, members of environmental and wildlife groups, 
urban users) claim an interest in water allocation and use. In this way, water is 
similar to ocean fisheries where the number of constituencies and objectives of 
management have grown, as noted above. Accordingly, there is resistance to 
recognising existing water rights and paying for them as part of any reallocation 
effort. Such payments are controversial because they appear to recognise an 
ownership right that does not formally exist. Further, such payments might drain the 
budgets of advocacy groups or State agencies. Third, monopoly conditions might be 
encountered where key water rights owners were in a position to hold out or extract 
most of the social surplus of the movement of water to environmental and 
recreational uses. 
Nevertheless, market transactions have values of their own. First, they generate 
information about relative water values and hence, the nature of opportunity costs. 
Since owners have the option of selling, they have incentive to determine just how 
much water they require and how much might be sold. Buyers have incentive to 
determine how much water is actually required to meet urban or environmental 
demands in the face of alternative uses. Second, water transactions and market 
values encourage investment in the stock of water by current owners. Third, market 
transactions can take place routinely and quickly to meet new social demands as 
they do for many other resources. Because owners are compensated, they have less 
incentive to block socially-valuable water movement. Accordingly, such 
transactions can be smooth and uncontroversial. 
                                                 
42 Brewer, J., Glennon, R., Ker, A. and Libecap, G.D. 2008, op.cit. There are undocumented, 
routine exchanges among farmers within irrigation districts. 
43 There are issues of quality and conveyance, but given rapidly rising water values, these factors 
are not likely to be binding on markets. 
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Despite these advantages, water transfers to meet environmental demands are often 
very contentious and lengthy. They occur through arbitrary reallocation, typically 
without compensation and implementation of common property-like regimes. The 
delay and wastes involved in these conflicts dissipate resource values. The Mono 
Lake case illustrates these issues and how they affect the response to environmental 
concerns. The alternative of greater reliance on water rights and trading is presented 
with discussion of the actions of the Oregon Water Trust. 
Common property: the public trust doctrine and Mono Lake  
The famous Mono Lake controversy, involving Los Angeles’ water, illustrates the 
use of common property through the public trust doctrine instead of private property 
rights. Between 1930 and 1940, the Los Angeles Department of Water and Power 
acquired riparian water rights to the four tributaries that feed Mono Lake, an 
alkaline and hypersaline lake situated in the eastern side of the Sierra Nevada 
mountains, roughly 300 miles northeast of the city.44 The agency applied to the 
State Water Resources Control Board (SWRCB) in 1940 for permits to appropriate 
the water and, in 1941, finished constructing an aqueduct and began diverting the 
water for urban use. In 1963, to further augment urban supplies, construction began 
on a second aqueduct, which was completed in 1970.45 While between 1940 and 
1970 an average of 57 067 acre-feet was exported to Los Angeles, with new 
aqueduct capacity exports increased to 100 000 acre-feet or more through 1975.46 
At the time, water for urban consumption was viewed as the highest and best use of 
the water. Indeed, the Mono Basin alone accounted for about 15 per cent of the 
city’s water.47 
Over time, however, these water exports had substantial adverse effects on Mono 
Lake and its surrounding environment. The tributaries dried up below the diversion 
points and the level of Mono Lake began to decline by about 1.6 feet a year. 
Between 1941 and 1981, the lake’s level fell about 46 feet, with one-third of that 
decline occurring after 1970. The surface area of Mono Lake diminished from 90 to 
                                                 
44 For discussion, see: Libecap, G.D. 2007, Owens Valley Revisited: A Reassessment of the West’s 
First Great Water Transfer, Stanford University Press, Palo Alto, pp. 132–7. 
45 http://wsoweb.ladwp.com/Aqueduct/historyoflaa/aqueductfacts.htm. 
46 National Audubon Society v. Superior Court (33 Cal. 3d 429). See also Libecap, G.D. 2007, 
op.cit., p. 138. 
47 Libecap, G.D. 2007, op.cit., pp. 132–7. 
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60 square miles, and its salinity increased from 50 grams per litre to 90 grams per 
litre.48 
As Mono Lake levels declined, the National Audubon Society, Friends of the Earth, 
the Sierra Club and a new coalition of environmental activists, the Mono Lake 
Committee, that had formed in 1978, brought suit under the public trust doctrine in 
May 1979 to curtail Los Angeles’ export of water. The plaintiffs charged that the 
public trust doctrine applied not only to navigable waterways, but to streams used 
for recreation, wildlife habitat, and ecological study; that Mono Lake was being 
harmed by Los Angeles; and that the city’s diversion was not a reasonable and 
beneficial use, as required by the State’s appropriative water rights system. This 
public trust argument posed a clear challenge to Los Angeles’ water rights. 
The ‘public trust’ is a common-law principle creating the legal right of the public to 
utilise certain lands and waters, such as tidewaters or navigable rivers, and other 
waters and natural resources with high amenity or public good values. Under the 
doctrine, the rights of the public are vested in the State as owner of the resource and 
trustee of its proper use. As a result, public trust resources are effectively common 
property with stakeholder membership very broadly defined. 
On 17 February 1983, in National Audubon Society v. Superior Court (33 Cal 3d 
419) the California Supreme Court held that exercise of appropriative water rights is 
subject to limitation by the State in order to protect public-trust values, including 
those of wildlife habitat: ‘Thus, the public trust is more than an affirmation of state 
power to use public property for public purposes. It is an affirmation of the duty of 
the state to protect the people’s common heritage of streams, lakes, marshlands and 
tidelands…’ (33 Cal 3d 441). According to the court, public-trust regulatory 
responsibilities applied ex post to existing water rights, and these rights were use 
rights only that could be reconsidered in light of changing perceptions of the trust. 
Regulatory agencies were required to monitor water use and reallocate it in a 
manner consistent with shifting notions of the public trust. 
Under this common property arrangement, constituencies with standing as part of 
the ‘public’ could lobby for changes in water use whenever they believed that 
current practices were inconsistent with the public trust. State agencies and courts 
would be responsive to these demands whenever they were politically salient and 
within the guidelines of past judicial rulings. No costs, however, are directly 
assigned from these actions, except for those borne by current water users, who are 
not compensated.  
                                                 
48 For discussion see Brewer, J. and Libecap, G.D. forthcoming, ‘Property rights and the public 
trust doctrine in environmental protection and natural resource conservation’, Australian 
Journal of Agricultural and Resource Economics. 
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In the case at hand, Los Angeles’ water rights were rejected and — facing the loss 
of valuable water rights as well as the value of past fixed investments in aqueducts, 
dams, reservoirs, and hydroelectric facilities — the city fought the reallocation of its 
water. It took over a decade of a complex series of subsequent court rulings and 
appeals before the California regulatory agency, the SWRCB, halted virtually all 
water exports until Mono Lake’s level reached 6377 feet above sea level. 
In the end, it took nearly 20 years from the initial effort to reduce diversions from 
the Mono Basin until the agency handed down its final decision. Millions of dollars 
were spent in the litigation. All the while, Mono Lake’s environment continued to 
worsen, streams remained dry, and riparian and aquatic habitats remained 
unrestored. 
Following the Mono case, other public-trust efforts have been launched to shift 
water from current uses, generally in agriculture, to environmental and recreational 
applications. These too typically have been very divisive, costly, and long-lasting.49 
A market-related response is an alternative approach for addressing conflicting 
public and private values as occurred in the Mono Lake case. In such a situation, 
rather than rejecting Los Angeles’ water rights under public-trust claims, State and 
Federal agencies might have purchased water to restore Mono Lake’s level to 
address public concerns. Where narrower private interests were involved, such as 
with individual stream fisheries, private fishing groups could have bought or leased 
water from Los Angeles. Organisations, such as the Oregon and Montana Water 
Trusts, regularly secure water from farmers in those States to maintain riparian 
habitats for fish and other species. 
Reliance on market transactions would have the advantages of producing more 
information about the relative values of water for current and proposed uses, and of 
reducing the conflict associated with uncompensated reallocations. Extreme 
demands encouraged by open standing under the public trust would have been 
tempered by the requirement to purchase. Where no voluntary agreements on water 
transfers for public environmental or recreational uses were forthcoming due to 
bilateral monopoly conditions, eminent domain with compensation could be used 
for government acquisition of water. The Oregon Water Trust is an example of an 
organisation that relies on markets for reallocation of water. 
                                                 
49 See, for example, the controversy over Friant Dam water releases: Friant Water Users Authority 
(FWUA) 2006, Settlement Press Release, http://www.fwua.org/settlment/supplemental/docs/ 
SJRS_ final_News_Release.pdf 
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Actions of the Oregon Water Trust as an example of water market 
processes for environmental benefits 
Under State laws in Oregon and some other western States, private organisations 
may acquire water rights by purchasing, leasing, or accepting donations for 
environmental applications, such as maintaining streamflow to protect fish stocks 
during dry periods. Once those rights are transferred from the previous water-rights 
owners (often irrigators) and converted to in-stream use, they must be assigned to 
the State and held in trust for in-stream public uses. 
In Oregon, such organisations include the Oregon Water Trust, the Deschutes River 
Conservancy, and the Klamath Basin Rangeland Trust. All three are not-for-profit 
groups formed to acquire water rights to enhance river flows for ecosystem 
restoration. Oregon’s laws permit several methods for converting existing water 
rights to in-stream use: standard leases, split-season leases, permanent transfers, and 
time-limited transfers. Split-season leases allow a water-right holder to use the 
water for an existing purpose, such as irrigation, for part of a year and leave the 
water in-stream for another part of the year. 
Split-season leases were developed so that irrigators could use their water in 
agriculture in the spring and early summer when instream flows are high and the 
additional value of putting more water in-stream is low. In late summer, the second 
half of the irrigation season, the water right is leased for in-stream use when flows 
are low and the value of in-stream water to protect environmental amenities is 
higher. Time-limited transfers allow for the water to be reallocated for short 
periods, such as for short-term drought, and then reverting to its original use.50 
Funding for the organisations comes from donations from private individuals, 
foundations, and the State and Federal governments.51 
The overall magnitude of these water market activities to provide environmental 
benefits is small, but growing. In Oregon, where there is the most activity, there 
were approximately 140 transactions in 2005, involving approximately 70 000 
acre-feet of water annually. One-year and five-year water leases were most 
common.52 The advantage of these activities is that they occur routinely, rapidly, 
and without contention. Further, they underscore existing property rights to water 
                                                 
50 King, M.A. 2004, ‘Getting our feet wet: An introduction to water trusts’, Harvard Law Review, 
vol. 28, no. 2, pp. 495–534; Landry, C.J. 1998, Saving Our Streams Through Water Markets: A 
Practical Guide, pamphlet, Political Economy Research Center, Bozeman. 
51 For example, see the 2006 Annual Report for the Deschutes River Conservancy. Substantial 
support comes from Bonneville power administration from the Columbia River basin. The 
Texas Water Trust is a State agency. 
52 Oregon Water Resources Department. In 2005, there were 868 leases and 34 sales. 
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and thereby maintain any beneficial incentives for investment in water quantity and 
quality. Finally, these exchanges generate information about the value of water in 
environmental uses and, hence, guide water allocation and use among both 
irrigators and those concerned about aquatic habitats. 
5.5 Concluding remarks and policy implications 
There is increased interest in the assignment and enforcement of property rights and 
the associated use of market mechanisms to provide environmental quality. Property 
rights and markets are attractive because they better align the incentives of the 
parties directly involved for reducing environmentally-damaging externalities. 
With command and control regulation, the setting is often one of extractors, 
harvesters, and emitters versus the state in the implementation and enforcement of 
regulatory policies. There are major incentives for free-riding. Little information is 
generated in this process to know exactly how much environmental quality to 
provide and at what cost. Once in place, regulations generate constituencies, 
creating inflexibility and, often, inefficiencies. 
With markets, on the other hand, the setting becomes more collaborative because 
with ownership there is potential for the parties involved to capture both costs and 
benefits.  
Self-enforcement becomes more prevalent. Ownership also identifies parties for 
bargaining over resource use and protection, creating the basis for trade to achieve 
environmental benefits. These trades provide valuable information to guide policy 
on the cost and value of environmental quality. And there are private incentives to 
invest in the resource. 
Two points have been made in this paper. One is that despite the advantages of 
property rights and markets, they typically are not the first response to the losses of 
open access. Rather, they are adopted late after considerable waste has occurred. 
There are important resource costs of bounding and enforcement, as well as 
important political costs due to allocation disputes. How these conflicts are 
addressed by public policy can influence just how effective the property-right 
structure might be. 
The second point is that broadening the scope of ‘ownership’ to include multiple 
and very different stakeholders can undermine the effectiveness of property regimes 
in providing environmental benefits. The pressure to be inclusive with common 
property is understandable, especially in light of the potential for public goods, such 
as biodiversity and other ecological services. Common property works best when 
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the number of parties is small, and they are in agreement on resource management 
objectives. Movement from these conditions, however, can lead to paralysis and 
ineffective measures to advance the environment. For these reasons, it may be 
preferable, when feasible, to define private property rights as the primary 
mechanism for governing resource use, but to regulate them to constrain behaviour 
and thereby reduce any externalities. 
Two US examples are used to demonstrate these arguments: fisheries and surface 
fresh water. In both cases, greater reliance on property rights and markets has come 
slowly, with delay. Crises have been instrumental in pushing privatisation. Even so, 
the process has been contentious. Inclusive common property, such as creation of 
regional fishery management organisations in fisheries and emphasis on the public 
trust doctrine in water either have or are likely to have limited effectiveness. Costs 
and benefits are not internalised individually in either case and there are no bases 
for private negotiations to provide environmental benefits. There may be cases 
where common property is optimal, but the tradeoffs between greater inclusion and 
higher decision-making and enforcement costs must be considered in policy 
debates. 
To conclude, there are growing institutional options to meet the increased demand 
for improved environmental outcomes. Property rights and markets are a key part of 
that menu. By sharpening incentives, reducing externalities, establishing trading 
opportunities, where they are feasible, private property rights and markets can 
promote the provision of environmental and natural resource benefits more 
smoothly, rapidly, and at lower cost than command and control regulation. And they 
may be superior to common-property regimes where the number of parties is large 
and heterogeneous. These insights are likely to be helpful in the design of policies 
as worldwide environmental and natural resource values rise. 
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6 On common ground: designing 
strategic spatial governance to 
advance integrated natural resource 
management and environmental 
outcomes1 
David J. Brunckhorst 
Institute for Rural Futures 
University of New England 
Abstract 
Despite a growing body of theory that emphasises the importance of socio-
spatial aspects in the representation of community interests, regionalisation for 
natural resource governance remains dominated by river catchments. At the 
same time, across many nations, local governments are being given increasing 
responsibilities for environmental and resource management, but work within 
boundaries that are largely historical artefacts. The confluence of these trends 
suggests that it is timely to examine the requirements for spatial definition of 
resource governance regions. A considerable body of research on ‘place’ 
attachment, social networks, and participatory resource management combined 
with institutional theory and political science suggests that joining forces to take 
responsibility for collective action towards sustainability is more likely within 
particular social-ecological contexts and scales. 
                                                 
1 This paper summarises several pieces of research that have benefited from input from many 
colleagues, in particular: Ian Reeve, Graham Marshall, Phil Morley, Elaine Barclay, Lin Ostrom, 
Meg McKean, Karl Bock, Michael Coleman, Margaret Shannon, Justine Graham, Richard 
Stayner, Phil Coop and Judith McNeil. Local governments, government agencies, community 
groups and individual farmers have also contributed. Elements of this research have been funded 
by Land and Water Australia, Rural Industries R&D Corporation, the Australian Research 
Council, New South Wales Department of Lands, and the Heinz Foundation (through US 
Department of Agriculture and US Fish & Wildlife). 
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This paper outlines some conceptual background, and then briefly describes 
three policy-relevant examples from recent research. The first two relate to ‘on-
ground’, cross-property resource collaborations; the first at a quite small ‘local’ 
landscape scale across four grazing properties (totaling 1 300 ha) within a small 
first-order stream sub-catchment on the New England Tablelands of New South 
Wales, and the second across several large ranches and National Forest Land in 
Idaho, United States (totaling around 700 000 ha). The third briefly describes the 
application of a new technique developed to delineate more appropriate spatial 
units, reflecting social-ecological context and other institutional design principles, 
at three nested scales. The Eco-Civic regionalisation technique could be applied 
across the continent to develop an improved regional framework for natural 
resource management (NRM), environmental stewardship, planning and regional 
development, and service delivery. 
6.1 Spatial resource governance across landscapes of 
property and policy: ‘Tilbuster Commons … beyond 
the boundary fence’ 
Under conventional property rights regimes, primary producers are required to fully 
utilise the resources available within their own property title boundaries in order to 
survive economically. Properties have tended to be ‘split up’, with reduced resource 
or economic viability. A typical landholding may comprise some high quality soil 
that is suitable for cropping, grazing land that is generally not suitable for cropping, 
and some poorer areas barely suited to grazing. The type and mix of these areas will 
vary depending on the topography and soils of the region. Faced with various 
family and economic pressures and with only these resources at the landholder’s 
disposal, there is often no option but to overuse, or inappropriately use, each type of 
resource. The productive riparian land is inevitably cropped, possibly for summer as 
well as winter feed for livestock. But grazing land might need to be cropped also. 
Stock will usually have access to the creek for water. The mid-quality land will be 
grazed throughout the year and the poorer areas will slowly decline due to the 
impacts of livestock ‘wintering over’. Input costs tend to increase to help production 
and counter negative trends of water quality, parasite load and reducing production 
from both farmed and grazed areas. 
Developing a cross-property or ‘common’ resource collaboration 
The ‘Tilbuster Commons’ project embarked on the challenging experiment of 
forming a contemporary ‘common’, simply by agreeing to a collaborative grazing 
enterprise across their individual landholdings (to which they retained title). 
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Individual graziers contributed land, livestock, infrastructure and labour to form the 
common-property grazing resource arrangement. The project, developed as an ‘on-
ground learning-by-doing’ experiment, aimed to understand how such a 
collaborative model might be established and evolve in a way which might be 
acceptable, in some situations, to ‘traditional’ farming families. The model needed 
to be able to demonstrate equivalent financial returns plus other benefits to 
collaborating landholders, or better, while delivering improved sustainability of the 
productive resource through the allocation of resources for the maintenance of 
ecological integrity, achievable only through an integrated management regime at a 
more appropriate scale (Brunckhorst and Marshall 2007). While the Tilbuster 
Commons group of collaborating landholders and their families ‘self-selected’ their 
participation on the basis of their shared values, concerns and future aspirations, the 
project area was selected as it contained many of the social and ecological issues 
and challenges that face rural communities. The four grazing families involved in 
the Tilbuster Commons experiment own adjacent properties of varying size totalling 
a land resource base of approximately 1300 ha. The land types associated with each 
member’s land parcel vary greatly. The smaller properties were not insignificant, 
because they consist almost entirely of very high quality alluvial soils. Two of the 
larger landholdings consist of more variable soil types, but also contribute some 
high value conservation areas. Whilst there are larger single landholdings on the 
New England Tablelands, these four farms are typical of many of the landholdings 
managed in the area and issues associated with small farm size. 
Considerable discussion and planning led the group to consider the kind of legal 
structures and corporate arrangements they needed. The group felt strongly, 
however, that a simple company structure, which farm families are generally 
comfortable with, would also provide both the flexibility required and a means to 
expand or ‘disassemble’ the Commons in response to future pressures of change. 
The range of issues discussed included livestock management, planned grazing and 
pasture management, the strategic allocation of conservation and environmental 
rehabilitation areas, and the issues associated with the operation of the Commons 
(such as management structure, bookkeeping and accounting). Other issues at the 
forefront of discussions included the allocation of land to the Commons (small areas 
are retained for private use, primarily the areas around each member’s home), the 
selection of key infrastructure, the development of a ‘formula’ which represents the 
interests of each member in the common and the allocation of land or resources to 
the maintenance of ecosystem function which is recognised as underpinning the 
productive sustainability of the common. The arrangement of landholders as equal 
directors of the company, however, established a ‘conflict of interest’, because the 
landholders are also directors of the company. This is a valuable and useful tension 
between the individual landholder’s interests and the collective interests of the 
group of landholders represented in the company. With both hats on, individuals are 
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always considering the best options of benefit to themselves and the other members 
through the company. Informal operational rules can be enforced; when the 
livestock are on your property, for instance, you are responsible for managing them. 
The landholders, as directors of the company, have a share issue based on the 
formula agreed by all (representing proportional contributions of land, stock, 
equipment and so on contributed by individual landowners), which also forms the 
basis for sharing profits. As company directors they are making the collective 
decisions for running the enterprises of the collective and managing the whole 
resource base that their land, and the creek that runs through it, represents across the 
landscape (Williamson, Brunckhorst and Kelly 2003). 
Individual and collective benefits of collaboration 
Individual and collective social benefits of collaboration include freeing up of time 
and labour and pooling of various expertise. This in turn helps build flexibility and 
resilience. For example, some simple but highly regarded benefits enjoyed by the 
participating landholders include more efficient accounting and management 
practices, shared labour (but also less labour such as eliminating the need to crop for 
winter feed), the chance for families to ‘get away’ to have a real holiday and being 
able to leave the gate open when the livestock herd are on another property (for 
detailed discussion see Marshall 2005, Brunckhorst and Marshall 2007). 
A valuable aspect of cross-property resource management collaborations is the 
ability to allocate the available resources more efficiently, but within their 
functional capacity. By recognising the distinction between resource allocation and 
utilisation (the geographical elements) and land tenure (a part of the institutional 
elements), these landholders may consolidate their herds and graze them across all 
collaborating properties (figure 6.1). This allows the utilisation of grazing 
techniques such as planned grazing regimes over a much wider area (across all 
properties). Input costs were greatly reduced and production increased, offering 
benefits including improved pasture and weed management, water and drought 
management (Brunckhorst and Coop 2003). In addition, pest issues such as external 
and internal parasite control are now managed far more effectively, but with 
reduced costs in terms of fencing or chemical needs. No cropping for winter feed 
(nor purchase of feed; trace minerals are provided for livestock health and soil 
replenishment) has been necessary so far and, while essential natural minerals are 
provided for stock, no superphosphate or similar fertilizer applications are now 
used. 
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Figure 6.1 Separation and allocation of landscape resources for collective 
management across landscapes of property and policy 
The Tilbuster Commons collaboration managed to completely remove the impacts 
of livestock on the creek system across properties. Water quality in the creek has 
measurably improved. This is partly due to the landscape scale of pasture 
management and the grazing plan which allows long rest periods and generally a 
high standing biomass of pasture, together with fencing and rehabilitation of the 
creek across the properties. Alternative stock water could be made available, even 
piped (cost-effectively) across properties as necessary. Collectively these farming 
enterprises are more efficient and include the potential for scaling up to more 
suitable resource use across all properties of the collective. Finally, reducing input 
costs, freeing up labour and time, increasing pasture production and drought 
resilience all add up to better financial returns and well-being while building a more 
sustainable (resilient) landscape. 
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6.2 Regional resource governance across landscapes 
of property and policy: Idaho ranchers and Forest 
Service … ‘dancing with wolves’ 
Policy-makers, planners, landscape ecologists and conservation scientists are 
increasingly finding themselves at odds with property and policy systems that create 
barriers to effective ecological management and conservation. Rather than fighting 
such embedded institutions, innovative approaches to circumvent such barriers 
might be more efficient and effective for ‘scaling-up’ landscape planning and 
management. Combining lessons from successful — old or new — cross-tenure 
management arrangements and collective (cross-property or common property) 
resource management institutions can provide a means of collaboratively managing 
landscapes. 
A variety of land and resource tenures, and policy decrees, have a considerable 
influence on social-ecological systems resilience. Various forms of property and 
resource rights (private, public, collective) are a key influence on landscape change 
and the degradation (or potential resilience) of ecological resources and ecosystem 
services at regional scales. Property rights play an important role in resource 
management, but create problems in the management of externalities. Our systems 
of property rights, administrative jurisdictions, policy and resource-management 
institutions, need to be more seamlessly integrated at various levels of resource 
governance and institutional arrangements to match landscape scales of social-
ecological interdependencies. An increasing number of examples demonstrate novel 
arrangements for cross-tenure and cross-jurisdictional resource management and 
conservation. Building flexible adaptive capacity from novel ‘on-ground’, cross-
tenure and cross-jurisdictional, collective action will also provide transferable and 
adaptive solutions with appropriate incentives to enhance multiple scales of 
resource and environmental management. The following project is one of several 
which have developed through adapting knowledge about cross-property 
institutions for collective, integrated NRM, building further on the lessons from the 
Tilbuster Commons experiment. 
Collaborating for grazing and environmental restoration across public 
and private tenure 
A group of public and private land managers have joined forces to collectively 
manage such areas along with more sustainable rotational livestock grazing 
practices across properties and tenure. Along these adjoining private ranches and 
public land of the National Forest Service in Idaho in the Unites States, the riparian 
areas and wetlands have been enormously degraded in recent decades, not simply 
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from domestic livestock, but more from large wild grazing ungulates such as elk, 
moose and deer. The Lava Lake Land and Livestock Collaborative in southern 
Idaho manages almost 310 000 ha of public and private land for sheep and cattle 
ranching, conservation, and river and wetland restoration. Therefore, one 
component of the conservation and restoration of wetlands and streams has been the 
reintroduction of the wolf — along with adopting new ways of planning and 
managing livestock grazing to avoid the wolves. The wolves keep large native 
herbivores such as elk from continuously ‘camping’ on, and degrading, stream-side 
vegetation. Over the past four years, to everyone’s delight, there have been no 
livestock losses to wolves, probably due to the use of different grazing management 
techniques. These management strategies include keeping stock in tight groups, 
giving them long grazing rotations, and protecting them at night with temporary 
electric fencing. 
Some of the keys to success, however, include good communication, planning, and 
clear rules of engagement designed — and upheld — by all the collaborating parties 
(see Ostrom 1990, McKean 1996, Marshall 2005). The ranchers and public land 
managers have adapted well to managing their land and livestock differently. They 
are enthusiastically observing the surprisingly fast regeneration of pasture and other 
grasslands (prairie), streams and wetlands. 
Two other similar projects, one in northern Oregon and another in Idaho, are also 
providing insights into successful cross-property collaborations across public and 
private tenure for regional landscape-scale integration of community development, 
sustainable grazing, forest use, ecological restoration and biodiversity conservation. 
Similar adaptations, for example, kangaroo-based enterprises — very large scale, 
across property and tenure — could assist sustainable environmental management 
in Australia’s rangelands. 
6.3 Strategic regional governance — institutions and 
landscapes in understanding regions as cross-
scale Eco-Civic frameworks 
Along with many areas of public policy, integrated catchment management has 
shifted from technocratic planning to various forms of participative planning. In 
Australia, this shift took place in the late 1980s and early 1990s, with little 
consideration either of the implications for the definition of resource governance 
regions, or of the considerable body of theory in the social sciences that is relevant 
to the regionalisation issue, such as theories of place attachment, central places, 
gravity modelling, institutional design and hierarchy theory. During the same 
period, local government has increasingly been given a considerable responsibility 
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for local environmental planning and management. The emergence of catchments 
and watersheds as the dominant method to delineate regions for resource 
governance has assumed that soils, vegetation, other biodiversity, land use, and 
ground water, along with community engagement and collective action, are best 
defined by such entities. Within the integrated catchment management literature, 
most authors accept unquestioningly that catchments should form the areal units 
within which natural resource governance takes place. 
There is a growing weight of evidence, however, against the assumption that 
catchment-based regions or local government areas automatically incorporate all 
environmental and resource governance issues and their communities of interest. 
Accordingly, there are an increasing number of critiques of catchment boundaries as 
spatial frameworks for integrating multiple resource governance. At least part of the 
reason for these shortcomings is that catchments usually do not represent very well 
either the ‘place attachment’ and communities of interest for civic engagement and 
participation, or the ecological resource base (Brandenburg and Carroll 1995, 
Barham 2001, Cheng, Kruger and Daniels 2003, Blomquist and Schlager 2005). 
Ecological and biophysical regionalisations and land-use regions also demonstrate 
that similar biophysical attributes, land use and climate have little correlation to 
watershed topography or to areas of interest to land use communities (Omernik and 
Bailey 1997, Getches 1998, Brunckhorst 2000, Ewing 2003, Lane, McDonald and 
Morrison 2004, O’Neill 2005). In practice, catchment management has a history of 
inefficiency, inappropriate monitoring and high transaction costs associated with it. 
Syme, Butterworth and Nancarrow (1994) went so far as to suggest that 
organisation of community involvement on catchment boundaries acts against the 
achievement of the stated goals and purposes of integrated catchment management. 
Three principles might underpin the development of regionalisations for 
government administration of, and community participation in, natural resource 
governance. The principles relate to the spatio-social context representing 
communities of interest, optimised for homogeneity of the ecological landscape, 
and spatially bounded in a nested hierarchy to facilitate scaling of institutional 
arrangements for management of externalities. While a few small catchments and 
watersheds might possess these characteristics, most do not. The majority of non-
metropolitan local government areas do not reflect these characteristics either, 
especially in relation to local-to-regional ‘communities of interest’ in the twenty-
first century. Policy makers would be wise to match a nested framework for natural 
resource governance with local government and other service delivery ‘regions’ that 
best capture the area of interest to local residents for representation, economic 
activity, resource activity and civic engagement.  
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Eco-Civic regionalisation for resource governance 
Despite the mounting criticisms of catchments as natural resource governance 
regions, and the growing conceptual and theoretical development in socio-spatial 
aspects of natural resource governance, there have been surprisingly few attempts to 
propose and apply empirical techniques of regionalisation that might address some 
of these criticisms and build on this growing body of theory around the concept of 
‘Social Catchments’ and ‘Communities of Interest’. 
What is a ‘region’ for resource governance? The placement of boundaries to define 
regions for integrated resource governance warrants more careful analysis than it 
has been accorded in the past. With growing emphasis on community engagement, 
there is also increasing understanding by both scientists and policy makers that 
many resource governance issues relate to the complex interdependencies of social 
and ecological systems operating at various scales (Berkes and Folke 1998). 
Concepts of federalism (polycentric governance) for efficiencies in ecological and 
economic management, useful in simplifying complexity and assigning levels of 
responsibility, have been employed to demonstrate design of administrative and 
spatial units for planning and management. In developing the Eco-Civic 
regionalisation technique, it was necessary to distil from the growing literature on 
socio-spatial aspects of natural resource governance some principles that could 
inform the detailed methodological development. 
Three key principles are considered to be of particular importance in defining 
spatial boundaries of regions for resource governance. The first required condition 
is for regional boundaries that maximise the representation of ‘place identity’, 
community social networks and the local areas of most interest to community 
residents (Hillery 1955, Brandenburg and Carroll 1995, Feld and Brasso 1996). The 
second condition that assists with planning and resource management is the relative 
homogeneity of multiple biophysical characteristics of regional landscapes. The 
third condition is for optimal collective representation of social-ecological contexts 
at multiple scales, as nested local-to-regional contexts for decision-making levels 
and institutional design in order to deal with social-ecological interdependencies 
including externalities (Brunckhorst, Coop and Reeve 2006). 
Empirical derivation of resource governance regions 
The method developed for empirical derivation of resource governance regions 
required the formulation of the concept of a ‘social surface’ or ‘social topography’ 
which geographically represents (by height and extent) the shared community area 
of interest (see Brunckhorst, Coop and Reeve 2006, Reeve and Brunckhorst 2007). 
The technique consisted of three major components: 
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1. derivation of a hierarchy of biophysical regions (to satisfy Principles 1 and 3) 
2. derivation of a social surface and a hierarchy of ‘civic’ regions defined by the 
‘valleys’ in social surface (to satisfy Principles 1 and 2) 
3. optimisation of the boundaries of the two hierarchical regionalisations so that all 
three Principles are satisfied to the maximum degree possible. 
The biophysical regionalisation was based on elevation, soil moisture, soils, and 
climate data at scales of 1 km or finer, using the ERDAS Imagine 8.5 classification 
routine. The result was a hierarchical biophysical regionalisation comprising eight 
major regions (level 1), each of which was divided into sub-regions (level 2). The 
level 2 sub-regions were further subdivided into two or more level 3 sub-regions. 
Derivation of a social surface or topography of communities of interest was 
approached through development of a modelling technique that initially used 
primary data to inform secondary data and modelling parameters specific to 
different regional contexts (for example, coast, tablelands, slopes, plains). This 
modelling approach was founded on results from an earlier study, focused on 
northern New South Wales, based entirely on primary data gathered via a spatially 
even, social survey that included maps for respondents to correlate with a variety of 
question framings (Brunckhorst, Coop and Reeve 2006), and which utilised insights 
from theories of place and cognitive mapping (for example, Brandenburg and 
Carroll 1995, Feld and Brasso 1996, Cheng, Kruger and Daniels 2003). The shape, 
orientation and sizes of the community areas which respondents had drawn 
suggested that it would be possible to model community areas for extension of the 
methodology to a study of the whole of the state (for methodological details, see 
Brunckhorst, Coop and Reeve 2006, Reeve and Brunckhorst 2007). To avoid 
excessive population of home points in metropolitan areas, a continuously variable 
population fraction was used, where the fraction was an inverse function of 
population density (for details refer to further reading list). The State was divided 
into five regions, each region having different modelling parameters in accord with 
contextual variables chosen to reflect the variation known from the earlier study. 
The final step in the modelling procedure was to assign each simulated community 
area a height of one unit in a third dimension at right angles to the north-south and 
east-west dimensions of the map of New South Wales. Working in this three-
dimensional space, the simulated community areas were summed to produce a 
‘social surface’ (see Brunckhorst, Coop and Reeve 2006). High points on this 
surface corresponded to points that lay within the community areas of relatively 
large numbers of people (strictly, large numbers of simulated home points). Low 
points on the surface corresponded to points that lay within the community areas of 
relatively few people. As proposed in Principle 2 above, it is these low points in the 
  
 
 STRATEGIC SPATIAL 
GOVERNANCE 
95
 
social surface that are suitable areas through which resource-governance region 
boundaries might pass (figure 6.2). 
To produce a hierarchy of regions based on the simulated social surface it is 
necessary to locate major and minor ‘valleys’ in the social topography. Boundaries 
based on the major ‘valleys’ will define larger level-1 regions, and boundaries 
following the ‘valleys’ within these regions will define the smaller level-2 sub-
regions. Once again, boundaries on minor ‘valleys’ within the level-2 sub-regions 
will define the yet smaller level-3 sub-regions. In some areas, the ‘topography’ of 
the social surface did not necessarily give a strong indication as to the placement of 
boundaries. This was a consequence of broad shallow ‘valleys’ in the surface, or the 
presence of several ‘valleys’ in close proximity that were equally good candidates 
for the location of a boundary. For this reason, verification via a telephone survey of 
a number of community organisations with hierarchical structures of local, regional 
and state branches was undertaken. In addition, ‘key informants’ were also surveyed 
as an efficient way of gathering surrogate data and for ‘on ground verification’. 
More than 400 interviews with key informants of the Country Women’s 
Association, Hockey Associations, Soccer Associations and Netball Associations 
were completed. Interviewees were asked about the localities where their 
organisation interacted as part of social activities and/or sporting competitions. 
Information from the telephone survey of community organisations and the 
‘network of social valleys’ were combined to produce a three-level hierarchical 
regionalisation of the modelled social surface. 
The accuracy boundaries derived from the combined modelling approach were 
compared against boundaries derived from primary spatial survey data. The earlier 
studies provided primary data to measure empirically the social surface and 
associated set of civic regions for north eastern New South Wales, against which the 
modelled civic regions could be tested. A classification matrix was used to record, 
for each civic region, the proportion of home points that were assigned to the same 
civic region when the modelled surface was used to derive the boundaries between 
the regions. The level of agreement between the modelled boundaries and the 
measured boundaries in north eastern New South Wales was extremely good, with 
correct classifications of more than 98.6 per cent of the 1 973 home points in the 
region for which primary data was available (Kappa = 0.982, p<0.0005). 
Optimisation of derived Eco-Civic regions 
The boundaries that define the biophysical regionalisation do not necessarily 
coincide with the boundaries of the civic regionalisation, although the coincidence 
is fairly good along the eastern escarpment of the northern tablelands. This is 
because a sparsely settled area coincides with a major climatic, floral and faunal 
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discontinuity in the landscape. In many areas, it is necessary to adjust the 
boundaries of the civic regions to bring them into closer coincidence with the 
boundaries of the ‘eco-regions’ of the biophysical regionalisation. Flexibility in 
options for boundary placement is possible because the ‘valleys’ in the social 
surface can be quite broad. This is particularly so for the ‘valleys’ at lower 
‘altitudes’ in the social surface. A boundary can therefore be moved reasonable 
distances within the confines of a ‘social valley’, without causing a significant 
increase in the number of community areas that are intersected (that is, dividing 
communities of interest) by the boundary. At broader scales (that is, level 1), 
therefore, the optimisation routine can give more weight to the biophysical 
boundaries. However, at finer scales (that is, level 3), it is necessary to ensure that 
the optimisation routine does not shift boundaries into relatively high areas on the 
social surface. The general procedure and results of the Eco-Civic regionalisation 
for New South Wales are shown in figure 6.2. (Details of the method and results can 
be found in the listed published papers and the Institute website 
(www.ruralfutures.une.edu.au).) 
Comparing the performance of ‘regions’ 
For any given administrative region, some community areas will be wholly within 
the region boundary, while others will be intersected by the region boundary. The 
proportion of a local resident’s community that is wholly within a region boundary, 
compared to the total number of people living within that boundary, provides an 
index of the performance of the particular resource governance region’s boundaries, 
in terms of its ability to include the areas that are of interest to residents. The 
‘Community Capture Index’ (CCI) provides a means of comparing the performance 
of different regions in terms of the extent to which people’s community areas are 
intersected by region boundaries. In conformity with Principle 2 above, a 
regionalisation with boundaries that intersect fewer community areas (higher value 
of the CCI), is preferable to a regionalisation that intersects a greater number of 
community areas (lower value of CCI). 
Comparison of CCIs of the three levels of the Eco-Civic regionalisation, and for a 
range of current administrative regions in New South Wales, including the 
Catchment Management Authority (CMA) regions which are based on catchment 
boundaries, was undertaken. The results demonstrate that the current administrative 
boundaries and those of the CMAs are poorly located if the intersection of people’s 
community areas by these boundaries is to be minimised. They do not encompass 
the majority of the areas of interest to local communities for civic engagement in 
NRM and governance. Indeed, local government boundaries and CMA boundaries  
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Figure 6.2 Summary diagram of the Eco-Civic regionalisation method and 
results for the state of New South Wales  
(After Reeve and Brunckhorst 2007) 
perform worse than a random allocation of regional boundaries would in 
representing communities of interest, whereas the Eco-Civic regions perform well 
(figure 6.3). Fragmentation of residents’ areas of collective interest reduces 
participation and effectiveness of planning, creates logger-heads and increases 
transaction costs. Potential institutional (re-)design is likely to be more effective 
given the spatially-nested ‘common grounds’ provided by the Eco-Civic 
regionalisation technique (Reeve and Brunckhorst 2007). 
The Eco-Civic research has established a practical method to produce a hierarchical 
regionalisation that will satisfy the proposed principles. This approach involves 
identifying where boundaries between resource governance regions should pass so 
as to minimise the fragmentation of the areas of the landscape with which local 
people identify and in which they have an interest for civic participation. Boundary 
placement is further optimised to ensure that natural resource issues and ecosystem  
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Figure 6.3 Community Capture Index (CCI) for various administrative 
regions and Eco-Civic regions 
The line tracks CCI values that would be achieved by a random allocation of 
regions 
functions are as homogeneous as possible within the regions defined by the 
boundaries. Applied nationally, an Eco-Civic regionalisation of Australia would 
improve civic engagement and integrative capacity of policy. In particular, it would 
provide for the design of spatial frameworks for local-to-regional governance, 
within which to plan and manage towards sustainability across multiple scales of 
human living areas, communities and natural resource management including water 
management. 
6.4 Conclusions 
Ecological systems, services and resources need to be managed to increase 
resilience and sustainability of interdependent social-ecological systems across 
landscapes of property, policy and place. While adaptation to climate change, 
including trading schemes for adjustment to carbon and water futures, are of 
necessity in the long term, Australian governments and communities currently face 
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crippling environmental degradation of the nation’s already limited resources base 
and natural capital for food production and other resource use and management. The 
spatial context of social-ecological interactions is critically important for building 
institutions leading to resilience and sustainability. 
Novel approaches to strategic spatial governance, coupled with institutional design 
at appropriate cross-scale levels, are likely to improve engagement with and 
outcomes from environmental and natural resource management. Australian NRM 
regions are in need of re-thinking and re-design to represent levels of social-
ecological systems and externalities appropriately within matching institutions. A 
national Eco-Civic regionalisation would contribute to this purpose and facilitate 
new policy directions to improve environmental outcomes of NRM, regional 
planning and local government. 
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7 Greenhouse gases and nutrients:  
the interactions between concurrent 
New Zealand trading systems 
Suzi Kerr and Marianna Kennedy 
Motu Economic and Public Policy Research  
Abstract 
Emissions trading and nutrient trading interact in critical ways. The agricultural 
sector is a major emitter of both nutrients and greenhouse gases in New 
Zealand. Thus the simultaneous implementation of such systems will have a 
large impact on the farmers in affected catchments. Many of the mitigation 
options that are available to farmers, for example reducing animal numbers, will 
reduce both nutrient loss and greenhouse gas emissions. Thus the combined 
cost of control could be much less than the sum of the costs of the separate 
systems. The allocation of units under each system will also affect the same 
people. Monitoring systems for each pollutant could have common elements, but 
could also impose a double burden. The interactions between the two systems 
will complicate the decision-making process for farmers and need to be 
considered when the policies are designed so that they are as complementary 
as possible. 
7.1 Introduction 
New Zealand authorities are considering market-based instruments as a way of 
dealing with pollution externalities including greenhouse gas emissions and nutrient 
loss causing water pollution. Nationally, an emissions trading scheme (ETS) is in 
development to assist in meeting our Kyoto obligations. In some catchments, 
nutrient-trading systems are being considered, or implemented, to control nutrient 
loss into waterways where water quality is declining. A nutrient trading system is 
already in place for the Lake Taupo catchment and Environment Bay of Plenty is 
actively considering the use of a nutrient trading system for the Lake Rotorua 
catchment. 
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The two types of system interact in critical ways. The agricultural sector is a major 
emitter of both nutrients and greenhouse gases in New Zealand. Thus the 
simultaneous implementation of such systems could have a large impact on the 
farmers in affected catchments. If the ETS is implemented at farm scale, some 
farmers would be required to determine and report both pollutants leaving their 
property, and buy and sell allowances as their land-use and management practices 
change. They will face compliance costs (understanding the systems and reporting), 
will need to change land use and management in response to their new economic 
circumstances, and will face financial costs to the extent that they mitigate and need 
to purchase allowances. 
The cost of responding to both systems may be lower than the sum of the costs of 
each individual system. For example, many of the emission reduction and 
mitigation options available to farmers will reduce both nutrient loss and 
greenhouse gas emissions. This is not always the case, however. Enhanced wetlands 
decrease nutrient loss off farmland, but do not decrease — and in some cases may 
even increase — greenhouse gas emissions. In addition, monitoring systems for 
each pollutant could have common elements but could also impose a double burden. 
Interactions between the two systems will complicate the decision-making process 
for farmers and need to be considered when the policies are designed so they are as 
complementary as possible. 
This paper surveys interactions between one specific nutrient trading system, that 
proposed for the Lake Rotorua catchment, and the agricultural component of the 
New Zealand emissions trading system. We discuss issues of price, reporting and 
verification, scope, mitigation costs, motivations for free allocation, and 
externalities over time. While we offer only a brief outline of each of these issues, 
the paper draws on our extensive policy research and integrated modelling work in 
each system.1 
Nutrient trading 
Nutrient trading applies market-based instruments to the problem of water pollution. 
Our work looks specifically at nutrient trading in the Lake Rotorua catchment, but it 
could be applied in a wider range of places. The system we propose is cap and 
trade: it has a cap on the total amount of nutrients coming into the lake and tradable 
allowances equal to the cap. The cap is equal to the level of nutrients required to 
meet an agreed environmental goal. 
                                                 
1 www.motu.org.nz/nutrient_trading and www.motu.org.nz/climate  
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Each year, farmers report the nutrients leaving their property using a 
computer-based model, and surrender allowances to match. If farmers hold more 
allowances than they require, these can be sold to farmers with insufficient 
allowances. The trading process will determine market price for these permits. 
Nutrients reach the lake through groundwater and surface flows. They cannot be 
seen or measured, and instead must be monitored using a model. The particular 
model being developed in New Zealand is called OVERSEER, though alternatives 
exist. Farmers input their activities and the farm’s geophysical characteristics, and 
the model estimates the amount of nutrients leaving the property each year. In 
particular, farmers must report animal numbers and fertiliser use. 
Emissions trading 
Agricultural emissions trading is very much in development as a core component of 
New Zealand’s ETS. The New Zealand government has an allocation of Assigned 
Amount Units (AAUs) under our Kyoto obligations, which equates to New 
Zealand’s allowable tonnes of carbon emissions. We can supplement these with 
carbon sequestration, and we can also buy units on the international market. 
The national cap-and-trade system is similar to that described for nutrient trading, 
but differs in that it is essentially embedded within a bigger cap-and-trade system. 
The national system is an attempt to devolve responsibility for emissions to 
individual actors who are capable of behavioural change. To do this, private sector 
actors will be required to acquire NZ units through free allocation or by purchase. 
Private actors are responsible for reporting information that can be used to model 
greenhouse gas emissions from their chain of production. The sum of individual 
actors’ emissions across all sectors and gases (plus any small sources excluded from 
the system) should sum to the national obligation. For agricultural emissions 
trading, the default point of obligation for emissions is the processor, though 
assessing emissions at farm level also remains under consideration. These details of 
the scheme are yet to be determined. 
For the purposes of this paper we consider agricultural emissions trading at the farm 
level of obligation. As for nutrient trading, private actors surrender emission units to 
match emissions inferred using a model. Under a separate component of the ETS, if 
farmers have the benefits of post-1990 forestry or native regeneration on their land, 
they can claim emission units to match sequestration. 
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Scientific background 
We are concerned with two related sets of emissions. Agricultural emissions trading 
controls the greenhouse gases, nitrous oxide and methane. Nutrient trading controls 
nitrates and phosphorus, which cause hazardous algal blooms in waterways in New 
Zealand. Both pollutants are produced predominantly by pastoral agriculture. 
Farm management designed to reduce greenhouse gases can also reduce nutrient 
loss. Reducing stocking rates reduces methane and nitrous oxide roughly in 
proportion to the consequent reduction in feed intake and can reduce nitrate loss 
even further. If you are already controlling gas emissions, by felicity you can also 
control nutrient losses, and vice versa. 
In some instances, the effects will not be so felicitous. For example, using straw 
bales to catch run-off reduces nutrient loss, but may increase nitrous oxide. This is 
because capturing nutrients creates more opportunity for them to escape into the 
atmosphere. 
In many cases, however, greenhouse gas regulation may not be a significant extra 
burden for farmers who already control for nutrient loss. Introducing an emissions 
trading system effectively reduces demand for nutrient allowances, leading to a 
price drop in the nutrient market. In effect, farmers will pay less for nutrients and 
will instead start paying for greenhouse gases. 
7.2 What are the similarities and differences between 
nutrient trading and emission trading? 
The burden of nutrient trading and emissions trading depends on a number of 
potential interactions between the two proposed schemes. This section sets out 
issues of price, reporting and verification, scope, mitigation opportunities, 
motivations for free allocation, and externalities over time. 
Price 
For nutrient trading, the Regional Council sets the nutrient cap, and the price is 
determined entirely by what happens within the catchment. 
By contrast, New Zealand has very little control over greenhouse gas emission 
prices. The Kyoto cap is set internationally through negotiations in which we are a 
very small player. For the global ‘carbon’ market we are price takers and therefore 
exposed to international changes. 
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In both systems, the council or government could choose to protect farmers from 
extreme prices and volatility by providing a ‘safety valve’ or price at which they 
will provide additional units. 
Reporting and verification 
If agricultural emissions are reported at farm scale, reporting and verification is very 
similar for both systems. Both involve pollutants that cannot be directly measured, 
but can be modelled through OVERSEER.  
The challenge is to design a model with verifiable data inputs that accurately reflect 
nutrient losses and greenhouse gas emissions. The data must be verifiable or it 
would be impossible to determine compliance. The data inputs should also enable a 
range of mitigation options. Farmers want to be able to respond to both systems in 
ways that will not cost too much. 
For both systems there is a real issue about the acceptability of regulation based on 
uncertain, inaccurate science. You can hear murmurings about nutrient trading and 
also emissions trading, saying ‘Why are we bearing cost when you’re not even 
really sure what’s going on?’ There is quite a lot of resistance on this basis. 
Traditionally, resistance where science has been uncertain has been beneficial to 
farmers because it has allowed them to avoid regulation. In this case, however, once 
the inevitability of Kyoto obligations or nutrient targets is accepted, acceptance of 
some of the uncertainty in modelling of mitigation options would allow farmers 
more flexibility and lower the burden on them. 
This raises an economic question: what is the value of extra information? Perfect 
accuracy is not possible in this situation, but how valuable is it to be more accurate? 
This question is a transactions cost versus accuracy trade-off. There is an economic 
cost if negative perceptions lead to the system working inefficiently. 
Scope 
Another issue that arises in both systems is determining who should participate. For 
nutrient trading there are arguments for higher participation and arguments for 
lower participation. Applying the same arguments to emissions trading suggests that 
direct participation in the latter scheme should be somewhat lower overall. 
To maximise environmental benefit from a nutrient trading system, it is desirable to 
have as many sources monitored and covered by the regulation as possible. It can 
also be difficult to monitor the activities of those who are not included. This has 
been seen in New Zealand fisheries, where commercial fishing is tightly controlled 
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and recreational fishing has very few controls. Those not included in the system as 
direct participants have less incentive to mitigate their nutrient losses, which leads 
to loss of efficiency. Nonparticipants may not use low-cost mitigation options 
because they do not lead to economic advantage through the sale of allowances. A 
greater number of participants might increase market liquidity, which could be an 
issue if the number of projected participants is really low. More participants might 
also avoid some market power problems.  
Transaction costs are the primary reason to limit involvement. It costs to comply 
with this sort of system, to determine and report farm nutrient losses and to learn 
how to gain the most benefit from trading. Dealing with many participants is also 
costly to the regulator who needs to verify reports and enforce compliance. In the 
prototype nutrient trading system, we propose that very small properties are simply 
made the responsibility of the district or regional council, which has the choice to 
pass on a nominal cost, potentially in combination with regulation to lower nutrient 
losses. This ensures that all activity is included within the overall cap, but avoids 
considerable effort from individual landowners. For the same reasons, we remain 
undecided about whether to create tradable permits for phosphorus alongside those 
for nitrous oxide. Nevertheless, both gases would be monitored as part of the 
nutrient cap. 
The emissions trading system differs in two areas: liquidity is not an issue and nor is 
comprehensiveness of coverage of gases.2 This is because we are working within an 
international market, whose associated regulations define all sources that are 
monitored and how monitoring is done. Actions in New Zealand will not affect the 
liquidity of the global market, and that would argue for lower participation in the 
trading system. In the short run, while the international market is relatively 
underdeveloped, the development of brokers who specifically deal with NZ units, 
and the Kyoto units that will be accepted in New Zealand, would help local 
liquidity. A system with lower participation would exclude sources with higher 
transaction costs and low emissions. 
Cost bearing and mitigation 
The major financial impact of both systems is on farm profitability, and, as a 
consequence, land values. Landowners are likely to bear the majority of the cost 
because lower land values will lead to a loss of equity. In the short run, if capital 
markets are relatively inflexible, introducing the trading systems could lead to 
                                                 
2 The New Zealand government is choosing not to regulate sources that are not covered by Kyoto 
and are closely mirroring the international rules in domestic legislation. 
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possible bankruptcy even of farms that will be viable in the long run, particularly 
for people who bought farms recently and have large debts. 
Initial costs are likely to be higher than ongoing costs for a given cap or price, 
because farmers will gradually begin to reduce and mitigate emissions. We lack 
robust empirical evidence on how much they can mitigate and the costs of doing so. 
We do know that greenhouse emissions per unit of output vary considerably across 
farms, which indicates scope for mitigation. This is the case even for methane, 
where it is possible to change the efficiency with which grass (dry matter) is used to 
produce meat and milk. The question is to what extent it will be possible for farmers 
to manipulate this variation, improving their productivity and hence mitigating their 
emissions. 
We use two farm models, FARMAX (for sheep and beef farms) and UDDER (for 
dairy farms) combined with OVERSEER, to explore these questions. These models 
do not involve explicit optimisation algorithms. Skilled users must try different 
options that they consider physically feasible to find an optimal outcome for the 
specific farming situation. Based on the inputs, farm geophysical characteristics and 
management practices defined by the user, and using a set of production functions 
for the farm and animal type, the model will produce predictions of output as well 
as farm profit.  
A difficulty with this modelling approach is that, in general, farmers do not 
currently optimise their activity in accordance with this type of model. Some of this 
may be due to rational differences between a farmer’s decision problem and that 
actually modelled; part may be due to non-price barriers to more efficient farm 
operation. Different farmers may have different preference for average returns 
relative to risk as well as across management options that require their input. 
Although models may appear to offer cheap (or negative cost) mitigation 
opportunities, these barriers may be real and certainly won’t be addressed solely 
through the ETS. 
Figure 7.1 illustrates the empirical question. We would like more robust numbers 
about how much farmers would optimally pursue each of the three broad types of 
activity — land use change, reduced intensity and mitigation — at different carbon 
prices. The more flexible farmers responses are, the lower the individual and 
aggregate costs of the system will be. 
If farmers’ responses are to change land use or reduce intensity and hence output, 
this could have negative effects in three ways. First, ‘leakage’ could lead to higher 
global emissions as a result of the ETS. Leakage arises when, as a result of carbon 
regulation in New Zealand and an incomplete global agreement, production falls in 
 
  
 
110 PROMOTING BETTER 
ENVIRONMENTAL 
OUTCOMES 
 
 
Figure 7.1 Emission reduction/mitigation cost curves 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
New Zealand and rises in a country that is not covered by the Kyoto cap. Regardless 
of New Zealand’s relative GHG efficiency in production, a movement of production 
to an uncovered country will raise their emissions above business as usual (BAU), 
while the sum of emissions under the Kyoto cap will be unchanged. Thus, global 
emissions will rise relative to BAU. Offsetting this somewhat, there may be local 
environmental benefits from reduced production. These could include 
improvements in water quality, biodiversity and reduced erosion. 
Second, the fact that we are competing with unregulated countries in the short term 
may lead to production going offshore, something which in the long run we would 
regret when (or if) there is a global agreement. If New Zealand is relatively GHG-
efficient in livestock production, we will have a long-term comparative advantage 
in production and we will want a strong livestock sector in the long term. Losing 
efficient production in the short term could lead to long-term regrets if New Zealand 
loses key skills, if infrastructure (including processing capacity) and the quality of 
herds decline in ways that are hard to reverse quickly or, if land moves into forestry 
or indigenous regeneration which is relatively costly to reverse in the short term. 
Short-term reductions in output could also lead to unnecessary social pain as small 
rural communities struggle to adjust to lower local economic activity.  
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Third, if the fall in New Zealand’s food production is not replaced by increased 
production overseas, it will exacerbate the current global problem of food insecurity 
and high food prices. The less emissions leak, the more we contribute to food 
shortages. The challenge is to trade off the lower burden in New Zealand from 
allowing production to fall (also avoiding the costs of protecting production) against 
the emissions leakage, long-term regret, and food insecurity effects. 
Motivations for free allocation 
Allocating free allowances is a contentious issue in any trading system because of 
the high value of the allowances and the considerable costs that regulation can 
impose. For nutrient trading in Lake Rotorua, the key issues are fairness and 
smoothing transition into the new market regime. We propose that landowners 
initially receive allowances proportional to but lower than their current nutrient loss, 
so that landowners bear some of the costs of achieving the environmental target. 
Over time, our proposed allocation mechanism would transition to one based on 
potential nutrient loss on each land parcel. This avoids locking in current land use, 
or rewarding high nutrient-loss properties indefinitely. For example, land that is 
currently in forest, with very low nutrient loss, but that has high potential for sheep 
farming, or Maori land that is currently underdeveloped, would be penalised if 
allocation were entirely on the basis of current nutrient loss. A measure of potential 
nutrient loss is yet to be developed, but will need to incorporate land characteristics 
and potential stocking rates alongside a basic model of ‘standard management 
practices’. 
For agricultural emissions trading, where there are 33.7 million tonnes per annum of 
free units to allocate, the key issues are fairness, transition, and production falls 
leading to emissions leakage, long-term regrets and food insecurity. Free allocation 
is the only mechanism available to address leakage in the current scheme. 
Emissions leakage does not apply to nutrient trading, since the proposed scheme is 
self-contained within the Lake Rotorua catchment. The other effects on water 
quality elsewhere or food security are likely to be small and are not considered a 
critical local issue. There is no possibility of long-term regret because changes in 
profitability as a result of the scheme are not transitional or dependent on external 
agreements. 
Figure 7.2 explores the decisions required to allocate to avoid leakage and economic 
regret in the ETS. The final question in this decision tree asks whether the potential 
social losses exceed the cost of free allocation, which is very expensive. This is 
another question requiring empirical evidence. We are working to collect evidence 
on potential production falls and emissions leakage in agriculture  
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Figure 7.2 Decision tree for allocation to address leakage and economic 
regrets 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
to give us a more robust idea of the sources and likely magnitudes and the effects of 
that leakage. 
Timing of environmental effects  
Another issue shared by the emissions and nutrient markets is that actions at one 
point in time can have environmental consequences at different times. In the Lake 
Rotorua catchment, nutrient loss can take between zero and 200 years to reach the 
lake, depending on a property’s geophysical characteristics and location. Excess 
nutrients from some properties can go straight into the lake and cause water quality 
issues now; while nutrients from other properties will take 200 years to filter into 
the soil and through an aquifer before reaching the lake. 
Our proposed nutrient trading system addresses this issue through vintage 
allowances. We propose creating a series of markets with their own targets, each 
related to a particular time period. Each property will have a groundwater lag 
associated with it, and landowners will purchase (or be allocated) allowances for the 
time period at which their nutrients reach the lake. For example, a property with a 
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one- to five-year lag will surrender 2010–2014 allowances to match 2009 nutrient 
loss. A property with a sixty-year lag will surrender 2059–2069 allowances to 
match the same action on their farm. This allows authorities to meet water quality 
targets with greater confidence than would be possible with a single market. 
For emissions trading, the comparison is not location but emissions type: carbon 
dioxide, methane and nitrous oxide each have different environmental outcomes 
over time. The NZ ETS converts each pollutant to CO2 equivalents using global 
warming potentials (GWPs), following UNFCCC and Kyoto rules, but these rules 
do not distinguish medium- and long-term effects. 
It is an open question whether the vintage approach can be applied to the global 
climate agreement. The relative treatment of different gases and the current use of 
GWPs is an important issue for New Zealand where we have high levels of 
emissions of methane, which has a very high global warming potential but whose 
current emissions will have little or no impact on the climate in 100 years. Two or 
more international markets for mid-term and long-term emissions targets would 
increase the accuracy of the environmental targeting and the economic efficiency of 
the global mitigation effort. 
7.3 Conclusions 
Emissions trading and nutrient trading are two related markets developing at the 
same time. We can take advantage of this situation by maximising 
complementarities and benefit from learning across markets. The markets have 
common challenges requiring innovative economic thinking and more empirical 
analysis. 
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8 Environmental policy for 
environmental outcomes 
David Pannell1  
University of Western Australia 
Abstract 
In order to generate real environmental improvements in a cost-effective way, 
environmental policy programs need to have a number of characteristics. Among 
other things, they need to: (a) draw on good-quality scientific technical 
information about environmental degradation, and about the links between 
actions and environmental outcomes (b) account well for the behavioural 
responses of land and water managers to policy interventions (c) prioritise 
investments well, consistent with an appropriate role of government (d) select 
realistic targets that can drive good monitoring and evaluation (e) select policy 
mechanisms that are appropriate for the circumstances (f) strike an appropriate 
balance between mitigation and adaptation (g) account for negative side-effects 
of proposed environmental management actions. 
Environmental managers need to be encouraged by program rules and 
procedures to pursue environmental outcomes cost-effectively. Recently 
completed national programs, the National Action Plan for Salinity and Water 
Quality, and the Natural Heritage Trust, fell short on all of these criteria. 
Improving matters will be difficult for reasons that include capacity constraints in 
government agencies and time pressures on policy development. Some 
alternative directions for environmental policy are discussed, including a stronger 
reliance on market-based policy instruments. 
                                                 
1  For related writings, see www.davidpannell.net. 
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8.1 Introduction 
This paper summarises a number of features that environmental policy needs to 
have if it is to deliver environmental outcomes cost-effectively. The discussion is 
illustrated using two major national environmental programs that came to an end on 
30 June 2008: the National Action Plan for Salinity and Water Quality (NAP) and 
the Natural Heritage Trust (NHT). 
Background to NAP and NHT 
The two programs were largely delivered through 56 regional natural resource 
management bodies, which I will refer to as Catchment Management Organisations 
(CMOs). Billions of dollars from the Australian Government were provided, 
conditional on matching funds being provided by State governments, CMOs were  
responsible for developing and implementing integrated regional plans for 
environmental investment. They appointed their own staff, but also relied on 
community participation and support by State government agencies. The approach 
was intended to be based on the idea of Integrated Catchment Management, where 
managers plan and prioritise, based on a detailed consideration of physical, 
biological, economic and social information. 
The two programs have been widely criticised. In my judgement, they were not very 
effective in achieving environmental outcomes. Many of the projects funded within 
these programs will have little enduring environmental benefit. In my view, their 
poor performance was easily avoidable using knowledge that existed at the times 
they were established. Problems with program design and implementation were 
pointed out in commentary at the time (e.g., Pannell 2001a, 2001b) and 
subsequently raised in a number of official enquiries (Auditor General 2004, 2008; 
SSCECITA 2006; HRSCSI 2004; SKM 2006). There were no substantial changes 
to the programs in response to these enquiries. Key issues determining the 
effectiveness of such programs are discussed in subsequent sections. 
Use of scientific technical information 
Environmental problems are often technically complex and uncertain. Sound 
decisions about their management need to be based on good knowledge about (a) 
the degree of threat or damage to environmental assets at risk, and (b) the extent to 
which this threat or damage can be reduced by particular changes in management. 
In many cases, generic knowledge about an issue is not sufficient — we need 
locally specific knowledge. 
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The NAP and NHT programs did not require CMOs to make good use of scientific 
information when formulating their investment priorities and plans. In general, 
CMOs did account reasonably well for threat or damage, but with very few 
exceptions they did not use adequate information about the link between proposed 
actions and environmental outcomes. They were not provided with technical 
support to do so and they were not required to demonstrate that they had done so in 
the course of their plans being accredited by government. Concerns about lack of 
science in the programs were identified repeatedly in the various enquiries and 
reviews commissioned by government. For example, it was highlighted that 
decisions should be ‘based in sound, up-to-date science’ (SSCECITA 2006, p. 221); 
that in dryland areas, ‘Links between actions and resource condition change … are 
often not confidently quantified...’ (SKM 2006, p. 1); and that ‘NAP/NHT have 
only been partly successful in enabling the flow of scientific and technical 
information into the catchment management planning process’ (Chartres et al. 2004, 
p. 4). Furthermore, CMOs were highly constrained by the programs in their 
investment in research to collect missing information required for sound decision 
making. Funding was expected to be spent on ‘on-ground works’. 
Use of socioeconomic information 
If the works or changed practices needed to protect an environmental asset require 
changes in behaviour by private land or water managers, investment managers need 
to consider whether those works will be attractive or unattractive to the people who 
would have to adopt them. There are many well understood reasons why 
conservation practices can be unattractive to land and water managers (Pannell et al. 
2006). If the practices are highly unattractive in a particular case, it will be 
expensive and difficult to get them adopted, and the viability of investing in that 
environmental asset will be reduced. It is important to appreciate that, even if the 
works are relatively attractive when implemented at small scale, they may be highly 
unattractive at large scale. 
Seymour et al. (2008) found that CMOs have little capacity in the use of social or 
economic information relating to landholder behaviour. The programs did not 
provide carrots, sticks or support to fill this gap. ‘Additional attention needs to be 
directed to issues associated with farm economics and profitability in natural 
resource planning’ (Chartres et al. 2004, p. 3). In general, the likely response of 
landholders to interventions was not considered in any depth, if at all. At national, 
state and regional levels, it was generally naively assumed that, with sufficient 
effort and skill on the part of extension agents, landholders would respond on an 
adequate scale to extension and the payment of small, temporary grants. The fact 
that they often did not do so could readily have been foreseen. Pannell (2001b) 
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highlighted the fact that in many regions there was a lack of sustainable land-
management practices that were readily adoptable by farmers. Pannell et al. (2006) 
argued that ‘If such innovations cannot be identified or developed, there is no point 
in falling back onto communication. Promoting inferior practices will only lead to 
frustration for all parties’ (p. 1421). That did occur very commonly. 
Appropriate prioritisation of potential projects 
There is a strong tendency for environmental programs to attempt to achieve too 
much, allocating too few resources to too many projects. The projects they do fund 
tend to be of widely differing merits. Some of the investments receiving funds are 
worthwhile, and some are not worthwhile at all. Given that project budgets are 
generally very small relative to levels that would be required to manage 
environmental degradation comprehensively, the need for tight and careful targeting 
of investments is obvious. 
The highest priority environmental investments should have at least these four 
characteristics: they should relate to (a) particularly valuable environmental assets; 
(b) facing threatened or current high degradation; (c) with high feasibility of 
reducing that threat or degradation at reasonable cost; (d) with the required works 
being reasonably attractive to relevant land or water managers. If even one of these 
elements is neglected, there is a high risk of selecting poor investments. 
In the NAP and NHT, no consistent framework for planning and prioritisation was 
provided to CMOs. Each developed its own approach and, not surprisingly, there 
was wide variation between regions in the approaches used. I have been unable to 
find any region with a prioritisation framework that I would rate as ‘good’. Indeed, 
very few would rate better than ‘poor’. There are hardly any assets funded under the 
two programs for which all four of the above required characteristics were assessed 
in any depth.  
Again, this deficiency was recognized in official enquiries, but not redressed. ‘Close 
attention must be paid to … actively encouraging regions to put in place measures 
that are well targeted’ (Auditor General 2004, p. 15). It was recognized that 
investment decisions should be ‘outcome focused’ and ‘subject to a cost-benefit 
analysis’ (SSCECITA 2006, p. 221). 
Good prioritisation requires good information and good analysis, which takes time. 
Programs need to be run with the patience to allow this to happen. In the NAP and 
NHT, CMOs were under severe time pressure to complete their planning processes 
and commence spending the money, irrespective of the quality of those plans. 
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Ridley and Pannell (2005) developed an investment framework for salinity (called 
SIF3) which explicitly addresses all four characteristics. The Senate Standing 
Committee on the Environment, Communications, Information Technology and the 
Arts (2006) recommended that governments should ‘keep a watching brief’ on our 
framework, ‘with a view to potentially implementing it (or a modified version of it) 
across the country’ (pp. 229–30). 
Balance of investment between current works and technology 
development 
‘For some environmental issues, the real challenge is to find or develop innovations 
that are not only good for the environment, but also economically superior to the 
practices they are supposed to replace’ (Pannell et al. 2006, p. 1421). In my view, 
this is underrecognised, including by economists. If economists do consider 
innovation, we tend to take the view that the right policy settings will foster 
innovation among polluters, resulting in the creation of lower-cost methods for 
pollution abatement. This may work for some sorts of pollution, but for the sorts of 
environmental problems covered by the NAP and NHT (often highly diffuse or 
dispersed problems caused by many small businesses), we cannot expect that they 
would be able to develop the sorts of new land-use options that would be required. 
The task would require research on a scale, and with a level of expertise, that is far 
beyond any individual or group of farmers. The NHT program made a minimal 
investment in this area, and the NAP made no investment that I am aware of. 
Again, the need for more investment in this area was well recognised in official 
enquiries but not acted on. ‘Limited availability of commercially attractive 
treatment options for regions [is a] key risk that require[s] careful management’ 
(Auditor General 2004, p. 14). ‘The Committee recommends that the Australian 
Government give greater emphasis through its investments in salinity science to 
develop new, economically-viable land and water use systems’ (HRSCSI 2004, 
p. 167). 
Balance of investment between mitigation and adaptation 
Where mitigation is not justified on benefit-cost grounds, there may be net benefits 
in investing in adaptation to a degraded environment. This becomes particularly 
important in problems like dryland salinity and climate change, where much 
degradation is physically impossible to avoid, and where even more degradation is 
not economically efficient to avoid. In the original NAP program documents, the 
focus was entirely on mitigation. Although there were eventually some investments 
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in adaptation, the appropriate balance between the two was never, in my view, 
properly considered. 
Use of appropriate policy mechanisms 
Pannell (2008) shows that the best choice of policy tool depends on the mix of 
public and private net benefits from proposed changes. Therefore the choice of 
policy mechanism needs to be sensitive to local conditions, as well as to the general 
characteristics of a problem. In the NAP and NHT programs, the great majority of 
funds were spent on extension and small temporary grants. As argued earlier, these 
were often used in circumstances where they could not deliver environmental 
outcomes, often because they were used to promote conservation practices that were 
not adoptable. Investors should either have used different policy mechanisms or 
taken no action.  
Avoidance of adverse side-effects 
In some circumstances, works undertaken to improve one natural resource problem 
can have negative consequences for another. For example, many trees were planted 
with the intention of reducing saline discharge into rivers, but in circumstances 
where they had a more important negative impact on the yield of fresh surface-
water into the same rivers (for example, Nordblom et al. 2006). Because the NAP 
and NHT programs did not deal adequately with the science of cause and effect, this 
was largely unrecognised by CMOs, who provided payments to encourage some 
actions that should have been discouraged. 
Monitoring and enforcement of compliance 
In circumstances where the preferred conservation practices are attractive to 
landholders, CMOs do not need to use incentive-based mechanisms to encourage 
adoption, and consequently they do not need any enforcement mechanism. But 
where an incentive mechanism is used to compensate for the negative private net 
benefits of a conservation practice, or to prevent adoption of an 
environmentally-damaging practice that is attractive to landholders, monitoring and 
enforcement needs to be part of the program. NAP and NHT had little monitoring 
and, as far as I am aware, no mechanism for enforcing agreed changes in land 
management, other than refusing to extend payments to a second phase. In practice, 
even this option was not always used. I am aware of cases where landholders 
received an incentive payment to adopt the same practice three times, but gave it up 
each time. 
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Setting appropriate targets 
Environmental targets should be consistent with the known biophysical information 
about the asset’s response to management, the known behavioural responses of land 
and water managers to policy interventions, and the resources available under the 
program. Clearly, you cannot select such targets unless you have undertaken high-
quality analysis of the investment options. In the NAP and NHT, the program 
required CMOs to specify targets, but did not require those targets to be in any way 
realistic. Indeed, in some ways realism was discouraged within the guidelines 
imposed. Not surprisingly, ‘80 out of the 163 resource condition targets identified in 
the plans [of eight regions examined] did not meet the identified criteria in terms of 
being measurable or having a specific timeframe’ (Auditor General 2008, p. 19). 
The lack of realistic targets also infected the high-level goals of the programs: ‘The 
consensus, from consultations during the course of the audit, indicates that [it] will 
not be possible [to meet the program goal to stabilise or reverse salinity trends] 
within the eight-year timeframe originally envisaged for the NAP’ (Auditor General 
2004, p. 18). 
Monitoring and evaluation linked to management 
Good evaluation is closely related to good planning. If the analysis has been done to 
select investments and establish high-quality targets, monitoring and evaluation is 
relatively straightforward, and results can feed into ongoing management decisions. 
Many CMOs did not understand how to undertake monitoring and evaluation so 
that they provided sound and useful data for evaluation and ongoing management 
(SKM 2006). The programs did not require them to do so. Monitoring in NAP and 
NHT focused on accountability for funds spent, but neglected the achievement of 
environmental outcomes. This focus sent a message to CMOs that the government 
was not really concerned about the achievement of outcomes, only with spending 
the money. Weakness of monitoring was also observed at the program level: ‘At the 
present time it is not possible to report meaningfully on the extent to which these 
outputs contribute to the outcomes sought by government’ (Auditor General 2008, 
p. 16). 
Supporting and creating appropriate incentives for environmental 
managers 
In a program where decisions about actual investments are devolved to individuals 
or groups separate from the funding body, it is important for the funding 
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arrangements to be set up in a way that provides incentives for environmental 
managers to seek environmental outcomes cost-effectively. Programs should also 
provide support to address important knowledge and skill gaps that managers may 
have. 
As we have noted above, NAP and NHT provided inadequate support: ‘enhancing 
guidance to the regions must be given a higher priority’ (Auditor General 2004, 
p. 15). They also provided almost no incentives for CMOs to pursue environmental 
outcomes. Targets were not required to be realistic, and accreditation of plans was 
very weak, particularly in relation to their use of science and socio-economic 
information. The Senate Standing Committee on the Environment, 
Communications, Information Technology and the Arts (2006) recommended that 
Government should ‘strengthen the accreditation process for regional bodies’ and 
‘ensure that funding is conditional on rigorous investment planning’ (p. 221). 
Consistency with an appropriate role for government 
Broadly speaking, government policy may seek to: (a) increase aggregate social 
welfare through reducing market failure; (b) protect or enhance publicly managed 
resources, (c) address areas of inequity, inequality or disadvantage; or (d) pursue 
political objectives to generate benefits to the government. In evaluating any 
program, I assume that item (d) is to be judged inappropriate. For the NAP and 
NHT, specifically, I believe that item (c) is of minimal relevance, although a very 
narrow and illogical view of the importance of equitable sharing of program funds 
pervaded both programs. The key issues here, then, are the extent to which the 
programs were targeted to addressing market failures, their success in reducing 
them, and their contributions to protection or enhancement of publicly-managed 
assets. 
The main market failures relevant to the NAP and NHT programs are public-good 
problems (non-rivalry and non-price excludability) associated with externalities, or 
associated with information failures. For example, land management on one farm 
can cause negative externalities due to salinity affecting water resources, 
environmental assets, public infrastructure, or agricultural land on another farm. 
Information failures may arise, for example, if farmers are unaware of or have 
misconceptions about land management practices that would be in their interest to 
adopt. 
Ostensibly, the NAP and NHT could be seen as targeting these market failures, 
through the payment of grants to farmers to internalise externalities, and the use of 
extension officers to promote changes in farming practices. But a deeper assessment 
reveals problems in both areas. 
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For an intervention to be judged as efficiently managing a negative externality, its 
overall benefits must exceed its costs. In the case of the NHT, there was no 
evidence that particular investments under the program would generate positive net 
benefits for the community. In the case of the NAP, there was evidence that they 
often would not. Benefits of managing salinity are often small and they may be 
highly localised (Pannell, McFarlane and Ferdowsian  2001). On the other hand, the 
costs of reducing externalities from salinity are often large, requiring very 
substantial changes in land management (for example, Dawes et al. 2002; National 
Land and Water Resources Audit 2001) and the recommended changes often have 
high opportunity costs (for example, Kingwell et al. 2003), especially when applied 
at large scale (Bathgate and Pannell 2002). Overall, the net benefits of acting to 
reduce salinity externalities would very often be negative. Identifying cases where 
they would be positive requires a detailed and sophisticated analysis. From the 
previous subsections, however, it is clear that the program did not include or 
support such analysis. 
As noted earlier, most of the advocated salinity-mitigation practices in most regions 
are unattractive to landholders for economic (Kingwell et al. 2003) or other (Pannell 
1999) reasons. This means that farmers’ non-adoption of these practices does not 
constitute an information failure, and so use of extension to promote these practices 
is not justified on a market-failure basis.  
On the other hand, some investments in direct action by government, such as 
pumping saline groundwater to prevent discharge into the Murray River (River 
Murray Water 2006), or pumping to lower saline water-tables under rural towns in 
Western Australia (Department of Agriculture 2004), seem much more likely to be 
justified on a benefit-cost basis. Unfortunately, investments of this type were the 
exception within the NAP and NHT, probably due to a view that they should be the 
responsibility of State governments. An assumption built into the program, 
presumably for political reasons, was that most funds should be directed to 
supporting land-use change on farms. It would have been better for the program to 
select policy approaches that were best suited to local conditions for particular 
environmental problems, rather than building in assumptions about the policy 
mechanisms to be used. 
Capacity requirements of policy agencies 
Policy officers designing programs for management of complex environmental 
problems should ideally have a good understanding of those problems and be able 
to draw on the scientific and socioeconomic evidence about their management. In 
my observation, the scientific knowledge used to design the NAP was superficial, 
based on a highly simplified and stylised understanding of the problem, and not 
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encompassing the latest relevant research. It did not involve effective integration of 
biophysical and socioeconomic information in the design of the program. I have 
found that many environmental policy officers in Canberra lack a deep knowledge 
of the environmental issues for which they are responsible. In part this is a 
consequence of the rapid movement of staff between jobs and agencies that is the 
norm in Canberra. I believe that this is a very serious and under-recognised 
problem. In my view, good quality environment policy cannot be developed by 
people who do not have very strong content knowledge. 
A part of this problem is the time pressure under which policy officers typically 
operate. Policy development always seems to occur in an unseemly rush, which 
inevitably reduces the quality of the resulting policies. The rush could be reduced if 
agencies pre-emptively invested more time and resources in the sort of analysis 
required to make good decisions about policy priorities, before an existing program 
is concluded. 
Alternative policy approaches 
The programs discussed here involved partial devolution of responsibility to 
regional organisations with community membership. Planning and prioritisation 
was conducted by committees, and for on-ground changes they relied primarily on 
voluntary actions by landholders. I have indicated how a system of this broad type 
might be improved: through providing carrots, sticks and support to those regional 
organisations so that they have the incentive and the capacity to take the science and 
economics of the problems seriously, undertake better integrated analysis, target 
funds more tightly to high-payoff investments, use a broader range of policy tools 
better matched to particular circumstances, and so on. 
One problem with this set of prescriptions is doubt about whether it is realistic at the 
bureaucratic level — about whether the government departments themselves have 
the incentive and the capacity to deliver the necessary reforms. It would also be a 
major challenge to change their cultures so that they give priority to the efficient 
achievement of environmental outcomes. With this sort of concern in mind, the late 
Peter Cullen proposed that an independent body be established with the 
responsibility for designing and overseeing the main environmental programs. This 
body would be more independent of politics than government departments are, and 
they would be judged strictly according to their achievement of environmental 
outcomes. I have some sympathy for this proposal. 
Whatever happens at that organisational level, there is a question about the 
appropriate mechanisms to deliver change on the ground. Some economists argue 
that we should rely more on market-based approaches to improve the efficiency of 
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environmental investments. The NAP program did include a small pilot program for 
market-based instruments, and some CMOs have dabbled in the use of conservation 
tenders, but, overall, the more sophisticated economic policy instruments have been 
little used within national conservation programs. The leading proponent and 
practitioner of this approach has been the State of Victoria, under the 
encouragement and guidance of Gary Stoneham, now at the Department of 
Sustainability and Environment (for example, Stoneham et al. 2003). Economic 
policy instruments look likely to play a major and very positive role in Victorian 
conservation programs in coming years. The Victorian approach solves the problem 
of prioritising investment using good science and good economics. I do, however, 
have some observations about a potential national rollout of market-based 
approaches. 
• The success in Victoria appears to rely very much on the high capability and 
determination of Gary Stoneham’s group, and their strong influence on policy-
makers. It is hard to see this being replicated in other States or at the national 
level. The sophistication of the approach is a great strength, but also a constraint 
on its broader application. Approaches that take short cuts on the underpinning 
analysis are unlikely to offer large improvements over more traditional 
approaches. 
• Market-based instruments are not always the most appropriate response to an 
environmental problem. For example, the available conservation practices may 
be so unattractive to landholders that the prime need is to develop improved 
practices, or so attractive to them that extension alone is sufficient. Or, given the 
property rights regime in place, enforcement of a perceived duty of care may be 
required. Or for a specific environmental outcome, the population of landholders 
may be too small for a market to operate. 
• Market-based instruments are just one tool within the class of incentive-based 
policy tools, and incentive-based tools are just one class of tool within the 
overall toolbox. In my judgment, the choice of the right class of tool (Pannell 
2008) is more important than the choice of a specific tool within that class. 
• Even if we do eventually move to a much stronger reliance on market-based 
approaches nationally, this is likely to take some considerable time. In the 
meantime, there is a pressing need to improve the institutions, the tools and the 
information used within the existing national system. 
In response to our perceptions of the needs of environmental policy programs, Anna 
Ridley and I have developed INFFER (Investment Framework For Environmental 
Resources, see: www.inffer.org). It is strongly based on our experiences with SIF3 
and includes similar principles, processes and frameworks. The aim is to ensure that 
environmental managers bring a benefit-cost analysis mindset to their consideration 
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of investment options. It is designed to be as simple as possible to use, but includes 
all of the key factors that need to be considered (as discussed earlier). It guides 
investors towards investment in assets with a high likely net payoff, and advises on 
the most appropriate class of policy tools to use. We have been promoting INFFER 
to governments and CMOs. 
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General discussion  
Professor Stavins commenced discussion with questions and comments to 
panellists:  
• he asked Professor Libecap to clarify whether the US Congressional moratorium 
on Individual Transferable Quotas (ITQs) was still in place, and for his views on 
the social efficiency (in terms of the social benefits and costs) of the Californian 
court decisions on Mono Lake 
• he commented that the notion of common property resources did not eliminate 
the potential for market failure – it was not a dichotomous choice between 
common property and open access, and there was potential for significant market 
failures across the full spectrum  
• he asked Suzi Kerr to identify any lessons for the United States that might be 
learnt from New Zealand’s experience with ITQs.  
Professor Libecap confirmed that the moratorium on ITQs under the Magnuson-
Stevens Act had expired. He explained that the point he was making was that in the 
United States, relying on common property regimes such as marine fishery 
management councils, was not very effective.  
Suzi Kerr said that New Zealand had the most extensive ITQ system in the world, 
with more than 500 separate markets operating under one unified system. The 
market was working well on the whole, there was evidence of species recovery, and 
the value of the fisheries industry had increased. There were some challenges, 
however, including governance issues and high regulatory costs relative to benefits 
in some areas.  
Suzi Kerr challenged Professor Libecap’s view that environmental markets tend to 
be introduced only after a crisis. Fisheries markets were introduced early in New 
Zealand, and this meant political conflict was avoided and simple and efficient 
processes could be implemented. ‘In contrast, US fisheries are in crisis with very 
entrenched local communities, and the social issues of adjustment are very 
significant. If [market reforms] had been implemented earlier, before fishing 
communities were collapsing, it would have been much easier.’ 
In relation to the Mono Lake decisions, Professor Libecap said: ‘We just don’t 
know whether or not it’s the right decision. It cost Los Angeles about US$1 billion 
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in terms of stranded capital and opportunity costs, but we don’t know whether the 
[social and environmental benefits] are worth that much. This is symptomatic of the 
problem of addressing reallocation issues through judicial processes rather than 
through water rights’. 
In response to Professor Stavins’ comment about common property and market 
failure, Professor Brunckhorst said that common property was a form of private 
property, rather than part of a broad spectrum of open access. The issue was not the 
type of property ownership, but achieving the right institutional rules and 
monitoring systems. 
Professor Freebairn asked the panellists to discuss the transaction costs of the 
different types of instruments: regulations and property rights and markets. 
Professor Libecap observed that the first response to a variety of open access 
problems was generally regulation — usually restrictions on either inputs or 
outputs — not the implementation of a property rights regime. Why was that? Were 
there any reasons why this might be an efficient approach? There are clear costs 
involved in property rights regimes, and the more valuable the resource (and the 
more contention around it), the greater are the costs. Economists tend to overlook 
the cost of defining and enforcing property rights. ‘This raises an important 
empirical question: “What does it cost to put regulation into place?”. When the 
problem isn’t a big one, it could be that regulation is the best response. But as 
regulation doesn’t solve incentive issues, problems tend to grow over time, and 
that’s when a property rights regime is effective.’ 
Professor Libecap added that trading systems, such as those described by Suzi Kerr, 
were also costly, and that these costs might be incurred without achieving the 
desired outcome (that is, a reduction in global warming). ‘We might need to have a 
big crisis before we resolve the uncertainty of how China, India and the United 
States will participate’, he said. 
The question of whether perceptions of equity generated institutional constraints on 
market instruments was raised by one participant. Professor Pannell replied that 
notions of equity, based on expectations of support created by existing 
environmental programs, often prevented the adoption of different approaches. 
Professor Brunckhorst agreed that perceptions of equity were very important but 
could be managed by appropriate institutional rules and monitoring (which should 
be subject to constant adjustment and adaption) and, if necessary, sanctions 
(including cultural sanctions).  
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9 Getting serious about global climate 
change: post-Kyoto international 
climate policy architecture 
Robert N. Stavins1 
John F. Kennedy School of Government 
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Abstract 
I examine some of the challenges the world faces in developing a successor to 
the Kyoto Protocol to address the threat of global climate change. I begin by 
highlighting key lessons learned from the Protocol, and then describe the major 
types of alternative policy architectures that can be employed in a successor 
international agreement, which may be negotiated at the Fifteenth Conference of 
the Parties to the Framework Convention on Climate Change in Copenhagen, 
Denmark, in December 2009. Drawing upon research from the Harvard Project 
on International Climate Agreements, I identify some of the key design elements 
of a scientifically sound, economically rational, and politically pragmatic post-
2012 international policy architecture. I also examine links between international 
policy discussions and likely US actions on climate change. I conclude by 
commenting on an international policy architecture that may already be 
emerging. 
                                                 
1 Albert Pratt Professor of Business and Government at the John F. Kennedy School of 
Government, Harvard University, University Fellow of Resources for the Future, and Research 
Associate of the National Bureau of Economic Research. This article is based upon oral remarks I 
made at the Productivity Commission Roundtable, ‘Promoting Better Environmental Outcomes’, 
at Old Parliament House in Canberra, Australia, on 20 August 2008. I draw extensively upon the 
research of the Harvard Project on International Climate Agreements, which I co-direct with 
Joseph Aldy (Resources for the Future). The Project has received major funding from the Doris 
Duke Charitable Foundation. Additional support has been provided by Christopher P. Kaneb, the 
James M. and Cathleen D. Stone Foundation, Paul Josefowitz and Nicolas Josefowitz, the Enel 
Endowment for Environmental Economics at Harvard University, the Belfer Centre for Science 
and International Affairs, and the Mossavar-Rahmani Centre for Business and Government. More 
information about the Project is available at www.belfercentre.org/climate. 
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9.1 Introduction 
In this essay, I examine global climate change policy, reflecting both on what is 
grabbing the headlines and — more important — what is happening behind the 
scenes in the development of public policy. Many people will remember the mega-
disaster film, ‘The Day After Tomorrow’, about the apocalyptic consequences of 
the greenhouse effect. That film had less scientific basis than ‘The Wizard of Oz’. 
But reality is disturbing enough. The message from the scientific community is that 
man-made emissions of greenhouse gases are likely to change the earth’s climate in 
ways that many people will regret. 
Climate concerns have gone mainstream, even in the United States. If this was not 
obvious from the 2006 Time magazine cover story about climate change, featuring a 
polar bear stranded on an ice flow, then it should be clear from the reality of a cover 
story in Sports Illustrated magazine in 2007, featuring a staged photo of a well-
known baseball player, knee-deep in water in his Florida stadium. Both stories were 
replete with misleading statements, particularly from an economic perspective, but 
that is not my point. My point is that concerns about global climate change are now 
widespread, and mainstream.  
We have witnessed the galvanizing effect of former US Vice President Albert 
Gore’s award-winning film, ‘An Inconvenient Truth’. Although the Vice President 
deserved his Nobel Peace Prize for having raised public awareness of the climate 
problem, which is what the Nobel citation indicated, from an economic and policy 
perspective the film was unfortunately misleading. Indeed, it may be said that a 
striking inconvenient truth is the fact that meaningful reductions of carbon dioxide 
and other greenhouse gas emissions will be very costly for the United States and 
many other countries. In the United States it will be approximately equivalent to the 
cost of complying with all other federal environmental regulations combined. And 
that is just for the relatively modest, short-term targets of the Kyoto Protocol.  
Of course, this does not mean that it is a bad idea to take action, but it does mean 
that the costs should be recognized if governments are to design meaningful policies 
that will be environmentally effective, economically sensible, and politically 
feasible. I will return to that later, but for now I simply wish to reinforce the point 
that concern about global climate change is mainstream and widespread in many 
parts of the world. 
These concerns have been reflected in international policy actions and domestic 
policy debates in many countries, and in the statements and actions of prominent 
business leaders, including calls from some leading corporations for climate 
regulation (such as the environment-business coalition in the United States known 
as USCAP). The subject of domestic US climate policy is an interesting and 
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important one, but climate change is a global commons problem, and unilateral 
actions by individual countries — no matter how necessary — will never be 
sufficient, because the benefits to individual countries will always be less than the 
cost. This means that a cooperative, international, if not global, approach is key. Of 
course, that is the fundamental logic behind the Kyoto Protocol. 
I begin by focusing on the global climate policy challenge, commenting on 
international policy architecture. Then I turn briefly to the outlook for US climate 
policy, and then return to the global context. 
9.2 The global climate policy challenge 
The Kyoto Protocol came into force in February 2005, without participation by the 
United States. However, even if the United States had participated, the Protocol’s 
direct effects on climate change would be very small to non-existent. At the same 
time, scientific evidence and economic analysis now point to the need for a credible 
international approach.  
Lessons learned from the Kyoto protocol 
It is helpful to reflect on lessons that can be learned from the Kyoto Protocol, 
examining the Protocol’s strengths as well as its weaknesses. First, with regard to 
the strengths of the Kyoto Protocol, the agreement contains within it provision for a 
market-based approach, and therefore holds promise, at least, of being cost-
effective. I am referring to the well-known flexibility mechanisms which are part of 
the Kyoto Protocol. First, under Article 17, there is provision for emissions trading 
among the Annex I countries, which take on targets under the Protocol, whereby 
these parties to the Protocol — the individual governments — can trade their 
targets, their ‘assigned amounts’. Second, there is Joint Implementation, which 
provides for project-level trades among the Annex I countries. Third, there is the 
Clean Development Mechanism (or CDM), which provides for project-level offsets 
created in non-Annex I countries — the developing countries of the world — to be 
used by firms in Annex I countries to help achieve their targets. 
A second advantage of the Kyoto Protocol is that it provides flexibility for nations 
to meet their national targets — their commitments — in any way they want. In 
other words, the Protocol provides for flexibility at the national level, that is, 
domestic sovereignty. The importance of this provision (Article 2) should not be 
underestimated in terms of its political importance for the agreement having been 
reached in Kyoto. 
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Third, the Kyoto Protocol has the appearance, at least, of fairness, in that it focuses 
on the wealthiest countries and those most responsible for the current stock of 
greenhouse gases in the atmosphere. This is consistent with the principle enunciated 
in the Framework Convention on Climate Change of ‘common but differentiated 
responsibilities’. 
Fourth and finally, the fact that the Kyoto Protocol was signed by more than  
175 countries and subsequently ratified by a sufficient number of Annex I countries 
for it to come into force indicates the political viability of the agreement, if not the 
feasibility for individual countries to comply with their targets. 
In the realm of public policy, as in our everyday lives, we frequently learn more 
from our mistakes, from our failures, than from our successes. So, too, in the case of 
the Kyoto Protocol, and therefore, I now examine some of the key weaknesses of 
the Kyoto Protocol and how those lead to potentially valuable lessons for the path 
forward. 
First, it is well known that some of the largest emitters are not constrained by the 
Kyoto Protocol. Some of the largest and most rapidly growing economies in the 
developing world do not take on targets under the agreement. Importantly, China, 
India, Brazil, South Africa, Korea, and Mexico are not part of Annex I. The rapid 
rates of economic growth in these countries, and therefore their rapid rates of 
growth of energy use, and hence CO2 emissions, result in the fact that the 
developing world will soon overtake the industrialized world in emissions. Indeed, 
in 2008, China’s CO2 emissions exceeded those of the United States for the first 
time, and thereby China has become the leading emitter in the world (Blanford, 
Richels, and Rutherford 2008).  
In addition, these realities raise the possibility that the Kyoto Protocol does not 
represent the fairness which was originally intended, at least in today’s world. More 
than 59 non-Annex I countries — countries of the developing world, as well as 
others — now have higher per capita incomes than the poorest of the Annex I 
countries. 
A second weakness of the Kyoto Protocol is that the United States — until recently 
the world’s largest emitter of greenhouse gases — has not ratified, and indeed will 
not ratify, the agreement. I will return later to some of the reasons for this, but for 
now this fact must be accepted as one of the weaknesses of the Protocol, as 
implemented. 
A third weakness of the approach of the Kyoto Protocol is associated with the fact 
that a relatively small set of countries are tasked with taking action — the Annex I 
countries of the industrialized world. Although this approach may have been well-
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intended, the result inevitably is that the costs will be driven up of producing 
carbon-intensive goods and services within the coalition of countries taking action; 
indeed, that is the intention of the Protocol, and it is fully appropriate. However, 
that means that through the forces of international trade, comparative advantage in 
the production of carbon-intensive goods and services — directly in proportion to 
their carbon intensity — will shift from the participating nations (the industrialized 
world) to the other countries of the world, that is, developing nations. 
The result is that as greenhouse gas emissions are reduced under the Protocol within 
the coalition countries, we simultaneously will witness an increase in economic 
activity to produce carbon-intensive goods and services outside of the coalition 
countries. This means that at the same time that emissions are being reduced by the 
Annex I countries, there will be an increase in emissions by the non-Annex I 
countries, leading to so-called ‘emissions leakage’. This leakage will not be one-for-
one, but nevertheless, it results in a reduction of cost-effectiveness, reduces the 
environmental performance of the agreement, and perhaps worst of all, pushes 
developing countries onto a more carbon-intensive growth path than they otherwise 
would have been, rendering it even more difficult for these countries to join the 
agreement later. 
A fourth weakness of the Kyoto Protocol concerns the nature of emissions trading. 
For reasons I have written about in detail elsewhere, the provision in Article 17 for 
international emissions trading is unlikely to be effective, if indeed it is utilized at 
all (Hahn and Stavins 1999). The entire theory behind the claim that a cap-and-trade 
system is likely to be cost effective depends upon the participants being cost-
minimizing entities. In the case of private-sector firms, this is a sensible assumption, 
because if firms do not seek to and indeed succeed in minimizing their costs, they 
will eventually disappear, given the competitive forces in the market. But nation 
states can hardly be thought of as simple cost minimizers; many other objectives 
obviously affect their decision making. Furthermore, even if nation states sought to 
minimize costs, they do not have sufficient information about marginal abatement 
costs at the multitude of sources within their borders to carry out cost-effective 
trades with other countries. 
There is also great concern regarding the Clean Development Mechanism in the 
Kyoto Protocol. This is not a cap-and-trade approach, but rather is an emissions-
reduction-credit system. That is, when an individual project results in emissions 
below what they would have been in the absence of the project, a credit — that may 
be sold to a source within a cap-and-trade system — is generated. But inevitably, 
this system raises the challenge inherent in the necessary comparison of actual 
emissions with what they would have been otherwise. The baseline is unobserved 
and fundamentally unobservable: what would have happened had the project not 
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been put in place. In fact, there is a natural tendency, because of economic 
incentives, to claim credits precisely for those projects which are most profitable, 
and hence would have been most likely to have been executed with or without the 
promise of credits. This is the so-called ‘additionality problem’. It is a serious issue. 
Although there are ways of reducing this problem through restructuring and reform 
of the Clean Development Mechanism in the future (Keeler and Thompson 2008), 
this surely must be taken as one of the weaknesses of the Kyoto Protocol. 
Finally, the Kyoto Protocol — with its five year time horizon (2008 to 2012) —
represents a relatively short-term approach for what is fundamentally a long-term 
problem. This is because greenhouse gases have lag times in the atmosphere of 
decades to centuries. Furthermore, in order to encourage the magnitude of 
technological change that will be required to address seriously the threat of climate 
change, it will be necessary to send long-term signals to the private market for 
investment and significant technological change (Newell 2008). 
Can the Kyoto protocol provide the way forward? 
So, the Kyoto Protocol has been criticized. The overall costs are much greater than 
need be, due to the virtual exclusion of developing countries. By conservative 
estimates, the costs are four times the cost-effective level. Second, the agreement 
will generate trivial short-term climate benefits over the period 2008 to 2012, and 
fail to provide a long-term solution for this long-term, stock — not flow —
environmental problem. Third, it is ironic that these insufficient short-term targets 
are actually excessively ambitious, in that they would foster premature capital 
obsolescence. They are particularly ambitious and costly for the United States, 
because of the Kyoto Protocol’s base year of 1990 and the remarkable economic 
growth that took place in the United States subsequent to that year. The result is that 
the United States’ apparently modest 7 per cent reduction target translates into an 
actual target of reducing emissions by 35 per cent compared with business-as-usual 
emissions. Thus, the Kyoto Protocol is too little, too fast. Not a very pleasing 
combination. 
Alternative policy architectures for the post-Kyoto period 
Despite its deficiencies, can the structure — the architecture — of the Kyoto 
Protocol provide the way forward? After all, the Protocol also has some very 
positive attributes, as I noted above. Whether one thinks the Kyoto Protocol was a 
good first step or a bad first step, everyone agrees that a second step is required. A 
way forward is required for the post-2012 period. With this in mind, we launched 
the Harvard Project on International Climate Agreements, which I co-direct with 
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Dr. Joseph Aldy of Resources for the Future, a think-tank located in Washington, 
DC. The Harvard Project is a global, multi-disciplinary effort to help identify the 
key design elements of a scientifically sound, economically rational, and politically 
pragmatic post-2012 international policy architecture.2 
We are drawing upon leading thinkers from academia, private industry, 
government, and non-governmental organizations around the world. Indeed, we 
have 28 research teams operating in Europe, the United States, China, India, Japan, 
and Australia. In addition to carrying out research, the Harvard Project has 
important outreach elements, which include our role as technical consultant to the 
Danish Prime Minister in his role as Incoming President of the Fifteenth Conference 
of the Parties to the Framework Convention on Climate Change, which will take 
place in Copenhagen in December 2009, where most people think — or at least 
hope — the post-Kyoto agreement will be struck or initiated. 
Three categories of international policy architecture 
In our book, Architectures for Agreement: Addressing Global Climate Change in 
the Post-Kyoto World, published by Cambridge University press in 2007, we 
describe potential post-Kyoto international policy architectures as falling within 
three principal categories: targets and timetables; harmonized national policies; and 
coordinated and unilateral national policies (Aldy and Stavins 2007). I will say a 
few words about each of these in turn. 
This first category — targets and timetables — is the most familiar. At its heart is a 
centralized international agreement, top-down in form. This is the basic architecture 
underlying the Kyoto Protocol: essentially country-level quantitative emissions 
targets established over specified time frames. An example of an approach that 
would be within this realm of targets and timetables, but would address some of the 
perceived deficiencies of the Kyoto Protocol would be establishing targets that are 
formulas rather than numbers. With so-called ‘growth targets’, an individual 
country’s target is a function of its gross domestic product (GDP) per capita, for 
example. As countries become more wealthy, their targets become more stringent. 
When and if countries face difficult economic periods, the stringency of their targets 
is automatically reduced.  
                                                 
2 The Harvard Project consists of three stages: (1) discuss among key international policy 
constituencies the proposition that the nations of the world ought to explore a range of options for 
a successor to Kyoto; (2) conduct economic modelling and policy analysis to develop a small set 
of promising policy frameworks and key design elements; and (3) explore key design principles 
and alternative international policy architectures with domestic and international audiences.  
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Such an approach does not divide the world simply into two categories of countries, 
as in the Kyoto Protocol, but rather allows for a continuous differentiation among 
the countries of the world, thereby including all countries, and hence reducing if not 
eliminating the problem of emissions leakage, but still addressing the key criterion 
of distributional equity, and doing so in a more careful, more sophisticated manner 
than is done under the Kyoto Protocol.3 
The second category, harmonized domestic policies, focuses more on national 
policy actions than on goals, and is less centralized than the first set of approaches. 
In this case, countries agree on similar domestic policies. One example of this, 
frequently discussed by academics, but receiving little favorable attention from 
policymakers, is a set of harmonized national carbon taxes.4 With this approach, 
each participating country sets a domestic tax on the carbon content of fossil fuels, 
thereby achieving cost-effective control within its borders. The taxes are set by 
nations, and the revenue from taxes stays within the respective nations. The taxes 
could be revenue neutral, that is, returned to the economy through proportional cuts 
in other, presumably distortionary, taxes, such as those on labour and capital. In 
order to achieve global cost-effectiveness, the taxes would need to be set at the 
same level in all countries. This would presumably not be acceptable to the poorer 
countries of the world, and therefore significant financial transfers, that is, side 
payments, from the industrialized world to the developing world would need to 
accompany such a system of harmonized carbon taxes to make it distributionally 
equitable and hence politically feasible.5 
The third and final category into which we sort potential post-Kyoto climate policy 
architectures is coordinated and unilateral national policies. These are the least 
centralized approaches of the three. They are essentially bottom-up approaches 
which rely on domestic politics to drive incentives for participation and compliance. 
Although these approaches are the least centralized, they should not be thought of 
as necessarily the least effective. Indeed, later in this paper, I describe one example 
of such a bottom-up approach — linking independent national and regional tradable 
permit systems — which holds promise of being a potentially effective approach. 
                                                 
3 In the Harvard Project on International Climate Agreements, one of the research initiatives 
focuses precisely on this approach, namely Frankel (2008). 
4 Cooper (2008) has made such a proposal in the Harvard Project on International Climate 
Agreements. 
5 For further discussion of equity considerations in the post-Kyoto climate regime, see Posner and 
Sunstein (2008). Issues of political feasibility are examined by Keohane and Raustiala (2008). 
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Summary of Kyoto and post-Kyoto architecture 
The Kyoto Protocol has come into force without US participation, and without 
compliance by other countries, such as Canada, which likely will miss its Kyoto 
target by more than 30 per cent. In any event, the effect of the Kyoto Protocol on 
climate change would be trivial to nonexistent. At the same time, scientific and 
economic consensus point to the need for a credible international agreement that is 
scientifically sound, economically rational, and politically pragmatic. Various 
alternative policy architectures exist — some more promising than others — and 
some of these alternatives will be thrashed out in Copenhagen in December 2009 at 
the Fifteenth Conference of the Parties to the Framework Convention on Climate 
Change. 
9.3 US climate policy outlook 
While international discussions continue, a topic of great interest is how will the 
United States respond when it takes action to reduce net emissions of greenhouse 
gases. What means — what instruments of public policy — will the United States 
government use to bring about greenhouse gas reductions? Because of their great 
advantages in this realm, most attention has been focused on market-based 
instruments. Most proposals have featured tradable permit systems, in particular, 
cap-and-trade systems. This is partly because of theory, but mostly because of 
experience. 
Market-based policy instruments in the United States 
Cap-and-trade systems are an effective approach that can achieve environmental 
targets at minimum cost and send price signals for long-term technological change, 
which is absolutely key in the case of climate change policy. This is the approach 
used in the United States in the 1980s to phase out leaded gasoline from the market 
at savings of approximately $250 million per year, compared with a conventional 
command-and-control approach (Stavins 2003). It is also the approach used in the 
United States since 1995, to cut sulfur dioxide emissions by half, saving about  
$1 billion per year in compliance costs (Carlson et al. 2000). Likewise, this is the 
approach used by the European Union and its path-breaking emission trading 
scheme to reduce CO2 emissions across the continent (Ellerman and Buchner 
2007).6 It is also the approach used by the northeastern states in the United States to 
control CO2 emissions from power plants in the Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative 
                                                 
6 See, also, Ellerman (2008), for an examination of the implications of the European system to a 
potential global regime. 
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(Stavins 2007). Finally, it is the same approach being considered in California to 
implement the aggressive climate goals of Assembly Bill 32 (Market Advisory 
Committee 2007). 
Another market-based approach to climate change is a carbon tax, which has some 
real merits compared with the trading approach, but also some real disadvantages.7 
Also, importantly, there are hybrids of taxes and permits, which combine some of 
the positive elements of each (Stavins 2007). The political attention in the United 
States, however, has been focused almost exclusively on the cap-and-trade 
approach. 
A US cap-and-trade system 
The key merits of a well-designed cap-and-trade system for climate change in the 
United States are as follows.8 First, this approach can provide cost effectiveness, 
while achieving meaningful reductions in greenhouse gas emissions levels. Second, 
it offers an easy means of compensating for the inevitably unequal burdens imposed 
by a climate policy. This can be done through free allocation of allowances or 
through returning revenues generated by an auction of allowances. Third, the 
overall performance of a cap-and-trade system is unlikely to be degraded by 
political forces, in contrast to carbon taxes. Fourth, this approach has a history of 
successful adoption and implementation. And fifth and very importantly, it provides 
a straightforward means to harmonize with other countries’ climate policies. 
There are a considerable number of proposals for cap-and-trade systems of various 
design in both the Senate and the House of Representatives of the US Congress. The 
most prominent of these — the Lieberman-Warner legislation in the Senate —
 utilizes a fundamentally upstream, economy-wide cap-and-trade system with a set 
of targets over time which are approximately equivalent to meeting the US Kyoto 
Protocol target level in 2020, rather than in 2008–2012, as intended under the 
Protocol itself. The new Presidential administration and the new Congress in 2009 
may move in this direction or some other, although real action may be delayed to 
2010 or even later, due to US and world economic conditions. But, in any event, 
further action in the United States will not mean anything in the absence of some 
sort of meaningful global action, and so I return to the global policy context. 
                                                 
7 For a comparison of taxes and cap-and-trade for CO2, see Stavins (2007). 
8 For further discussion of a meaningful, upstream, economy-wide cap-and-trade system for the 
United States, see Stavins (2007), produced for the Hamilton Project at the Brookings Institution. 
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What will the future hold for US participation in an international climate 
agreement? 
The Bush administration’s announced plan of ‘slow, stop, and reverse’ emissions 
makes basic sense, but dates and targets are required for the ‘stop and reverse’. 
Also, the plan’s embrace — in principle — of market-based instruments is positive, 
but a real cap-and-trade system is required, not simply voluntary programs. What 
has been missing most from the Bush administration’s approach to climate change 
has been action, if not leadership, in the international domain. President Bush 
appropriately criticized the Kyoto Protocol as a flawed international approach, but 
what was absent for many years was the administration’s proposed alternative. In its 
final years in office, the administration has made movements in that direction with 
its series of meetings among the major economies of the world, although this 
process appears to have been too little, too late. 
What about a future Democratic administration? First of all, it is important to keep 
in mind the vote in the United States Senate on the Byrd-Hagel Resolution in the 
summer of 1997 leading up to the Kyoto Protocol. Many people, particularly 
outside of the United States, seem to think that opposition to the approach embodied 
in the Kyoto Protocol has been partisan in the United States. But the Byrd-Hagel 
Resolution, which indicated that the United States Senate would not ratify an 
agreement which did not provide for meaningful action by key developing 
countries, was passed by a vote of 95 to 0. President Clinton did not submit the 
Kyoto Protocol to the US Senate for ratification, nor would Vice President Gore had 
he been elected President, nor would Senator Kerry had he been elected President. 
Likewise, this year’s Democratic candidate for President, Senator Barack Obama, 
has indicated that he is not supportive of the Kyoto Protocol (as has Senator John 
McCain, the Republican candidate). 
Thus, no matter who occupies the White House in the coming years, a Kyoto 
Protocol type treaty will not be submitted to the United States Senate for ratification 
(and if it were, it would not be ratified). State and regional initiatives in the United 
States will advance, and we are likely to see a meaningful national program — a 
cap-and-trade system — by 2010 or 2011 that will be endorsed and signed into law 
by the President. 
The key remaining question is when will the United States begin to work with 
others on a better international agreement, and the answer is that this will happen in 
2009 no matter who is elected President. Two important caveats, however, should 
be added to this claim. If the economy is mired in a deep and prolonged recession, 
or if there is a major — or even minor — terrorist incident on US soil, then 
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consideration both of domestic climate policy, as well as US activity on the 
international front will be decreased and delayed. 
9.4 An emerging post-Kyoto climate policy architecture 
Interestingly, the new international policy architecture may be evolving on its own, 
based upon the undeniable reality that tradable permit systems are emerging 
worldwide as the favored national and regional approach.9 Among the greenhouse 
gas tradable permit systems that have emerged are: the European Union’s emission 
trading scheme; the Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative in the northeastern United 
States; and systems in Norway, Switzerland, and other nations; plus a global 
emission-reduction-credit system, the Clean Development Mechanism. 
Furthermore, cap-and-trade systems now appear highly likely to emerge as the 
chosen approach to reducing greenhouse gas emissions in an additional set of 
industrialized countries. Even before the change of government in late 2007, 
Australia had set itself on a course to develop a cap-and-trade system to achieve 
ambitious reductions in carbon dioxide emissions. Canada, which is likely to miss 
its Kyoto target, will most likely adopt a cap-and-trade approach when and if it 
attempts to move towards its Kyoto targets, or at least for the post-Kyoto years. 
Also, Japan, which had long indicated its interests lie in a sectoral approach to 
lowering greenhouse gas emissions, indicated in the summer of 2008, that it will 
develop a cap-and-trade system to reduce greenhouse gas emissions. And finally, 
within the United States, it appears likely that the United States Congress will adopt 
a comprehensive, upstream cap-and-trade system for carbon dioxide and possibly 
other greenhouse gas emissions in 2009, 2010, or at the latest, 2011. In addition, in 
California, a cap-and-trade system is being developed as a central part of the state’s 
portfolio of approaches it will use to achieve the ambitious targets set out in 
Assembly Bill 32 (AB 32). 
International linkage — incentives, merits, and concerns 
Because of the emergence of this diverse set of cap-and-trade systems and 
emission-reduction-credits systems around the world, there is now increased 
attention and increased pressure — both from governments and from the business 
community — to link these systems. For example, in late August 2008, Australian 
Prime Minister Rudd and New Zealand Prime Minister Clark agreed that it was 
                                                 
9 This section of the paper draws on Jaffe and Stavins (2008), prepared for the Harvard Project on 
International Climate Agreements. 
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important for both countries to design their respective climate policies (cap-and-
trade systems) so that ‘there are no barriers to linking the schemes’. 
By linkage, I refer to direct or indirect connections among tradable permit systems 
through unilateral or bilateral recognition of allowances or permits. The benefits of 
linkage are, first of all, significant cost savings. These cost savings are brought 
about by linkage in the same way that a cap-and-trade system reduces costs, 
compared with separate regulation of sources. In addition, linkage across countries 
of one tradable permit system with another reduces overall transaction costs, 
reduces market power (which can be a problem in such systems), and reduces 
overall price volatility. 
There are also some legitimate concerns about linkage, and some of these are very 
reasonable concerns. Most important is the automatic propagation of cost-
containment design elements, that is, banking, borrowing, and safety valves. If one 
cap-and-trade system has a safety valve, for example, and another system does not 
have a safety valve, and the two systems are directly linked, then the result will be 
that both systems will now share the safety valve. Given that the European Union 
seems opposed to using a safety valve in its emissions trading scheme, and given 
that it appears quite likely that a safety valve will be a key element of the future 
emissions trading system in the United States, this automatic propagation of cost 
containment design elements is a serious concern. 
More broadly, as a result of linkage, nations have reduced control over allowance 
prices, emissions impacts, and other consequences of their systems. However, it is 
important to recognize that this loss of control over domestic prices and other 
effects as a result of linking is simply a special case of the general proposition that 
as a result of engaging in international trade through an open economy, nations lose 
some degree of control over domestic prices. Indeed, the only way for a nation to 
have complete control over the prices within its borders, whether those be the prices 
of shoes or emissions allowances, is to close a country’s borders to international 
trade, thereby impoverishing one’s own economy and citizens. 
Nevertheless, concerns about automatic propagation of design elements are 
significant, and these mean that advance harmonization of some design elements 
will be necessary prior to direct linking of cap-and-trade systems across 
international borders. Such requirements to harmonize systems before linking mean 
that two-way, direct links between cap-and-trade systems will be challenging. 
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An emerging post-Kyoto architecture 
Interestingly, there are ways to gain the benefits from linkage of cap-and-trade 
systems, but without the downside of requiring advance harmonization. If a cap-
and-trade system links with an emission-reduction-credit system, such as the Clean 
Development Mechanism, that linkage is of necessity a one-way link, since an 
emission-reduction-credit system has no use for allowances. If two cap-and-trade 
systems both link with the same emission-reduction-credits system, then the two 
cap-and-trade systems are indirectly linked with one another. All of the benefits of 
linkage occur: cost-effectiveness for the pair or set of cap-and-trade systems; and 
more liquid markets that reduce transaction costs, market power, and price 
volatility. But the downside of automatic propagation of key design elements from 
one cap-and-trade system to another does not occur when the linkage between the 
systems is indirect through an emission-reduction-credit system. 
Such indirect linkage of cap-and-trade systems through the CDM is already 
occurring, because virtually all cap-and-trade systems that are in place, as well as 
those that are planned or contemplated, allow for offsets (to some degree) from the 
CDM to be used to meet domestic obligations. Thus, this kind of linkage among the 
world’s cap-and-trade systems may already be evolving into the de facto, if not the 
de jure, post-Kyoto international climate policy architecture. 
Let me emphasize that I am not recommending this particular post-Kyoto 
architecture as the best approach. Rather, I highlight it because it is an interesting 
departure from the typical centralized, targets-and-timetables approach that we 
typically think of as serving as the logical successor to the Kyoto Protocol, and 
because it may be evolving spontaneously. It is being examined in just one of the 
28 research initiatives of the Harvard Project on International Climate Agreements 
(Jaffe and Stavins 2008). 
9.5 Conclusions 
National governments are pursuing a variety of individual climate policies. Europe 
has called for emissions to be 20 per cent below the 1990 level by the year 2020. 
The target likely to emerge in the United States by 2010 is 6 per cent to 7 per cent 
below 1990 emissions by the year 2020, which is similar to current European Union 
action, although it is less then stated European aspirations. 
Cap-and-trade systems are clearly emerging as the preferred approach to address 
climate change in most countries of the industrialized world. And there is 
continued, very strong interest from developing countries in the Clean Development 
Mechanism. The United States will likely be much more aggressive in 2009 with a 
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new Presidential administration and Congress in place, both with regard to domestic 
action and with regard to US participation, indeed, leadership, in international 
negotiations regarding the post-Kyoto climate regime. 
Even if the post-Kyoto international policy agreement is not decided in Copenhagen 
in December 2009, serious negotiations will at least be initiated at that time. 
Although it is not clear what all of the elements of that agreement will be, some key 
features are beginning to emerge. The key question, of course, is what architecture 
and what circumstances will bring China and other key developing countries into 
the coalition of action. 
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10 Institutions and incentives for 
promoting better policies and 
outcomes: challenges of achieving 
environmental outcomes that require 
coordination across multiple 
jurisdictions 
Wendy Craik and James Cleaver 
Murray–Darling Basin Commission 
Abstract 
The Murray–Darling Basin Commission (MDBC) is an unincorporated joint 
venture involving six governments. Its mandate is to provide coordinated 
planning and management of environmental (chiefly water) resources in the 
Murray–Darling Basin. With a history of over 90 years, the MDBC has evolved 
from an engineering-focused, state-based organisation for river management 
and operation, mainly for consumption and navigation. It is now a natural 
resource management organisation operating in a politically-charged 
environment of fundamentally reducing water availability and increasingly 
centralised control and funding. The mandate and structure of MDBC and 
decision-making arrangements have proved sufficiently robust over the longer 
term, where lengthy negotiations preceded significant decisions. This may be 
much less satisfactory in an environment of unforeseen and rapidly reducing 
water availability, a rapidly moving media cycle and highly politically-sensitive 
issues. The institutional arrangements and factors which have underpinned the 
organisation’s progress to date are outlined with particular emphasis on one of 
the MDBC’s major programs — The Living Murray (an environmental water 
recovery program). 
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10.1 Geography and water use in the Murray–Darling 
Basin 
The MDB covers 14 per cent of south eastern Australia, approximately one million 
square kilometres. Two million people live in the Basin and are dependent on it for 
their drinking water, as are another 1.2 million residents of the city of Adelaide, 
which is outside the Basin but draws its main water supply from the Murray River. 
Long-term average rainfall in the Basin is approximately 500 000 GL per annum, 
yet the vast majority does not flow into rivers. Long-term average annual runoff is 
24 300 GL (5 per cent of rainfall) with approximately 11 400 GL of long-term 
average extractions. In the River Murray system, long-term average runoff is 11 600 
GL (pre-1996–97). Conditions have, however, been significantly drier in recent 
years (figure 10.1). The driest year on record occurred in 2006–07 with 1040 GL of 
inflows, (less than 60 per cent of the previous recorded minimum inflow). 
The MDB accounts for 40 per cent of the gross value of Australia’s agricultural 
output. Only 2 per cent of MDB land is irrigated and yet this produces 70 per cent 
of the gross value of Australia’s irrigated agricultural output. Water use in the Basin 
has reflected the reliability of its supply. Annual cropping, such as cotton and grain, 
suits the episodic water availability of the Northern Basin (as a result of extremely 
variable rainfall and small storages). Consequently, Northern Basin permanent 
horticulture relies mostly on groundwater. The Southern (Murray) system, with a 
historically more reliable surface water supply, supports significant permanent 
horticulture as well as annual cropping and irrigated pasture, including for the dairy 
industry. 
Long-term average water diversion in the Murray system is approximately 
4068 GL. There is, however, a total of 5280 GL of Murray River water 
entitlements. Of these, approximately 2487 GL are high-reliability water 
entitlements, and approximately 2793 GL are low-reliability water entitlements. The 
attributes of high- and low- reliability irrigation water entitlements vary between 
states and river valleys. On the Murray River, the long-term average allocation 
against the high reliability Victorian entitlement, called a ‘water right’, is 99 per 
cent. The long-term average allocation against the low-reliability Victorian 
entitlement, called ‘sales water’ is 80 per cent. Approximately 350 GL of Murray 
River water is used by urban and domestic consumers each year. The largest 
consumer of this water is the city of Adelaide (260 GL), near the end of the Murray 
River. Delivery of 350 GL of water for human consumption requires an extra 1000 
GL approximately. 
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Figure 10.1 River Murray system inflows 1891–2008 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
10.2 A brief historical perspective 
The MDBC is an unincorporated joint venture of four States (New South Wales, 
South Australia, Victoria, Queensland), the ACT and the Commonwealth 
Government. It was first established as the River Murray Commission in 1914, 
following prolonged debate between the three southern States and the 
Commonwealth at the time of Federation, driven by severe drought and concern 
about navigation and water security. Constitutional control of navigation and trade 
lay with the Commonwealth, while control of water lay with each State, thus the 
underlying challenge of reaching water management outcomes in the interest of the 
Basin as a whole has its genesis in the Australian Constitution. 
The current Murray–Darling Basin Agreement is reflected in parallel legislation of 
each partner government. The Agreement and subsequent decisions of the 
Ministerial Council and the Commission provide the legal basis under which the 
Commission operates. The only sanction is ‘name and shame’. Unresolved disputes 
are ultimately to be resolved by a Tasmanian judge. 
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10.3 The role and structure of the MDBC 
The MDBC has evolved from an agency entrusted with directing the management 
and operation of water storages — from Dartmouth Dam to the Murray Mouth and 
including the lower Darling — into a broader range of responsibilities, including 
environmental management and planning for the future. Its mandate, captured in the 
Murray–Darling Basin Agreement, is to coordinate effective planning and 
management of natural resources in the Murray–Darling Basin. Salinity, native fish, 
interstate water trade and water policy development are examples of other areas into 
which the MDBC’s role has expanded. A Ministerial Council and a Commission of 
jurisdictional representatives, chaired by an independent president, oversee the 
organisation. The MDBC office provides the secretariat for the Ministerial Council 
and Commission, including administrative services, technical advice, project 
funding and acting as a program coordinator and facilitator of the partner 
governments, which deliver the on-ground projects. 
An extensive network of interjurisdictional committees has developed beneath the 
Ministerial Council and Commission (figure 10.2), each with a technical focus on 
specific areas of MDBC business. Whilst these committees are not decision-
making, they underpin the MDBC’s inclusive and consensus-based approach by 
evaluating options at the detailed level and making robust recommendations to the 
Commission and Ministerial Council which maintain a more strategic focus. The 
committees and working groups also provide strong links between the policy 
development and on-ground project implementation of Commission and Ministerial 
Council initiatives. This process can be time-consuming, but it leads to far quicker 
and more robust decision making by the Commission and Ministerial Council. A 
Community Advisory Committee provides advice to both the Council and 
Commission and individuals participate in the advisory committees. 
Under the MDB Agreement, decisions need to be unanimous to be implemented. 
Achieving unanimity of decisions that initiate significant new policies can be time-
consuming. The original River Murray Agreement took 22 years to negotiate, and 
both the Cap (a limit on surface water diversions) and The Living Murray First Step 
each took about a decade to resolve. Once taken, however, the decisions are 
durable. Although the MDBC decision-making progress has been the subject of 
significant domestic criticism because of its lengthy gestation periods, it is highly 
acclaimed internationally as a successful model. 
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Figure 10.2 Murray–Darling Basin Commission governance structure 
The success of the MDBC as a coordinator and facilitator is dependent on a number 
of factors: 
• its decisions are unanimous 
• jurisdictions jointly fund MDBC programs, including those implemented by the 
States 
• the MDBC’s ‘river operation’ and hydrological modelling functions afford 
traction to the environmental and natural resource management programs, 
policies and outcomes, which are enhanced through the cooperation and 
integration of ‘river operations’ and natural resource management programs 
• the MDBC shares all information with all jurisdictions 
• the MDBC fosters cooperation and collaboration with jurisdictional partners, 
through strong links with jurisdictions’ natural resource management agencies. 
Jurisdictions are engaged in policy development, and the design and 
implementation of programs at all levels 
• the MDBC has a high level of technical expertise 
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• the MDBC has a basin-wide focus, as opposed to the jurisdiction-centric focus 
of particular governments 
• the MDBC commissions independent audits of all its major programs with 
agreed auditors. 
10.4 Achieving environmental outcomes 
In 2002, in response to increasing evidence of environmental degradation in the 
Murray system, the MDB Ministerial Council requested an independent review and 
assessment of options to address environmental decline, combined with a 
comprehensive process of industry and community engagement. Since it was 
understood that overallocation of water (coupled with unnatural river operation) 
was a significant cause of environmental degradation, the independent review 
assessed the likely impacts of three water-recovery volumes: 350 GL, 750 GL and 
1500 GL. 
Significant community concern, particularly from irrigators about the method of 
water recovery, led the governments of the Murray system (all jurisdictions except 
Queensland) to provide, in August 2003, $500 million over five years for water 
recovery in the Murray. The Commonwealth Government contributed a further 
$300 million in June 2006. Strong disagreement about the value of volumetric water 
recovery targets alone resulted in an approach that led to the development of 
objectives for agreed individual Icon Environmental Sites identified by the 
Commission. The objectives are specific measures of fish, birds and vegetation, 
which provide a tangible assessment of Icon Site condition. 
In November 2003, the MDB Ministerial Council took the First Step Decision to 
recover 500 GL of water and to achieve environmental objectives at six Icon Sites 
along the Murray (figure 10.3). The program was called The Living Murray (TLM) 
‘First Step’ because it was understood to be the beginning of the river restoration 
process. The First Step was underpinned by an Intergovernmental Agreement 
(IGA), signed in June 2004, binding the governments to the objectives, water targets 
and financial commitments of TLM, and providing a deadline of June 2009. 
Under TLM, the MDBC coordinates five programs: (1) recovering water for 
environmental use; (2) construction of environmental works and measures 
(structures and actions which facilitate the flow of water); (3) delivering water for 
the environment; (4) monitoring ecological outcomes; and (5) community 
engagement including Indigenous partnerships. The institutions, incentives and 
features of each program are described in order to identify success factors of multi-
jurisdictional coordination. 
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Figure 10.3 Living Murray Icon Sites 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Water recovery 
The Living Murray First Step aims to recover 500 GL of water to improve the 
health of the Murray system, with an initial focus on the Icon Sites. The Southern 
Basin jurisdictions all contribute to the water recovery target: New South Wales 
(249 GL); Victoria (214 GL); South Australia (35 GL); and the Australian Capital 
Territory (2 GL). The targets reflect each State’s consumption. The water recovery 
targets are a firm commitment, agreed in TLM IGA. Methods of water recovery and 
priorities were determined by the Ministerial Council, hence the initial focus on 
infrastructure over water purchases. 
It is a necessarily long process to recover water, requiring a robust assessment of the 
volume, reliability and ultimately cost-effectiveness ($ per ML). The water recovery 
institutional arrangements have been established to recover cost-effective 
permanent water to achieve environmental objectives at the six Icon Sites. This 
objective is achieved by: a committee process that fosters cooperation and 
jurisdictional ownership of the outcomes; the expertise of the MDBC and 
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jurisdictional staff; and an independent review at the completion of the process. The 
Ministerial Council considers the outcomes of the independent review and agrees 
the amount that will be credited on the Environmental Water Register. These 
amounts contribute to those volumetric targets to which each jurisdictional 
government is committed. 
Initially, a number of cost-effective infrastructure projects were available and there 
was some community opposition to market-based water recovery. But 
infrastructure-based water recovery projects are generally increasing in cost 
$ per ML, especially against the market value of a comparable water entitlement. In 
2007, the MDBC Community Advisory Committee’s strong statement in support of 
developing market-based water recovery measures was a factor in the MDB 
Ministerial Council’s decision to pilot an environmental water purchase of 20 GL. 
The environmental water purchase was very successful, closing several weeks early 
due to high interest and over-subscription of the 20 GL target. The pilot identified a 
number of risks associated with water markets, including those associated with 
probity and due diligence. 
There are currently approximately 400 GL in projects on the water recovery 
Eligible Measures Register. Water entitlements amounting to 133 GL have been 
transferred to TLM environmental water register. The significant increase in the 
price of permanent water in recent years is another factor that must be taken into 
account; infrastructure projects that were previously deemed too expensive may be 
reconsidered. 
Construction of environmental works and measures 
The strategic placement of regulators, channels and levies on the Icon Site 
floodplain allows more efficient delivery of TLM water to achieve environmental 
objectives. The Environmental Works and Measures Program (EWMP) assesses 
several criteria in order to achieve the greatest environmental return from 
investment at each of the Icon Sites, including: water requirements; cost, area of 
inundation; construction issues; and environmental outcomes. ‘Objective’ measures 
of cost and inundation provide a relatively easy comparison between projects and 
outcomes. The Taskforce also, however, looks for ‘subjective’ analysis of overall 
environmental outcomes that can be expected from the project. 
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Figure 10.4 The MDBC environmental water purchase was positively 
reported in the media 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
To optimise these criteria, the MDBC coordinates a ‘blueprint and prioritisation’ 
process — through the multijurisdictional ‘technical’ taskforce and more ‘strategic’ 
working group (under the auspices of the Commission and Ministerial Council) —
which informs a holistic assessment of the projects’ value for money in achieving 
Icon Site objectives. During this process, strong links are maintained with the 
partner governments, who deliver the on-ground component of the projects, and 
other MDBC programs. The Native Fish Strategy (to assess the impact of the 
structure on native fish, including the need for a fishway in floodplain works), Basin 
Salinity Management Strategy (to assess the impact of flooding on salt 
mobilisation) and River Murray Water Asset Managers (to provide feedback on 
design and construction, as well as ongoing operation and maintenance) are all 
engaged in the process. 
An example is in the Gunbower Forest, where three works options vary in terms of 
cost, complexity, water consumption and inundation (figure 10.5). 
Environmental water delivery 
The environmental water delivery program is an umbrella program of TLM. It 
combines long-term planning to achieve the ecological objectives at each Icon Site, 
with an annual process to allocate available environmental water between Icon 
Sites. 
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Figure 10.5 Options for works at the Gunbower, Koondrook, Pericoota Icon 
Site 
 
The mechanisms for long-term planning are the Murray System level 
Environmental Watering Plan and the Icon Site-level Environmental Management 
Plans, both of which are approved annually by Commission. The Environmental 
Watering Plan creates a framework for short-term decision making and priority-
setting, which maximises the environmental outcomes across all Icon Sites. The 
Icon Site Environmental Management Plans provide the building blocks necessary 
to achieve specific Icon Site objectives. Computer modelling of environmental 
water delivery options is the next key input into the Icon Site Environmental 
Management Plans. The partner governments have developed Icon Site-specific 
models, which combine inundation, water depth, frequency and duration of 
flooding. These models are used to canvass management options for all sites, 
including by estimating the likely ecological outcomes from alternative flooding 
regimes, comparing various potential locations of environmental works on the 
floodplain and priority water recovery measures. 
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Short-term planning is conducted through the Annual Watering Plan process. The 
Annual Watering Plan allocates available water to Icon Sites on a needs basis 
according to the framework set out by the Environmental Watering Plan. This 
process recognises that sharing the available water equally between states will not 
necessarily achieve the best outcomes. The Annual Watering Plan begins with a 
bidding process, whereby each State Icon Site manager submits environmental 
watering proposals for the coming year. The MDBC supports a multijurisdictional 
committee, which ranks each proposal against the agreed set of weighted eligibility 
criteria. The result is a list of watering proposals approved by the MDBC which is 
sequentially implemented. The MDBC Chief Executive is delegated to approve a 
reordering of the list in the event of changed circumstances. But if new priorities 
emerge, which are not already on the list, higher level approval from the MDBC is 
required. 
As a result of extreme dry conditions, there has been very little water available for 
environmental purposes (approximately 16 GL in 2007-08) and many Icon Sites are 
in severe stress. The MDBC has approved an interim set of ecological objectives, a 
clear and robust process to guide environmental water allocation, while extreme dry 
conditions continue. These are to: avoid loss of threatened species; avoid 
irretrievable damage or catastrophic events; and provide refuges to allow re-
colonisation following drought. 
Environmental water should be delivered to the Icon Site as efficiently as possible. 
‘Piggybacking’ an environmental flow on natural high flow is often the most 
efficient way to deliver water. For this purpose, the MDBC Environmental Manager 
is delegated to direct the release of environmental water for an approved (by the 
annual watering plan) purpose. In October 2005, an opportunity was identified to 
coordinate an environmental release from the Hume Dam with an unregulated high 
flow from the Ovens River. Strong links between river operations and 
environmental managers, both in the MDBC and partner governments, together 
with flexible arrangements to authorise the release of environmental water, achieved 
significantly greater flooding in the Barmah–Millewa Forest than would have been 
achieved from the environmental flows alone (figure 10.6). 
Monitoring environmental outcomes 
The purpose of TLM environmental monitoring program is to evaluate the progress 
toward the Ministerial Council-agreed Icon Site ecological objectives. TLM aims to 
put into practice the principles of adaptive management by using consistent 
methodologies for monitoring, and by establishing strong links between 
environmental monitoring outcomes and decision making. This will maximise  
 
  
 
160 PROMOTING BETTER 
ENVIRONMENTAL 
OUTCOMES 
 
 
Figure 10.6 Barmah-Millewa Forest environmental flow event, 2005–2006 
Actual flow in River Murray downstream of Yarrawonga versus probable flow 
without environmental release 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
feedback into future management practices and thereby optimise environmental 
outcomes. 
Specific ecological objectives have been developed for each Icon Site, which 
address fish, birds and vegetation, for example: 
• successful breeding of thousands of colonial water birds in at least three years in 
ten (at the Barmah–Millewa Forest) 
• thirty per cent of River Red Gum forest in healthy condition (at the Gunbower 
and Koondrook-Perricoota Forests) 
• increasing the population size and breeding events of the endangered Murray 
Hardyhead, Australian Smelt, Gudgeons and other wetland fish (at the Hattah 
Lakes). 
These ecological objectives are the basis of the environmental monitoring program. 
In order to be effective, they must be clearly defined and consistently monitored. 
The MDBC has developed a monitoring framework called the Outcomes Evaluation 
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Framework (OEF). The OEF has been agreed by the partner governments and sets 
out monitoring, evaluation and reporting arrangements across the Icon Sites. 
The monitoring framework gathers information at a number of resolutions: 
• River Murray system-scale and Icon Site condition monitoring are designed to 
monitor the effectiveness of TLM at the Murray System scale and Icon Site scale 
respectively, during the implementation of the First Step decision. 
• Intervention monitoring is designed to monitor the effectiveness of individual 
management interventions at the Icon Site-scale, for example the decision to 
pump water into an Icon Site. 
• Compliance monitoring determines if management actions, particularly water 
delivery, are being implemented as agreed. 
Collecting and analysing data at these resolutions is a key input into future decision 
making and the objective of adaptive management. Through the multijurisdictional 
Environmental Monitoring Taskforce, the MDBC coordinates analysis of the data 
into a monitoring synthesis, which is submitted to decision makers to inform future 
watering priorities and decisions. 
Community consultation 
TLM coordinates two forums for community and Indigenous consultation: the 
Community Reference Group (CRG) and Indigenous Partnerships Program (IPP). 
These forums aim to provide community and Indigenous input into decision-making 
processes, as well as to increase awareness, understanding and support for TLM 
programs. States also coordinate individual Icon Site consultation groups. 
The IPP is beginning to engage Indigenous people in the management of Icon Sites 
through a process called ‘use and occupancy mapping’. The objective is to map 
Indigenous peoples’ contemporary relationship with the Icon Site. As part of an IPP 
pilot project, use and occupancy maps have been produced at two Icon Sites. 
10.5 Success factors for achieving environmental 
results 
TLM is a holistic process to maximise the environmental outcomes at the six Icon 
Sites. The program’s institutions and procedures have been established with a view 
to identifying the most cost-effective and water-efficient ways to achieve real 
environmental benefits at sites across multiple jurisdictions. It is proposed that the 
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success factors for achieving environmental outcomes in a multijurisdictional 
environment are: 
• Unanimity in decision making: without agreement from all implementing parties, 
progress can be slowed by passive non-implementation. 
• Agreeing to clear objectives and targets, and  monitoring and reporting against 
them: TLM sets out agreed criteria for funding and decision making to achieve 
clear and tangible Icon Site-scale targets. These are underpinned by agreed 
approaches for monitoring and reporting. Institutionalised links between 
environmental monitoring and other TLM programs provide feedback on the 
effectiveness of individual management actions into future decisions. 
• Initial clarity of objectives and targets rather than prescriptive process 
description has proven helpful in making progress. 
• Setting clear roles and responsibilities: all TLM programs combine MDBC 
coordination with jurisdictional on-ground delivery of projects that often span 
state borders. Clear definition of roles and responsibilities is critical. TLM IGA 
sets out the roles and responsibilities of the partner governments with regard to 
objectives, targets and funding arrangements. Governance approaches have been 
designed to deliver against these both in the short and long term. 
• Robust processes: throughout the long-term planning processes the TLM 
committees and independent reviewers canvass all options on the trade-offs 
required to optimise systemwide outcomes. Unanimous agreement is required 
throughout the committee process. Whilst this requirement may slow some 
decisions, a more robust outcome is achieved in the longer term. Clarity in 
objectives and targets, roles and responsibilities, and decision-making criteria is 
an important tactic against ‘filibustering’ in forums that require unanimity. 
• All partners make a financial contribution: TLM IGA sets out the financial 
commitments of all partner governments to the programs. The programs benefit 
from a high level of interjurisdictional ownership and engagement with the 
decision-making process because all parties have a financial stake in the 
outcomes. 
• Adequate resourcing: since 2006 the MDBC has had sufficient resources to 
enable it to provide adequate staffing and construction funds to meet objectives. 
As part of the coordination process, the Commission has increasingly funded 
jurisdictional project officers for major programs. This helps ensure that state 
resources are available to undertake the necessary work. 
• Independent review: the MDBC coordinates independent reviews of many TLM 
work programs, including individual water-recovery measures and cost-time 
delivery models for EWMP. An annual whole-of-program independent audit is 
also conducted, which brings together all the elements of TLM, assessing issues 
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and risks to the delivery of the Icon Site objectives. These annual audits are 
presented to the Ministerial Council and made public. 
• Maximising inter-jurisdictional and interdisciplinary cooperation: the MDBC 
coordinates a series of committees that support the MDB Commission and 
Ministerial Council. The committees provide technical and policy input, weigh 
up different opinions and priorities as well as providing authorisation of projects 
decisions of escalating cost and consequence. 
10.6 Meeting future challenges 
TLM was established as a river restoration project to address the impacts of long-
term overallocation in the Murray System. Given an initial low level of detail and 
the implication of low water availability at the time of the First Step decision, 
significant progress has been made in the past four years. This paper describes 
practical institutional processes and incentives that have been implemented, using 
the example of achieving TLM objectives, and indicates broad success factors for 
achieving environmental outcomes in a multijurisdictional setting. Severe drought 
and critical water shortage have exacerbated environmental decline in the Murray 
System and restricted remedial options, forcing TLM to focus on preventing species 
loss and preserving drought refuges. 
Under a multijurisdictional system, where there is no ability to impose action or 
direction, it is difficult to identify additional measures that may have been 
implemented. But the ‘competition policy’ approach of incentive payments for 
achievement of specific outcomes may provide another mechanism. 
The obvious downside of the MDBC structure is the time- and resource-consuming 
nature of decision making. Jurisdictions wish to be engaged in many decisions that 
would normally be the prerogative of the Executive Team under a broad agreed 
framework. Jurisdictions recognise this problem but are loath to cede authority. 
Proposed institutional change for the MDB provides the Commonwealth with a 
much greater role in key areas — determining sustainable river extraction limits that 
reflect all available water and are climate-change sensitive. Water quality and 
environmental watering plans for the entire Basin will be established by 2011. 
Institutional arrangements regarding compliance are also much more clearly defined 
under the new arrangements. 
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11 New policies create a new politics: 
issues of institutional design in 
climate change policy 
Henry Ergas 
Concept Economics 
Abstract 
This paper covers three institutional aspects of current debates about climate 
change policies. They are first, the issue of where responsibility should lie for 
determining the implied price of carbon in an ETS; second, whether part of the 
funds raised through an ETS should be used to provide compensation; and third, 
whether some of those funds should be hypothecated or earmarked for R&D.    
11.1 Introduction 
Institutional design focuses on the task of providing accountability and effective 
monitoring of decision-making by bodies vested with the coercive powers of the 
state in a context where information is inherently limited, costly to acquire and 
asymmetrically distributed.1 These information imperfections create scope for 
rent-seeking, which results in both an allocative inefficiency — in the sense that the 
policies pursued do not reflect underlying preferences — and in productive 
inefficiency, in that policy objectives are pursued at higher than efficient cost. 
While the conventional prescription for reducing vulnerability to rent-seeking is to 
insulate the policy process from interest group pressures, this conflicts both with 
effective accountability and with the need for policy to adjust to changes in 
preferences, information and choice sets. Further aggravating the difficulties is the 
                                                 
1 The underlying assumption is that effective monitoring will yield decisions that accord with the 
preferences of voters. Of course, voters may choose to structure institutions so as to achieve 
goals other than effective monitoring, but then that merely raises the question of how those 
institutions will be controlled. For a general discussion of institutional design, see Komesar 
1997. 
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inherent conflict between this need for policy adaptability on the one hand, and the 
contribution that policy credibility and stability can make to the efficiency of policy 
on the other. These three elements of the institutional design dilemma — limited 
information, rent-seeking, and costly commitment — define a world where there are 
no solutions but only trade-offs. 
Although these trade-offs are not very different across policy areas, our focus today 
is on environmental policy. Within environmental policy, few areas are as high on 
the current agenda as climate change. I will therefore focus my remarks on climate 
change policy, and specifically on the proposals advanced in the June 2008 Draft 
Report of the Garnaut Climate Change Review (‘Garnaut Report’), and in the 
Government’s July 2008 Green Paper on the Carbon Pollution Reduction Scheme 
(‘Green Paper’). 
In particular, I will examine, first, the proposals for how revenues raised by the sale 
of emissions permits would be used; and, second, the proposed governance 
arrangements for the emissions trading scheme. Each of these raises interesting and 
important issues of institutional design, and of broader policy analysis. I will 
examine for each of these the broader principles of institutional design that are 
involved, and then apply those principles to the specific proposals. 
11.2 Use of ETS revenues 
According to the Green Paper: 
The Government has committed that every cent raised for the Australian Government 
from the Carbon Pollution Reduction Scheme will be used to help Australians —
households and business — adjust to the scheme and to invest in clean energy options. 
(p. 277) 
Revenues raised from the scheme have, in other words, been earmarked for outlays 
on adjustment, compensation and the promotion of ‘clean energy’, including 
through investment in low emissions R&D. 
Generally, the revenues raised through Pigovian taxes are large relative to the direct 
efficiency changes those taxes induce.2 As a result, the efficiency with which those 
revenues are spent can dramatically affect the overall efficiency of the Pigovian 
scheme.3 It is therefore important to examine the extent to which the proposed 
                                                 
2 Simply put, this is because the revenues raised are a rectangle, while the efficiency change is a 
triangle. 
3 This is one reason why the conventional prescription in the case of Pigovian taxes is for the 
revenues to be used to provide lump sum transfers to taxpayers. 
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earmarking is likely to encourage the efficient use of the revenues generated by the 
ETS.4 
Earmarking generally 
Earmarking, also commonly referred to as revenue hypothecation, can enhance the 
quality of public expenditure in three broad ways. 
First and most important, it can signal the tax price of achieving particular outcomes 
and thereby improve accountability for, and public decisions about, public 
expenditure. For these improvements to occur, there must be a rational relation 
between the tax and the outcomes (so that the tax is a payment for the benefits, 
rather than serving some other purpose),5 expenditures on the outcome must be 
determined at the margin by the tax (that is, the hypothecation must have bite), and 
taxpayers must be able to monitor the linkage and the use of the revenues. 
Second, earmarking could alter incentives for program administrators, including by 
constraining spending decisions and changing the marginal costs and benefits 
associated with alternative options. For example, where two activities are 
complements (that is, an increase in the supply of one reduces the marginal cost or 
increases the marginal benefit of an increase in the supply of the other) but 
diligence in one is observable while diligence in the other is not, bundling the two 
and ascribing to them a dedicated revenue stream may be efficient. 
Third, earmarking may be a way of increasing the credibility of promises, reducing 
the inherent incompleteness of the implied contracts between government and the 
public. As well as any direct benefits arising from greater credibility of 
commitments, this may allow proponents of programs to signal the quality of the 
programs, of the proponents or both. For example, in the model of Brett and Keen 
(2000), a commitment to dedicate revenues to a particular use, which is of value to 
the public but would not be of value to a ‘poor quality’ politician, can support a 
separating equilibrium in which politicians signal their quality to the electorate. 
                                                 
4 Useful discussions of earmarking can be found in Bird and Jun 2005, Eklund 1972, Glazer and 
Proost 2007, Spackman 1997, Teja 1988, and Wilkinson 1994, among many others. 
5 Some hypothecation — such as the widespread linking of revenues from government lotteries to 
‘merit goods’ such as education or culture — is obviously unlikely to improve the quality of 
public decision-making in that there is no meaningful sense in which the ‘price’ of culture at the 
margin is the loss of welfare associated with the holding of lotteries. As a result, the 
hypothecation does not signal the cost of expanding the supply of culture, will not induce 
revelation of marginal valuations of culture, and will not ‘unbundle’ tax-payer decisions about 
the supply of culture from other decisions. 
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That said, there are also at least four important ways in which earmarking can 
reduce efficiency in public expenditures. 
First, earmarking implies inflexibility in the allocation of revenues among 
competing uses. If the earmarking is substantive, in the sense of being effectively 
constraining, social rates of return are unlikely to be equalised at the margin across 
uses. Tax rates, expenditure levels or more likely both, will be distorted as a 
consequence. 
Second, reserving revenues to a program gives it a monopoly over those revenues, 
encouraging and potentially perpetuating technical inefficiency in its supply. 
Third, earmarking can facilitate rent-seeking by allowing the interest groups that 
benefit from the hypothecated revenue stream to focus their activities more 
effectively. Rather than competing against other interest groups for a larger share of 
general revenues, the relevant groups can limit their efforts to seeking an increase in 
(or protecting from erosion) the hypothecated tax. At the same time, the political 
commitment they secure is potentially made more credible by the earmarking, 
increasing both the ‘price’ that the interest groups are willing to pay in exchange 
and the resources they are willing to dissipate in obtaining it. Rent-seeking 
coalitions therefore become easier to create and sustain, and the aggregate costs to 
the community from rent-seeking rise, as Kimenyi, Lee and Tollinson (1990) found 
in their study of the US Highway Trust Fund. 
Fourth, these adverse consequences are made all the greater by the risk created by 
earmarking of fiscal illusion, that is, of the hypothecated revenues not being as 
visible as other forms of public revenue and expenditure. The Garnaut Report 
provides a striking example of fiscal illusion when it claims that using revenues 
from ETS auctions for the earmarked purposes allows those purposes to be achieved 
‘without placing pressure on public finances’ (page 372) — ignoring the fact that 
devoting the revenues to those purposes has an opportunity cost. 
By and large, empirical studies of earmarking find that these harmful effects 
outweigh the positive effects that hypothecation can have. For example, a series of 
recent, careful, assessments of earmarked transport programs in Europe — where 
congestion or road toll charges have been earmarked for public transport programs 
— generally finds that the hypothecation has been wasteful.6 First, putting income 
distribution consequences aside, congestion and higher road use charges should lead 
                                                 
6 See de Palma, Lindsey and Proost (eds) 2007. 
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to lower subsidies and higher prices for public transport,7 but hypothecation has 
caused the effect to go in the opposite direction, causing an efficiency loss. Second, 
many of the programs funded, or proposed to be funded, by hypothecated funds 
have had very low social rates of return, both in absolute and relative to alternative 
uses of the funds. Third, any income distribution consequences of the changes in 
road pricing would be more efficiently dealt with through direct transfers, rather 
than through public transport subsidies, which, given use patterns of public 
transport, are a poor way of achieving distributional goals. Fourth and last, welfare 
would have been increased by instead using the funds raised by the charges to 
reduce other, more distorting, taxes.8 
Earmarking in the Garnaut Report and the Green Paper 
As the transport case illustrates, any assessment of earmarking needs to look to the 
specifics of the proposal, and the earmarking proposed in the Garnaut Report and 
the Green Paper are no exception to this rule. 
At the most general level, it seems obvious that the earmarking proposed by these 
documents bears no relationship to the Lindahl-Buchanan approach of benefits 
taxation. In particular, there is no sense in which the proposed charges are the ‘tax 
price’ of the outcomes being sought through the outlays. Moreover, there is no 
commitment to limit expenditures on those outcomes to the quantum of the 
revenues raised. Finally, the bundling of outlays on compensation, income support, 
spending for energy efficiency and for investment in ‘clean energy options’ 
                                                 
7 Subsidies to public transport are justified to a greater or lesser degree by the under-pricing of 
road use. When road use charges are set at (or closer to) Pigovian levels, the efficient subsidy to 
other transport modes declines. 
8 In most cases, the direct burden of taxation is larger than necessary to raise a given amount of 
revenue. This is because taxes alter individual incentives and economic decisions at the margin, 
and therefore affect economic outcomes at the margin and in the aggregate. In driving a wedge 
between bid and ask prices for economic resources, taxes eradicate the opportunity for 
individuals to exploit all gains from trade. Because the revenue raised is typically not sufficient 
to offset the value of the foregone gains from trade, the direct burden exceeds the revenue 
collected, and so most taxes are said to create an excess burden or deadweight loss. The size of 
this deadweight loss is proportional to the extent to which individuals divert resources towards 
lower-valued uses in response to the tax. The marginal excess burden (MEB) of a tax describes 
how the excess burden changes as a tax is changed by a very small amount. Some taxes have a 
higher MEB than others, but they may also raise more revenue at the margin. Thus, a natural 
measure of the welfare cost of a tax that can be used to compare the efficiency consequences of 
different kinds of taxes is the normalised marginal excess burden (NMEB) of a tax, which 
measures the MEB per dollar of revenue raised. By definition, a pure Pigovian tax involves no 
deadweight loss, that is, it causes no excess burden. As a result, using the revenues from a pure 
Pigovian tax to reduce other taxes increases welfare by the extent of the excess burden foregone. 
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undermines the transparency that is integral to the effectiveness of earmarked 
schemes of benefits taxation. 
The resulting concerns are made all the greater by the specific proposed uses of the 
funds. While there has been extensive public discussion of the proposed 
compensation to especially emissions-intensive industries, the other elements in the 
package can also be shown to be of concern. 
First, some of the alleged market failures on which spending is to be targeted seem 
poorly thought through. The discussion of buildings in both documents is a case in 
point, with the Garnaut Report claiming, for example, that the fact that rented 
houses contain older, less ‘energy-efficient’, appliances than those found in 
owner-occupied houses is evidence of a market failure that should be addressed 
through subsidies and regulations (section 18.7). 
However, rented accommodation may be older and/or generally lower quality than 
owner-occupied housing: usually, the most efficient way of providing lower-quality 
accommodation is to build high-quality accommodation and allow it to deteriorate 
over time.9 As a result, rental housing will embody older vintages, and — as in the 
rest of the economy — it is incorrect to think that efficiency is increased by the 
forced scrapping of vintages whose operating costs, though relatively high, are still 
less than the effective average total costs10 of more recent equipment. Additionally, 
to the extent to which tenants value more ‘energy-efficient’ appliances at more than 
their effective average total costs cost, it is not obvious why this outcome would not 
be achieved through appropriate contracts with landlords. And if there is an 
impediment to that outcome being achieved, it seems more likely to lie in tenancy 
laws, which reduce landlords’ incentive to invest in higher quality,11 than in any 
market failure as such.12 
                                                 
9 See the discussion of equilibrium in the housing market in O’Flaherty 2005, pages 410 and 
following. The intuition behind this result is simple. Assume the objective is to provide 
low-quality rental accommodation in ten years’ time. One way of doing this is to set aside today 
an amount sufficient to build such accommodation at that time. The alternative is to build high 
quality accommodation now and allow it to deteriorate gradually over time. So long as the rental 
rate on high quality accommodation is more than the interest rate, the latter alternative will 
dominate. In equilibrium, the rental rate will decline to the point which just makes these options 
equivalent. 
10 These costs are higher than average total costs for owner occupiers, both because of transactions 
cost and because of higher rates of depreciation associated with moral hazard (that is, the 
tendency of tenants to take less care of equipment that they do not own). 
11 See again, O’Flaherty 2005, pages 372 and following. 
12 Capital market rationing is sometimes said to lead to inefficiently slow scrapping of outdated 
vintages of consumer durables. While this is obviously possible, the same capital market 
failures would affect a wide range of household investment decisions, and it is not clear why 
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All of this merely highlights the more general point, which is that, especially when 
price signals are set correctly (as is the aim of the ETS), ‘energy efficiency’ is not a 
sensible goal in itself, any more than is ‘making Pavlovas using less passionfruit’, 
as it may indeed be efficient in an overall sense to use more energy per unit of 
output rather than less in particular situations.13 
Second, while it is likely that there is a case for promoting innovations that reduce 
the carbon intensity of output, the approach proposed in the Garnaut Report and the 
Green Paper seems flawed. The essence of this approach is to link the funding of 
this R&D to ETS receipts, and through that linkage, to increase outlays on that 
R&D substantially. 
This link between the funding of these innovations and receipts from the sale of 
emissions permits, however, seems unreasonable. In effect, it is a straightforward 
application of the Sandmo rule for Pigovian pricing in the presence of substitutes 
(Sandmo 1976) that the greater the likelihood of investment in low-emissions R&D 
succeeding, the lower should be the current ETS price and hence the receipts from 
the ETS, but the greater should be the investment in low-emissions R&D. As a 
result, the linkage is likely to distort the carbon price, the volume of resources 
devoted to low emissions R&D, or both. 
Additionally, rather than providing a dedicated revenue stream for low-emissions 
R&D, it seems preferable to include realistic estimates of any positive externalities 
in the assessment of the benefits from R&D proposals generally, and then to subject 
those proposals to the same decision criteria, regardless of the technology or 
industry to which they relate.14 To the extent to which the general process for 
allocating R&D funding is flawed, the Government’s current review of the 
innovation system provides an opportunity to address those flaws.15 In contrast, the 
                                                                                                                                                    
welfare would be improved by addressing them in respect of one type of appliance (namely, 
those that are especially energy intensive). Moreover, capital market rationing is not likely to 
affect investment decisions by landlords. 
13 For instance, the rental housing may actually be provided at minimum social cost, even if it 
involves using older appliances that have higher energy use than do the most recent vintages. It 
is an obvious fallacy to think costs are minimised by constantly scrapping older vintages so as 
to always use equipment of the most recent vintage. 
14 There is no reason to believe that this is more difficult for low emissions R&D than it is for 
other types of R&D, but even if it were, this could be dealt with by applying a mark-up to the 
measurable benefits. 
15 This is consistent with the Tinbergen theorem: that if a policy instrument can directly address a 
market imperfection then it should be relied on, rather than an alternative instrument that can 
only indirectly address the issue (Tinbergen 1956). This is because any indirect intervention 
distorts economic choices, is likely to have a weaker impact on the intended indirect target than 
direct regulation there, and the impacts of the indirect approach are likely to be harder to predict 
than those of the direct approach. 
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approach proposed by the Garnaut Report and the Green Paper would distort the 
allocation of resources as between competing uses of scarce R&D resources. 
These distortions are likely to be all the greater given that the supply of research 
scientists and engineers is likely to be relatively inelastic, even in the medium term. 
Additional earmarked funding for one type of R&D is then likely merely to increase 
payments to scientists and engineers as the favoured form of research bids resources 
away from other, less favoured, types of R&D.16 Assessments of earmarked R&D 
projects find that the earmarked funding increases the output of scientific research, 
as measured by number of publications, but that the publications have relatively low 
citation rates. This fact suggests that these displacement effects can be socially 
highly costly.17 Accentuating these concerns is the more general finding that 
especially (but not solely) for basic research, progress primarily reflects scientific 
and technological opportunity, and attempts to speed up the rate of progress lead to 
rapidly decreasing quality, rapidly rising costs, or both.18 The frequently observed 
inefficiencies in the selection and governance of large publicly-funded R&D 
projects only make these risks more acute.19 The inefficiency arising from 
distorting the pattern of R&D would then be compounded by ineffectiveness in 
actually promoting scientific and technological advance. 
Finally, to the extent to which the results of low-emissions research are indeed a 
public good, or at least confer substantial benefits on the world as a whole, that 
needs to be taken into account in determining the appropriate level of funding, 
exactly as we would in other areas.20 This is even more plainly the case where the 
results of that research (for instance, in renewables) could reduce world demand for 
                                                 
16 The impact of the elasticity of supply of scientists and engineers was discussed in Ergas, 1984 
and is examined in Goolsbee 1998. The fact that (according to ABS 81090DO003_200607) 
environmentally-related R&D already accounts for 20 per cent of all Government funded R&D 
in Australia — exceeding health and defence, and only slightly less than is spent on primary 
industries — itself suggests that further expansion may be difficult and highly costly. 
17 See for example Martin 1992 and Payne 2002. Typically, these studies refer to congressional 
earmarks in the US, rather than to hypothecated funding as such. The causal mechanisms that 
lead to poor-quality outcomes are likely, however, to be similar — the restriction of 
competition for the funding and the fact that with given funding, the scarcity of high-quality 
projects means that some low-quality projects will be funded. 
18 The hypothesis that the underlying rate of scientific progress is not all that responsive to rates of 
effort was famously set out by Derek de Solla Price (see, for example, de Solla Price 1986, 
pages 92 and following). See also, for basic research, Stephan, P. E. and S. G. Levin 1992. 
George Stigler’s well-known ‘law’ (Stigler 1963) that at any one time there are no more than 
14 really first class scholars in any field of research, is fully consistent with de Solla Price’s 
results. 
19 See for example Jewkes, Sawers and Stillerman 1969; Henderson, 1977; Ergas, 1984 and 1987; 
Finon 1987; Keck, 1988; and Cohen and Noll 1992. 
20 See for instance Alston and Mullen 1992, and Alston, Freebairn and James 2004. 
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(and the prices we receive for) Australian exports, for instance of coal.21 In that 
case, increasing funding for those technologies could involve a two-fold loss to the 
Australian economy, as Australians would pay both through the carbon tax and 
through the loss of income consequent on the use of the technology. 
Third, the proposed compensation to low- and middle-income earners may be both 
unnecessary and inefficient. 
The case for that compensation is explained in the Green Paper in terms of the 
higher share of emissions-intensive goods in the consumption baskets of 
low-income households. What would seem to matter more from an equity 
perspective, however, is the share of those goods in the consumption of 
low-consumption households, as some households (notably the elderly) with low 
incomes may be living off accumulated capital and, in that sense, not be particularly 
disadvantaged. Indeed, US evidence suggests that while the emissions intensity of 
consumption is relatively high for low-income households, it is not equally high for 
low-consumption households, and the income-related gap in emissions intensity is 
even lower when income is measured on a lifetime basis (thus eliminating the effect 
of transitory income shocks).22 As a result, it remains to be demonstrated that the 
price changes consequent upon an ETS will cause disproportionately large real 
income losses for disadvantaged households. 
That said, truly disadvantaged households in Australia are likely to be recipients of 
government pensions and other benefits, and those payments are indexed in a way 
that appears to cope relatively well with relative price shocks.23 As a result, the 
Government’s commitment to provide compensation above and beyond the effect 
picked up through benefit indexation suggests a real increase in benefit levels. The 
justification for such an increase is unclear. It is even less clear why specific 
compensation would also be provided to middle-income households. As for the 
notion, suggested in the Green Paper (see for example p. 80), that the budgets of 
those households, that is, of the vast majority of Australians, could be fully 
compensated for the impact of an ETS, it seems difficult to reconcile with the fact 
that introducing a binding carbon tax must impose a cost on the economy and hence 
reduce at least some real incomes. 
                                                 
21 Obviously, the same issues arise if the R&D results in supply shifts that transfer surplus to 
foreign consumers, as would occur, for example, if exports are a significant share of output and 
the supply shift is pivotal rather than parallel. 
22 Hassett, Mathur and Metcalf 2007. 
23 See the estimates of growth in the real value of pensions provided in Farmer 2008, for example 
at pp. 77–8. 
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Be that as it may, the effect of thus providing compensation, in a way slanted to 
low- and middle-income earners, would be to increase the effective progressivity of 
the tax/benefit structure, that is, the effective marginal tax rate on labour incomes. It 
seems, however, likely (Bovenberg and de Mooj 1994, and Parry and Oates 2000) 
that a carbon tax will itself increase the tax on labour relative to leisure, thus 
accentuating the disincentives to work arising from the tax structure.24 Further 
increasing the distortion, thereby increasing the economic cost of the carbon tax, 
seems very difficult to justify. 
In short, the proposed earmarking does not seem likely to increase the quality of 
public expenditures. Rather, the earmarked expenditure programs appear to be of 
low quality, at least from the standpoint of aggregate welfare. It would probably be 
greatly superior to use the revenues from the scheme to reduce distorting tax rates: 
for instance, by flattening the structure of the personal income tax. 
Indeed, as explained by Fullerton and Metcalf 2001, this policy prescription — that 
the revenues collected through the sale of pollution permits should be used to fund 
reductions in other, distorting, taxes — is fairly robust. In effect, the revenue raised 
from the sale of the permits reflects a scarcity rent associated with restricting access 
to the pollutant. The effect of that scarcity rent is to increase production costs by 
more than the minimum necessary, as firms must both incur the ‘real’ outlays 
associated with reducing emissions and pay the tax. This will reduce real net wages, 
with adverse consequences for labour supply. It is difficult to do better, from an 
aggregate welfare perspective, than to use the revenues to offset this effect through 
a reduction in other taxes on production. 
In contrast, the earmarking proposed in the Garnaut Report and the Green Paper 
seems likely to inflict a double loss on the Australian economy: the loss associated 
with the increase in production costs; and the loss associated with wasting the funds 
raised through the sale of permits. 
11.3 Scheme governance 
I turn now to the issues associated with scheme governance. Attention here focuses 
on the question of where responsibility should lie for determining the path of 
emissions, administering targets and allocating compensation, and what role, if any, 
should be played in these by a carbon ‘central bank’. The more general question is 
that of the appropriate division of labour between differing kinds of institutions, 
notably executive government (Ministers and their departments, answering to 
                                                 
24 While Australia has a relatively low average tax rate on labour income by OECD standards, the 
progressivity of the personal income tax structure is relatively high (OECD 2007). 
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parliament) on the one hand, and what are often referred to as ‘non-majoritarian 
institutions’ (such as independent agencies and courts) on the other.25 
These non-majoritarian institutions reflect the delegation, by the electorate as the 
principal, of authority to an agent, with the extent of that authority being defined by 
the scope of the delegated powers (in substance, the policy discretion) granted that 
agent relative to the control instruments (that is, powers to shape, constrain, reverse 
or annul outcomes) on which the principal can rely. While non-majoritarian 
institutions play a wide variety of roles in democratic systems of government,26 and 
have an especially long history in Australia,27 two efficiency objectives that can be 
served by thus delegating powers are of particular interest. These are, first, 
resolving commitment problems, that is, enhancing the credibility of actual or 
implied promises, and, second, reducing vulnerability to rent-seeking.28 
These objectives can be enhanced by delegation if delegation confers what can be 
very loosely described as ‘greater distance’ from immediate pressures and provides 
incentives for those to whom power is delegated to act in ways that reflect that 
‘greater distance’ while nonetheless conforming to the public interest, at least in 
                                                 
25 Such an institution can be defined as one that (a) possesses and exercises a grant of specialised 
public authority separate from that of other institutions; and (b) is neither directly elected by the 
people nor directly managed by elected officials. See Thatcher and Sweet 2003, p. 2, and also 
Vibert 2007. 
26 See for instance Holmes 1995. 
27 Thus, Parker, writing in the 1960s, noted the ‘long-established habit, carried further, perhaps, in 
Australia than in any other advanced society, of institutionalising the resolution of conflicts over 
the allocation of values. Its central feature is the attempt to remove important allocative 
decisions from a process of ad hoc bargaining or trials of strength, based on the relative power 
of competing interest groups, to a system of adjudication by committees, boards, tribunals, 
departmental agencies, autonomous corporations and similar institutional devices’ (1965, 
pp. 88–9); see also Hughes 1980 for a more extensive review of the history and role of 
delegated powers in Australia. 
28 A third efficiency objective often ascribed to these institutions is that of overcoming 
information asymmetries in technical areas of governance through the development and 
deployment of specialised expertise. It is not apparent as a general matter, however, why similar 
expertise could not be secured within executive government, and there is little evidence that 
non-majoritarian institutions enjoy a clear advantage in this respect relative to executive 
government, for example in the Australian system of government. That said, where the primary 
reason for delegation is to secure access to expertise, one would expect the relevant agency to 
have limited substantive decisional independence, for instance, in terms of making and 
implementing policy. This is consistent with the observations in Thatcher and Stevens, who find 
that ‘expertise-based’ agencies are more likely to have what amount to advisory roles (or at 
least, are more readily overruled) than do agencies that seem to be aimed at addressing credible 
commitment and rent-seeking issues. 
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some net sense.29 As with earmarking, there is a ‘tying the hands’ effect, in which, 
in principle, governments improve outcomes by reducing the scope of their 
discretionary powers. Inevitably, that reduced scope has some cost, and the issue is 
whether that cost is worth bearing. In considering that issue, I will deal first with the 
question of the credibility of long term commitments and then with that of 
rent-seeking. 
The credibility of commitments becomes especially important when it is desirable 
for economic agents to make investments that have an element of irreversibility in 
reliance on actual or implied policy promises, and which hence are vulnerable to 
loss should those promises not be kept. Time inconsistency is the canonical form of 
this commitment problem in economics, with the term referring to situations in 
which conduct by a policy-maker that is rational ex ante is not (and is known not to 
be) rational ex post, so that rational actors will discount the probability of a 
commitment to that conduct being maintained. 
The problem of time consistency is readily illustrated. Consider a central bank 
facing a trade-off between inflation and unemployment, in which current inflation 
depends also on expectations of inflation in the future (Schaumburg and Tambalotti 
2007). The credible announcement of a future tightening of policy, in excess of that 
needed to curb current inflationary pressures, lowers inflationary expectations, 
thereby easing today’s trade-off. Given that, it is optimal for policy to seek to 
exhaust the marginal benefits of this announcement effect. Once the recession this 
tightening implies arrives, however, the optimal policy is to reverse course, renege 
on the announcement and avoid the recession. But for the original intention to have 
the desired effect, it must be believed to be credible. In other words, for the sacrifice 
ratio (the cumulative increase in unemployment that is due to the disinflation effort 
divided by the total decrease in inflation) to be improved, investors, wage-setters 
and other price-making actors must believe that the central bank will not deviate 
from the policy it has announced, regardless of the consequences. The lower the 
probability attached to the central bank staying the course, the less effect the 
announcement will have on the costs of disinflation. 
At least analytically, a similar issue of time consistency arises in respect of 
pollution taxes, in so far as the objective of those taxes is to induce investment, 
including through innovation, that once made is sunk. 
Laffont and Tirole (1996), for example, model a pollution tax that is intended to 
promote low-pollution innovation, where the innovation, once made, has low 
constant marginal costs. The government issuing the permits can then act 
                                                 
29 In other words, the gains from the delegation exceed the costs in terms of reduced 
responsiveness to community preferences. 
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opportunistically, expanding (or threatening to expand) the supply of permits 
post-innovation, reducing the innovator’s bargaining power with respect to potential 
users. Ex post, this allows the government to pursue its objective of reducing 
pollution at lower social cost; but the likelihood of this time-inconsistent behaviour 
reduces the ex ante incentives to innovate, thereby increasing costs overall. The 
greater the likelihood of ex post opportunism, the higher the aggregate social costs 
will be of achieving the pollution reduction target.30 
When the ex post profitability of innovation depends on artificial scarcity — as is 
the case in an ETS — there is, in other words, a risk that does not arise in other 
contexts: that to expropriate the innovator, government may not need to modify 
intellectual property rights (which would likely be highly politically costly) but can 
simply rely on its ability to alter the supply of pollution rights. As with 
time-consistency risks generally, the scope this offers for opportunistic conduct will 
deter otherwise efficient investment. 
In Stanley Kubrick’s 1964 film ‘Doctor Strangelove’, the time-consistency problem 
is solved through a commitment technology — the ‘doomsday machine’ — that, 
once put in place, will, in the event of a surprise nuclear attack, automatically 
‘destroy all human and animal life on earth’, despite the fact that it ‘is not a thing a 
sane man would do’.31 In the economic literature, the institutional equivalent of the 
‘doomsday machine’ is the independent central bank, which, vested with the 
discretion to control inflation, does not succumb to the temptation to seek 
short-term gains in real output at the expense of long term price stability. 
This occurs because the central bank, unlike the executive government, does not 
internalise (or internalise to the same extent) the political benefits that short-term 
output expansion would create. In other words, by delegating the control of inflation 
to the central bank, the government severs the costs and benefits of the inflation-real 
output trade-off, assigning the price stability objective to an agent whose benefits 
depend mainly or solely on the inflation rate. In its simplest form (often referred to 
as ‘Rogoff delegation’, after Rogoff (1985)), this is done by vesting control of the 
central bank in individuals who are especially ‘conservative’, in the special sense of 
having an unusually strong aversion to inflation, that is, having a utility function in 
which immediate real output gaps have little weight relative to long-run price 
                                                 
30 Additionally, it can be shown that the slower the rate at which the new technology is likely to 
become obsolete, the greater the incentive for the permit issuer to act opportunistically: see 
Levine, Stern and Trillas 2005. 
31 The underlying principle of seeking to achieve deterrence through credible commitments to 
mutually assured destruction is classically set out in Schelling (1960) 1980. The origins of this 
principle are discussed in Ayson 2004. 
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stability. Given those preferences, commitments to price stability will be regarded 
as credible, reducing the costs of disinflation.32 
Whether this account of central bank independence is plausible is a matter of 
intense debate, both as regards the solidity of its theoretical foundations33 and its 
empirical relevance.34 So too is the question of whether, as a factual matter, central 
bank independence, however defined, actually reduces the sacrifice ratio, with 
perhaps the best that can be said being that the case in favour of independence is not 
proven.35 
That said, it may be that time-consistency issues would have greater weight in the 
context of the introduction of an entirely new set of ‘fiat rights’, such as those 
involved in an ETS.36 This view is expressed in the Garnaut Report, which notes 
that ‘markets can quickly collapse if their credibility is shaken. This is all the more 
pertinent for markets that owe their existence solely to government decree’ (p. 363). 
To the extent to which the key issue, however, is that of underpinning confidence in 
irreversible investments in abatement (that is, abatement investments whose 
profitability depends on the path of future carbon prices), this leads to somewhat 
different conclusions than might be initially thought. 
In particular, unlike the central bank case — where the bank must be assumed to 
have (or be induced to act as if it had) an unusually strong preference for price 
stability — in an ETS, the entity setting policy, were it seeking to overcome 
perceived risks of time inconsistency, would need to place a particularly high 
weight on industry profits, as compared to abatement.37 This is simply because ex 
                                                 
32 The same outcome can be achieved by other means: for instance, by assuming that the central 
bank owns a ‘reputational capital stock’ that would be devalued in the event of time 
inconsistency, making deviation from an anti-inflation stance costlier for the central bank than 
for other decision-makers. 
33 See notably McCallum 1995 and McCallum 1997. More generally, any credible account of 
central bank independence that justifies independence on the basis of time consistency must 
explain why the arrangement is not vulnerable to renegotiation, especially if politicians would, 
in fact, derive significant benefit (even if only short-term) from acting in a time-inconsistent 
manner. This inevitably goes to issues of political structure, which are discussed in Keefer and 
Stasavage 2003, Lohmann 2003 and Moser 1999. 
34 For example, Bell 2004, in his review of the development of central bank independence in 
Australia, concludes that time-consistency issues played no role. 
35 See for example de Haan and Eijffinger 2001, who conclude that independence does not reduce, 
and may in some conditions actually increase, the sacrifice ratio, and more recently, Crowe and 
Meade 2007, who find that any significant relation between central bank independence that may 
have been found in earlier data sets no longer persists. 
36 Lohmann 2003 discusses ‘fiat institutions’ and their credibility. 
37 This is similar to the utility regulation case, discussed in Gilbert and Newbery 1994, and in 
Levine, Stern and Trillas 2005. 
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post (that is, once successful innovation has occurred), the greater the weight placed 
on abatement, the greater the attractiveness to the agency will be of acting 
opportunistically, forcing down the price of the new technology and thereby 
securing widespread use. What is therefore required ex ante is a credible 
commitment to forgo what in ex post terms are socially profitable opportunities for 
abatement, thereby increasing the expected return on investment in innovation. 
Moreover, the greater the uncertainty about the fixed costs innovators will incur, the 
greater must be the willingness to allow prices ex post to be marked up above cost, 
thereby further reducing ex post abatement.38 
What the relevant theory would recommend, in other words, is selecting as the 
agent setting future price paths one who places an especially low, rather than an 
especially high, weight on abatement, relative to industry profits. 
Of course, such an assignment of policy responsibilities would have costs, as well 
as potential benefits. So as to limit monitoring and agency costs, delegation is 
frequently accompanied by rigid rules, which must impede the response to new 
information, including changes in the public’s preferences. Moreover, so as to allow 
economic actors to distinguish opportunism, on the one hand, from justified changes 
in policy conditional on new information on the other, the institution itself needs to 
rely on rule-conforming behaviour, even when that is costly.39 This is especially 
likely to be true when institutions are relatively new. Finally, the stress on 
rule-conformity in decision-making is likely to be especially great when agency 
performance is difficult to measure in terms of outcomes, or when the relation 
between instruments, outputs and final (welfare-determining) outcomes is uncertain. 
All of these factors are likely to be relevant in the context of a carbon ‘central 
bank’. 
The greater the need for ongoing flexibility, the higher the cost of rule-oriented 
delegation will be. As well as those direct costs, delegation of a specific task (such 
as that of setting a path for future emissions reductions) may prevent the ‘bundling’ 
                                                 
38 There is, in other words, an information rent, which in expectational terms, must be greater, the 
greater is the information asymmetry about the cost of the innovative technology. 
39 Indeed, an agent that is seeking to develop and preserve a reputation for time consistency faces 
the problem that the parties with respect to whom it seeks that reputation can find it difficult to 
distinguish the response to new information from opportunistic conduct. The extent of the 
problem can be reduced through transparency of decision-making, and there is a significant 
trend among central banks towards ever greater disclosure — see for instance Mahadeva and 
Sterne 2000. Given that disclosure is never complete, however, and explanations of actions may 
be viewed as self-serving, some part of the burden of establishing and retaining credibility is 
borne by adherence to simple, observable, rules, such as the Taylor Rule in monetary policy. 
Adherence to these rules inevitably involves a loss relative to the first best response to new 
information. This is another form of the ‘rules versus discretion’ issue. 
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of responses to new information with other policy instruments, with the failure to 
secure economies of scope as between these instruments causing an efficiency 
loss.40 
In practice, new information will emerge not only with respect to the climate 
change policies of other countries — as is stressed by both the Garnaut Report and 
the Green Paper — but also about the severity, or otherwise, of climate change as a 
problem and the costs and benefits of addressing it. As a result, it seems important 
to retain the flexibility to amend policy, and to have direct political accountability 
for that policy, thus enhancing the likelihood of a timely response. This suggests 
that it is indeed desirable to locate responsibility for setting the emissions path, and 
the political accountability for that path, directly in a Minister, rather than 
delegating that responsibility to an independent body (whose response would be 
hindered by its statutes and operating rules).41 The fact that decisions as to the 
trajectory of emissions reductions can have such major effects on Australia’s 
prosperity, and are not capable of being reduced to a clear and fixed formula or set 
of rules that a third party could be given responsibility for implementing, make the 
case for direct Ministerial responsibility all the stronger.42 
To that extent, an independent agency should not have ‘outcome independence’, 
that is, the scope to set its own targets. This is perhaps comparable to the position of 
the Reserve Bank (which under the Statement on the Conduct of Monetary Policy 
has an inflation target set by the Government),43 though such an agency would also 
have less ‘instrument independence’ (that is, control over the mix of instruments) 
than has the RBA. In effect, under an ETS without price caps, the objective and the 
instrument essentially coincide, in that setting the emissions reduction path 
                                                 
40 The costs of delegation are analysed in Alesina and Tabellini 2007(a) and Alesina and Tabellini 
2007(b.) 
41 The literature on central bank independence stresses that for the independence to be credible, it 
must be costly for government to alter the mandate and operations of the central bank. As a 
result, effective delegation involves constructing bulwarks against change. The need to then 
maintain controls against misbehaviour by the agency then induces the imposing of further 
constraining rules, to an extent that depends on the costs and likelihood of misbehaviour. 
42 The impossibility of devising such a formula, and the high error costs involved in inappropriate 
decisions, would make monitoring costs very high, undermining the efficiency gains from 
delegation. It can be shown that the smaller the extent to which the agent’s behaviour can be 
made to be rule-bound, and the higher the costs of the inappropriate use by the agent of its 
discretion, the greater the other limitations that must be placed on its substantive capabilities — 
see generally Komesar 1997. As these limitations erode the quality of the agent’s decisions, they 
reduce and may entirely eliminate the net gains from delegation. 
43 The scope of the RBA’s statutory independence is controversial, but in practice, likely to be 
substantial by convention. That said, the RBA does not have the degree of statutory or practical 
independence of the European Central Bank, which both sets its own objectives and controls its 
choice of instruments. 
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automatically determines the volume of permits to be issued. As a result, the 
agency’s role, as far as the ETS itself was concerned, would seem to be relatively 
narrow and essentially regulatory (that is, ensuring compliance), though it might 
have some responsibilities for monitoring and better promoting efficiency and 
stability in the secondary market. Whether this is an appropriate or sensible role for 
an agency that might otherwise not require much substantive economic and 
financial expertise is an open question. 
In short, while there may be issues associated with time consistency, it does not 
seem that they warrant the delegation of responsibility for setting emissions 
reduction trajectories to a ‘carbon central bank’. Absent that responsibility, such an 
entity would, in an ETS without price floors and ceilings, have a rather limited 
decision-making role, certainly compared to the RBA, as the Government’s 
decisions about the emissions trajectory would effectively determine the settings for 
the primary instrument (the volume of permits). 
The Garnaut Report and the Green Paper suggest that the agency should also be 
given responsibility for addressing compensation claims, presumably so as to 
reduce the costs of rent-seeking. This assumes that independence provides 
assurances against rent-seeking, which runs counter to both theory and experience 
with regulatory agencies.44 These suggest that the costs of rent-seeking (including 
by the agency itself) are not effectively constrained by the mere fact of distance or 
otherwise from the political process. Rather, they are best constrained by a 
combination of, first, procedural safeguards, including constraints on the forms and 
nature of interaction between the parties seeking the relevant rents and the 
decision-maker;45 and, second, by narrowly confining discretion in the 
determination of claims, both through clear rules that can guide the disposition of 
those claims and by providing for substantive rights of review. Given such 
constraints on discretion, the allocation of the initial decision-making power — be it 
to a Minister, a Ministerial Department, or a statutory agency — is not likely to be 
of great significance. 
                                                 
44 See Dal Bó 2006 for a recent survey of the relevant literature. 
45 Thus Komesar 1997 stresses the role that constraints such as the adversarial and public nature of 
litigation place on the extent to which courts are vulnerable to rent-seeking relative to 
administrative agencies. In a classic article, Vilhelm Aubert explained the ‘formalism’ 
associated with adjudication as a means of converting the parties involved into ‘professional 
strangers’, limiting the scope for improper influence to be brought to bear (1967, p. 45). Fuller 
1978 explains that this ‘formalism’ is only effective where disputes can be resolved into matters 
of right, and highlights the tendency of ‘polycentric disputes’ (which lack clear ‘guiding 
principles’) to degenerate into forms of adjudication that are merely ‘a kind of continuation of 
bargaining behind closed doors’ (1978 p. 397). 
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11.4 Conclusions 
The introduction of an ETS would be an event of obvious significance for 
Australia’s economic prospects. Designing the institutional arrangements for such 
an ETS raises important questions about how to deal with the constraints arising 
from limited information, with the risks of rent-seeking and with problems of policy 
credibility. 
The standard recipes for dealing with these issues involve a broad range of options, 
including earmarking of revenues, as a way of improving public choice, and the 
delegation of key decisions to independent agencies, so as to enhance policy 
credibility and reduce vulnerability to rent-seeking. This paper has examined those 
options, so as both to clarify the general principles involved and to assess their 
applicability to the specific proposals made in the Garnaut Report and the Green 
Paper. Four broad conclusions can be drawn from the discussion. 
First, while earmarking can have merit, the specific proposals advanced in the 
Garnaut Report and the Green Paper do not. These proposals are more likely to 
reduce efficiency than to enhance it. The community would be better off if the 
revenues raised through the ETS were used to reduce other, more distorting, taxes. 
Second, there may be an issue of time consistency in respect of an ETS, and to the 
extent to which there is such an issue, the effect would be to reduce otherwise 
desirable investment and innovation. Were such an issue to be dealt with by 
delegation of responsibility for setting the emissions trajectory to an independent 
‘carbon central bank’, that bank, if it is to give investors confidence that their 
investments would not be expropriated, would need to develop a reputation for 
placing greater weight on industry profits than on abatement. This is the opposite of 
what is commonly supposed. 
Third, delegation of responsibility for setting the emissions trajectory to an 
independent ‘carbon central bank’ would not, however, be costless. Rather, so as to 
reduce agency costs, any delegation is likely to require the entity to operate 
according to fairly tightly defined rules, which limit the extent to which it could 
respond to new information. Moreover, delegation to a specialised agency would 
reduce the ability to achieve economies of scope across policy areas, imposing 
further costs. Given the many uncertainties that surround the science, economics 
and international politics of climate change, it would seem preferable to retain 
ministerial responsibility for setting the emissions trajectory. As a result, any 
‘carbon central bank’ would have little or no ‘outcome independence’ and (in an 
ETS without price caps and floors) very limited ‘instrument independence’. 
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Fourth, delegation to such an independent entity of the responsibility for 
determining compensation claims is no panacea against rent-seeking. In effect, 
theory and experience suggest that the mere fact of independence has little impact 
on the extent of rent-seeking and may indeed create rent-seeking opportunities for 
the independent agency itself. Rather, rent-seeking costs are best reduced by setting 
out clear rules for the allocation of any compensation, formalising the processes 
involved in seeking and obtaining compensation, and providing substantive rights of 
review of decisions. With those in place, the location of decision-making powers at 
first instance is of limited significance. Given that, it is a matter of opinion whether 
there is a clear case for establishing an independent agency, especially since its role 
should be so limited. 
All of this suggests a far simpler institutional design than proposed in the Garnaut 
Review and the Green Paper, with no earmarking of revenues and little role for new 
institutions. These conclusions seem out of step with the spirit of the times, 
however, and it is worth concluding on why that might be the case. 
In his famous 1935 study of the US tariff, Elmer Schattschneider observed that 
‘within limits, every regime can choose and formulate the pressures to which it will 
be subjected’. Thus, through ‘the protective system’, governments ‘stimulate the 
growth of industries dependent on this legislation for their existence’. It is these 
industries, he noted, that ‘form the fighting legions behind the policy’. Equally, ‘the 
losers adapt themselves to the new conditions imposed upon them, find themselves 
without the means to continue the struggle, or become discouraged and go out of 
business’. By these means ‘new policies create a new politics’.46 
Indeed, shaping such a ‘new politics’ is fundamental to successful policy 
entrepreneurship, which requires developing actors and coalitions that can support 
and sustain the policy into the future. It does not seem far-fetched to suggest that the 
institutional designs set out in the Garnaut Report and the Green Paper pursue this 
objective, rather than being informed by the grander goals of economic efficiency. 
Thus, even putting aside the payments to emissions-intensive firms, the earmarking 
provides a very substantial stream of net revenues to scientists and engineers, as 
inelastic supply encounters a significant increase in spending, driving up prices. 
Moreover, the greatest rewards would go to those scientists and engineers involved 
in emissions-related research, cementing a community that has been, and could 
remain, a strong supporter of an ETS. At the same time, the earmarking promises 
what could be substantial side payments to low- and middle-income earners, thus 
reducing the opposition to rising implied carbon prices. Further support would come 
from industries receiving compensation, especially if that compensation locked in 
                                                 
46 Schattschneider (1935) 1974 at p.  288. 
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rents that increased with the ETS price. However inconsistent these uses of the ETS 
revenues are with standard welfare maximisation, and however fallacious the notion 
that everyone (or nearly everyone) can be compensated for the costs of a scheme 
that must reduce real income, they may well be highly politically efficacious.47 
At the same time, any independent agency created to operate the ETS would 
probably be an additional advocate for the scheme, much as has happened with such 
agencies in many other policy domains. Moreover, such an agency might well have 
the ability, through the allocation of compensation revenues, to create coalitions that 
unconditionally support its efforts, reducing rather than enhancing the scheme’s 
long run efficiency. 
In short, institutional design is likely to be shaped first and foremost by the primacy 
of politics. The pity of it is that the economic costs could be so high.  
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General discussion  
Discussion opened with questions to Professor Stavins about the proposed 
Australian emissions trading scheme (ETS): should the scheme aim to reduce the 
production of emissions; or should it aim to reduce the consumption of emissions? 
In other words, should exports be exempt and imports included, or vice versa? 
What’s happening in other countries and does it matter if Australia were to go in a 
different direction? 
Professor Stavins replied that, while he was unable to comment on the domestic 
Australian debate, a starting point was not to think of the regulation of carbon 
emissions, but the upstream carbon content of fossil fuels at the mine mouth, as well 
as at the point of import. Under an allowance trading system, all fossil fuels brought 
into the economy, including imports, would be subject to an allowance allocation, 
and exports would be exempt.  
Professor Stavins predicted that a significant issue would be political pressure from 
private industries subject to international competition, concerned about imports of 
carbon-intensive bulk goods such as aluminium, bulk glass, cement, rolled steel and 
bulk paper. He observed that in the United States, the Lieberman-Warner bill1 
included an import allowance requirement specifically for these products which was 
equivalent to a border tax. Furthermore, as there is an extremely strong protectionist 
stream in US politics, there was a risk that the cure might be worse than the illness. 
He noted that the European Union had indicated that it was opposed to import 
allowance requirements. If, however, the United States were to implement such a 
scheme, then the European Union would likely retaliate. 
While an aim of the import allowance requirement — which would only apply to 
countries that do not have domestic climate policies commensurate with those of the 
United States — was to encourage developing countries to adopt such policies, it 
was doubtful whether this outcome would be achieved. He raised the example of 
                                                 
1 Editor’s note: The America's Climate Security Act of 2007, also known as the 
Lieberman-Warner bill, was introduced to the United States Senate in October 2007. The bill 
proposed a national cap-and-trade scheme for greenhouse gas emissions (in the electric utility, 
transportation, and manufacturing industries) in which polluters would mostly be allocated 
right-to-emit credits based on how much greenhouse gas they currently emit. The cap would get 
tighter over time, until by 2050, emissions would be reduced to 70 per cent below 2005 levels. In 
June 2008, the bill was defeated. 
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China, which is the largest producer of cement in the world. Ninety-seven per cent 
of its cement production is for domestic consumption. The question was whether 
China would adopt policies that affect the cost of all its cement production, in order 
to protect the 3 per cent that is exported to the United States. 
In another question from the floor, Suzi Kerr asked panellists to comment on how 
the current silo-based approach to environmental policy and institutional 
arrangements could be overcome, so that the inherent conflicts and tensions across 
different environmental issues could be better resolved. Wendy Craik replied that 
the Murray Darling Basin Commission recognised the importance of this issue and 
undertakes reviews of the interactions between various policies, but only on a case 
by case basis — for example, interactions between salinity and Living Murray 
policies were assessed. There was little evidence, however, of this being done 
anywhere in a formalised, structured manner. 
Professor Stavins agreed that this was an important issue. In the environmental 
sphere, policies that solve one problem may make another problem worse. In the 
United States, there is much concern about national energy security, which means 
reducing imports of petroleum and liquid fuels. These concerns can be addressed by 
developing biofuels or through the liquification of coal — but these are horrible for 
climate change. When there were multiple market failures (that is, multiple social 
problems that merit being addressed), multiple policy instruments were required. In 
the case of climate change, for example, it was important to get the climate policies 
right, recognising that there will be both positive and negative impacts, and then 
develop policies to address the negative impacts, rather than playing around with 
climate policy, because this blunts the instrument and nothing is achieved.  
Professor Libecap asked if there had been any studies on the sensitivity of emissions 
trading systems to macroeconomic effects; and whether, given the potential for rent 
seeking, it made sense to auction allowances, or whether it would be better to 
grandfather them.  
Professsor Stavins replied that the environmental performance of cap-and-trade 
systems was not affected by the business cycle, with the possible exception of an 
extremely strong economic contraction when the cap could become non-binding.    
In answer to the second part of Professor Libecap’s question, Henry Ergas said that 
analysis by Bovenberg and de Mooj of the general equilibrium impact of an ETS 
showed that because an ETS accentuates the distortion associated with the tax 
wedge on labour, efficiency will be maximised if the revenue raised from an ETS 
was used to at least partially offset that distortion. Research by Fullerton and 
Metcalfe showed the same effect with Pigovian taxes. So a credible commitment to 
using ETS revenues to reduce distorting taxes in the economy was important. The 
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problem was that it could create a new political economy around those with an 
interest in driving up carbon prices.  
Professor Stavins commented that while it would be meritorious to use revenues 
from either a carbon tax or from the auction of allowances to cut distortionary taxes, 
it was important to recognise that ‘there is no way in heck the political process is 
going to cut the distortionary taxes in the way that every one of those models 
assumes. They won’t even come close … Political systems just aren’t going to do it. 
They are more likely to use the revenue to provide tax credits for favoured 
industries.’  
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12 Reflections for public policy: a 
drawing together and drawing apart. 
Comments on proceedings 
Geoffrey Brennan 
Australian National University 
12.1 The great divide 
My task this afternoon is to provide a kind of grand synthesis of all that has gone on 
in the course of this event. It is, I’m afraid, a task that is beyond me. 
Indeed, instead of drawing the ends together, I am actually going to try to draw 
them apart. That is my ambition because — although everything on the table since 
Warwick McKibbin began to talk last night has been connected in one way or 
another with the ‘environment’ — I think that that commonality of subject-matter 
has served to mask what I regard as a more basic, and quite crucial distinction (one 
that I regard as ultimately economic in character) between the intranational and the 
international aspects of environmental policy. Simply put, there is I believe a 
categorical distinction between the ‘global warming/climate change/greenhouse 
gas’ issue, and everything else on today’s agenda. 
So, on the global side of my conceptual divide, I place the McKibbin and Stavins 
papers, with perhaps Suzi Kerr having a little each way. All of the other papers fall 
on the national and sub-national side of the divide. (As I shall try to argue, I 
consider that balance entirely proper.) So, problems of water extraction in the 
Murray–Darling system (the Buchan and Craik–Cleaver papers) or the NAP and 
NHT initiatives (Pannell) or the fine-tuning of political institutions and 
geographical domain in sub-national environments (David Brunckhorst’s paper) are 
all examples. I place Henry Ergas’ paper in this group because it is concerned 
primarily with the purely domestic issue of how best to use the revenue from 
carbon-reduction schemes. 
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Equally, the Libecap and Freebairn papers (though at a more general level) are 
directed at the national policy design problem — dealing with the comparative 
evaluation of alternative instruments for externality problems within a given 
political boundary. Although both papers have an ‘environmental’ gloss, the basic 
issues are ones that arise in a wide variety of policy areas: the exercise is largely 
one of taking a general analytic framework from public economics associated with 
Samuelson and from micro-economics associated with Coase (and perhaps political 
science associated with Elinor Ostrom) and applying that framework in the 
environmental setting.  
Of course, the two dimensions of environmental policy — the national and the 
global — are related, in a variety of ways and at a variety of levels. And I shall later 
want to say a little about a number of those connections. But at this point, I want to 
underline the logic of the global/national distinction — partly because I am deeply 
uneasy about much of the discussion of carbon emissions policy. I am uneasy 
because I am not quite sure whether people who ought to know better are putting 
their blind eye to the telescope as a kind of Nelsonian heroic gesture or a rhetorical 
manoeuvre; or whether they don’t really understand the magnitude of the challenge,  
or worse, the real nature of the problem. 
Let me put the point a slightly different way. I confess that I have never been much 
impressed with that economist joke that has as its punch line: ‘Assume a 
can-opener!’1 It has never seemed to me to be either particularly funny or 
particularly apt. Until recently. Because these days I hear a lot of talk in exalted 
policy circles about the details of Australia’s projected policy to combat CO2 
emissions and stop global warming — and I can’t help wondering where the can-
opener has come from! 
So, back to basics. There is a long tradition of thought, beginning perhaps with 
Thomas Hobbes, running through David Hume and Adam Smith and familiar to 
economists from Samuelson’s canonical public goods papers, that sees the primary 
rationale for government as lying in what we would identify as the n-person version 
of Tucker’s prisoner’s dilemma. The common claim is that we need institutions that 
possess coercive power (the power specifically to tax and/or regulate) because 
decentralised decision making cannot produce public goods in anything like optimal 
quantities. As Bob Stavins rightly remarked, we cannot rely on voluntary behaviour 
to solve the policy problems that our emissions create. We just wouldn’t be here 
talking about global warming or climate change issues if that were so. 
                                                 
1 I assume that every economist knows that joke. Those who do not can find it on Google under 
‘economist jokes’. Some sources attribute it to Paul Samuelson. 
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This is something that economists know. We know it because we understand the 
structure of individual interaction and we have good evidence for thinking that 
people are less than totally altruistic. 
Global carbon emissions reductions are, as I understand the science, a classic case 
of a global public good. That is, the greenhouse gases that are released from any 
source are pretty rapidly diffused into the atmosphere — if Australia’s carbon 
emissions affected only the Australian climate, then things would be different. But 
the effect on Australia’s atmosphere of any reduction in Australian carbon 
emissions is just to reduce carbon by the proportion represented by Australia’s share 
of world carbon emissions. Australia’s actions on CO2 emissions therefore have 
negligible effect on Australia’s climate; Australian policy to reduce carbon 
emissions will only have a proportionate effect on Australia’s climate if Australia’s 
policy action causes all other countries to impose the same reduction in CO2 
emissions — and it is the essence of independent action that Australia’s action does 
not cause identical policy in all other countries! 
Recall that in an independent adjustment equilibrium in the provision of a public 
good, it must be the case for every individual contributor that the marginal value of 
a dollar’s contribution to public goods provision is a dollar. (At optimality, each, on 
average, has a marginal evaluation of the public good equal to 1/n dollars; so it 
won’t be rational for any individual to contribute at that optimal level unless she is 
part of an n-person compact in which each contribution is matched by the 
contributions of all others.) If one or other of the individuals in question is highly 
altruistic, then that individual may contribute a large amount to the public good. But 
an increase in that individual’s contribution is, under a variety of assumptions, 
likely to cause an equal reduction in the total contributions of others. 
This is all so familiar as to be boring. Sadly, however, although it is boring, the 
reasoning is also entirely valid. And it is presumably exactly what Stern and 
Garnaut (and economists generally) have in mind when they say that global 
warming/climate change is the most difficult problem the human race has ever had 
to face. With all due respect, that problem is not the problem as to whether carbon 
taxes or cap-and-trade or hybrid price/quantity restrictions represent the best 
mechanism for Australia’s policy on this matter. Those latter issues only make it 
onto the agenda when we have a conceptual solution to the global public goods 
problem. I say ‘conceptual solution’ here, because I don’t have in mind a 
requirement that we have an actual treaty with real teeth to which every nation has 
signed on and to which we have some reason to expect faithful compliance by all 
players. I mean by ‘conceptual solution’ that we have at least some idea of what 
would actually motivate the governments of nations to act in ways that are 
systematically contrary to their national interests! In the absence of an answer to 
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that question, I have to say, it seems like just another case of the can-opener, all 
over again! 
The contrast with domestic environmental issues is that these issues are, at least in 
principle, something we can do something about. We may not know exactly how to 
measure the marginal benefits of, say, restoring the marginal wetland. We may 
concede that negotiating the political process (with the complications of our Federal 
structure) in order to secure what we believe to be genuine environmental gains is a 
tricky business. But at least there is a political process to negotiate. The policy ends 
are something Australia can deliver on — and policy-makers can be held politically 
accountable on their performance in delivering those ends. There is, in short, a 
collective institution, the Australian polity, that can be an appropriate addressee of 
any policy recommendation — that can tax citizens to provide the means to buy 
back water; that can define and assign property rights and enforce the terms of any 
exchange; that can experiment with the modification of subnational political and 
social boundaries in the manner that David Brunckhorst recommends. 
Generally I don’t believe in categorical distinctions: I deal a lot with philosophers 
and for my taste they use categorical distinctions much too much. I prefer to think 
of differences in terms of positions along a spectrum. But here, I think, there is 
something close to a conceptual knife-edge. Given what I take to be a fact, that  
national boundaries are a prevailing institutional feature of the current world order, I 
think national and global policy are of different ‘institutional kinds’. They are as 
conceptually separate, perhaps, as the modern state is from Hobbesian anarchy. 
On the basis of this distinction, I want to say a little more about both sides of this 
divide — though, slightly apologetically (for reasons that may already be clear and 
which I shall restate at the end), mostly on the global side. 
12.2 The global aspect 
There is, it seems, a consensus within the relevant scientific community: first, that 
there is ‘global warming’ (or at least ‘climate change’) of significant magnitude; 
second, that it is caused by increased CO2 emissions — or, at least, could be 
substantially ameliorated by a significant reduction in CO2 emissions; and hence, 
third, that the global consequences of doing nothing about CO2 emissions are 
potentially catastrophic. 
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Apart from a kind of habitual scepticism about predictions concerning the end of the 
world, I have only the very weakest grounds for questioning that ‘consensus’.2 It 
seems to me that at this point we ought take the science as given. And that is what I 
shall do here. 
But I also think we ought to take, as presumptively authoritative, the no less broad 
consensus within the economics profession concerning incentives to free-ride in 
public goods provision, that I have already discussed. By way of summarising that 
consensus, let me put the point starkly: if the Australian government were an utterly 
faithful agent of its citizens’ interests, it would simply free-ride in the matter of CO2 
emissions. 
In the face of that latter consensus, I confess that I found the conclusions of the 
Stavins paper puzzling. As he observes, there seems to be some evidence that 
countries are acting unilaterally in the face of global emissions. Many did sign on to 
the Kyoto protocol (some, like Australia, more reluctantly than others). Europe is 
developing its own policy — just as Australia now seems to be. There are good 
prospects that the United States will do something, despite the resolute opposition to 
the Kyoto approach. California has its own purely state-based proposal. Broadly, 
and despite his acceptance of the necessity for government action within nations, 
Stavins seems optimistic about the prospects for decentralised unilateral action 
among nations — with cooperation emerging perhaps in due course. I find this 
puzzling because Stavins must ultimately be claiming that, while individuals cannot 
solve n-person prisoner’s dilemma problems qua individuals, they can go much 
closer to solving them via what we might call the ‘partitioning’ solution. That is, we 
partition the set of individuals into two hundred or so groups, such that there is 
coercive power within groups, but where the relation between groups is one of 
independent action, just like the relation between individuals prior to partition. 
That there might be such a solution to the public goods problem strikes me as an 
interesting speculation, and I shall want to explore it a little in what follows. But I 
have to say that I know of no formal treatment of any such speculation in the 
literature.3 And I cannot find any defence of it in the Stavins paper itself. So we are 
left with a puzzle. It is one I want to engage briefly. 
                                                 
2 These grounds relate to some niggling doubts about incentives and selection biases in the funding 
of science. 
3 One might claim that a 250-person prisoner’s dilemma is easier to solve than a several 
billion-person prisoner’s dilemma. That I freely acknowledge. But I do not think that that entitles 
us to think that the 250-person version is solvable. And in any event, the standard solution 
involving explicit cooperation among potential contributors is not what Stavins has in mind.  
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I said that if governments were faithful agents of their citizens’ aggregate interests, 
they would not act to curb CO2 emissions. But virtually no serious scholar of 
politics I know, whether of the standard ‘public choice’ school or of the revisionist 
variant of rational choice political theory that I favour, thinks that government 
actions faithfully reflect aggregate citizen interest all the time. 
The standard public choice account 
Take the standard public choice argument first. As a whole slew of regulations and 
tariff ‘protection’ measures testify, democratic politics is hospitable to policies that 
serve to redistribute to well-organised interests away from relatively unorganised 
ones, at the expense of aggregate interests. Those same general forces that make 
genuinely free international trade such an elusive policy goal can conceivably be 
mobilised to promote CO2 emission reductions. As I see it, orchestrating just such a 
mobilisation is the agenda that Warwick McKibbin sets for himself in his ‘hybrid’ 
approach. Although he declared himself last evening to be dissatisfied with the 
‘trade’ analogy, I think the tariff parallel is useful. Rights to emit, like tariffs, serve 
to create rents. Who gets those rents is an artefact of the particular regulatory 
instruments used. McKibbins’ aim is to construct those instruments and their 
allocation so as to establish a more or less stable political coalition supporting the 
maintenance of the policy that gives those instruments their value. His strategy is 
rather like that of a company, seeking tariff protection, which gives out shares to a 
well-devised majority coalition so that that majority will reliably support that tariff 
in future elections. As our experience in trade negotiations indicates, the political 
forces supporting ‘protective’ measures can be extremely stable and impervious to 
change even when it is in the country’s aggregate interests to change them. 
McKibbins’ ambition is to do for emissions restriction instruments what jolly Jack 
McEwen attempted to do for tariffs — create a regime of ‘protection all round’ in 
which a critical mass of political forces see themselves as having a stake in the 
maintenance of that regime. That will serve to embed a policy that will impose net 
costs on Australia — but it will distribute those costs in a way that is politically 
profitable. 
Put the issue a slightly different way. Just why are Australian business interests 
generally in favour of the current round of carbon emission entitlements? The 
answer is surely that they expect some significant proportion of those entitlements 
to be given away to existing businesses. Contrast the creation of these emission 
entitlements with a general carbon tax — something that Henry Ergas argues 
persuasively could be a rather better arrangement in efficiency terms, assuming that 
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most of the revenue were used to substitute for high marginal income tax rates.4 
The carbon tax creates revenues for government. Those revenues can also be given 
out to special interests — but how that is done remains at the discretion of the 
government of the day and so is subject to future change. The emission entitlements 
by contrast effectively assign the revenue value of that carbon tax to those who are 
given the entitlements: the rent transfers are an intrinsic feature of the policy 
instrument. Of course, under the carbon tax, exemptions can be granted. But it is by 
no means easy to disguise tax exemptions; whereas the precise pattern of giving out 
entitlements is not a salient policy feature. The McKibbin scheme involves, as I 
understand it, giving some proportion of the entitlements to ordinary citizen-voters, 
as well as to business interests, presumably with an eye to building around the 
carbon scheme a robust ‘coalition of the willing’. 
In any event, this is my reading of the current preference for retradeable permits 
over taxes. It might all seem somewhat Machiavellian — but another way to read it 
is as shrewd politics. We create some monopoly-cartel rents in the CO2 policy 
process as a means of buying business approval. All this, of course, for a policy that 
creates net harm for Australia — though if the science is right, probably net benefits 
for the rest of the world. 
If this were all there is to be said about democratic political process, it would not be 
good news. Taking a step back from the particular environmental application, the 
logic suggests that it is possible to create political support for almost any policy by a 
strategic manipulation of the redistributions to which that policy gives rise. If 
McKibbin can do it for carbon emissions, why couldn’t any special interest do it for 
whatever madcap scheme happens to be on their agenda? 
One important part of the answer to this question lies in the constraints imposed by 
broad public opinion, as revealed in electoral processes. It is one thing to be able to 
construct a policy framework that will buy off special interests. It is another to do so 
in a manner of which the electorate will approve. Jack McEwen can deliver 
‘protection all round’ only if there is a general mistrust of free trade and a climate of 
community support for tariff regimes in principle. The standard public choice line is 
that securing electoral approval does not involve any test independent of the 
distributive structure of policy, because individual voters can be ‘bought off’ by 
strategic redistributions in the way that special interests can. McKibbin’s scheme to 
involve a critical mass of ordinary citizens in the allocation of emission permits 
suggests that he endorses that standard line. (Note that this involves finding a 
critical minority of Australians who are going to have to bear the full burden!) But I 
think that the standard line is at best partial and at worst misleading. Indicating why 
                                                 
4 Which interestingly in the Australian case does not mean the rates on upper incomes so much as 
rates on welfare recipients with sharp means tests. 
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brings me to my revisionist ‘expressive’ account of voter behaviour; and to a second 
line of hope for a solution to the global emissions issue. 
Expressive voting 
The expressive account of voting offers a distinct reason why policies may not be in 
the aggregate national interest — because votes do not reliably track the voters’ 
individual interests. 
The account takes as its point of departure the fact that no individual voter can 
reasonably expect to be decisive — that the probability of my vote determining who 
wins in an election is asymptotically negligible. This means, among other things, 
that voting in accord with my conscience becomes a pretty cheap activity. 
Suppose that there’s a policy that, if implemented, will cost me $10 000 a year. I 
think that it’s the right policy from a global point of view. But $10 000 a year is a 
lot of money. On the other hand, what does it really cost me to vote for that policy? 
Not $10 000 a year. Rather, $10 000 a year times the probability that my vote will 
determine the outcome of the election! To simplify just a little, $10 000 a year times 
the probability that there will be an exact tie among all other voters! (In all other 
cases, my vote is outcome irrelevant: if I made a mistake in voting and somehow 
voted for my less favoured candidate, that mistake wouldn’t actually change the 
outcome!) Now, the probability of an exact tie among twelve million other voters is 
a small number. (Actually, the relevant magnitude is the probability of an exact tie 
in the marginal electorate in an election won by one seat — times the probability 
that my electorate will turn out to be the marginal one!) This probability is almost 
certainly small enough to make the cost to me of voting my conscience on this 
$10 000-a-year matter something like a mere dollar or two. Acting as my 
conscience dictates may not be worth $10 000 a year; but it is likely to be worth a 
few dollars. 
What this means is that if individuals were truly rational (and held rational beliefs 
about the probability of being decisive), individual interests would predictably play 
not much role in politics — and certainly a much smaller role than they do in 
market settings, where agent choice is decisive over options. The right way to think 
about voting behaviour is in terms of cheering at a football match — not choosing a 
car or a house or an assets portfolio. When you cheer at a football match, you 
express your desire that a particular team win: you show your support for your 
chosen team. But your cheering is not causally efficacious — it exercises negligible 
effect on the actual outcome. Voting is more like a ‘speech act’ than it is like a 
market action — closer to an opinion poll than, say, selecting your portfolio 
manager! 
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A direct implication is that the things that are relevant in electoral competition, and 
hence in determining electoral outcomes, are the factors that make individuals cheer 
(and boo). And one thing that lots of people are likely to cheer for is the 
environment. Who, after all, wants to express support for global catastrophe?! On 
this basis, large numbers of voters can quite rationally vote for carbon emissions 
policies that will make them individually considerably worse off (and almost 
certainly Australia worse off as a nation) because they believe that it is the morally 
and globally responsible thing to do. And expressing that moral position in a 
context where they are just expressing their views is much cheaper than doing so in 
a setting where each only pays if she speaks up.5 
It is therefore by no means inconceivable that enough citizens in enough of the 
democratic countries around the world will support policies that inhibit CO2 
emissions entirely unilaterally — and that emissions will fall to a level such that 
potential catastrophe will be averted. And this notwithstanding the fact that the 
national interest does not support emission reductions in any of the countries 
involved. 
I say that this is not inconceivable. I do not say that it is especially likely. 
Personally, I am sceptical. My prediction is that, in the medium term, some 
countries will have made significant sacrifices, but that the level of global CO2 
emissions will nevertheless have increased — with its attendant climatic effects. 
When that happens, enthusiasm will start to run thin: pre-emptive suicide is not, 
after all, an especially popular policy. (This, we might observe, is the fate of many 
popular enthusiasms — like wars that go on longer than a year; or megalomaniacal 
public projects when the real cost comes home to bite. There is a flurry of electoral 
support when they are first introduced, but unless there is manifest ‘success’ the 
support is hard to maintain.) 
Moreover, the danger in expressive politics is that it encourages symbolic policies. I 
do not, for example, regard it as at all surprising that Kyoto had little overall effect 
on CO2 concentrations. Drew Collins made the remark in passing that ‘much 
environmental goodwill had been squandered on tokenism’ (nice turn of phrase, 
that!); but again, that is what I think we ought to expect. For example, when I 
remarked earlier that, if the Australian government were a totally faithful agent of 
its citizen’s interests, it would simply do nothing about carbon emissions, I did not 
                                                 
5 The line of argument at stake in this view has been elaborated and defended extensively in 
Brennan, G. and Lomasky, L. 1993, Democracy and Decision: The Pure Theory of Electoral 
Preference, Cambridge University Press, New York. It has implications for policy that are 
extremely general. Of course, this is not the context to spell those implications out in even minor 
detail. The remarks here will, though, perhaps be enough to suggest that the expressive account 
of voting offers a better account of environmental politics than do rival accounts of voting that 
treat the voter as if she believed that her vote actually determined the electoral outcome! 
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claim that that is what the Australian government would say that it was doing. On 
the contrary, the demands of international respectability almost certainly require 
countries to pay lip-service to international environmental agreements; and even to 
be active promoters of the development of such agreements. And at the domestic 
level, there will be a lot of emission reduction rhetoric; but there will also be a lot of 
trying to manage a symbolic commitment to global environmentalism without 
imposing too great a cost on ordinary producers and consumers. We have already 
witnessed a little of that here in Australia in terms of the petrol price debate. 
In short, I predict a lot of ‘I’ll fumble; you pay’ across the international community; 
and perhaps even greater than usual amounts of political hypocrisy across the 
Western world, as self-imposed CO2 emissions regimes start to bite. That itself 
presents an interesting policy challenge. ‘Hypocrisy’ doesn’t, I like to think, come 
naturally to economists — so balancing the requirements of political respectability 
against considerations of the national interest, truly conceived, is no small ask. And 
I sympathise with those who are going to have to negotiate the questions. Of course, 
many here are familiar with that challenge; but I suspect it is going to get worse —
much like the environment itself. 
From the global to the local 
I have spent almost all of my word allocation (and time) talking about the global 
case. This instantiates what I often say in meetings like this: that there is an 
important difference between academics and policy makers. We academics can 
focus on what is interesting (and I have to say that I personally find the global 
issues fascinating); whereas public servants and policy advisors have to focus on 
what is relevant. And it should be clear by now that I think the relevant challenge 
lies with environmental issues that appear at the domestic level. 
But although I have drawn a sharp conceptual distinction between global and local, 
I do not want to suggest that they are unrelated. Indeed, focusing on the connections 
between the two levels will perhaps serve to sharpen the force of my overall 
judgement of the proper policy response. 
• First, to reiterate the conceptual point. If unilateral action in the global warming 
case is rational for Australia (or more modestly constitutes a ‘political 
equilibrium’ for any individual country), then public goods problems can’t be of 
quite the severity for decentralised institutions that the standard public goods 
analysis assumes. So, international success or otherwise in the carbon emissions 
area will have interesting implications of a general theoretical kind for how we 
think about public goods and common property problems more generally — and 
specifically at the more domestic level. 
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• Experience of success or failure in more national/local environment problems 
can inform us as to the prospects of success in international ones. If the fact that 
political jurisdictions are overlapping creates problems for, say, resolution of the 
Murray–Darling problem, when the number of governmental players is small, 
what are the prospects for tolerable solutions to the carbon emissions issue when 
the number of players is huge and highly heterogeneous, and there is no 
overarching political authority? 
• The severity of purely local environmental problems is likely to be a function of 
the more global situation. For example, climate change will affect rainfall levels, 
with implications for water management in river systems (a prospect that both 
Arlene Buchan and Wendy Craik note in their papers in relation to the  
Murray–Darling). More generally, as Gary Libecap notes, norms and policy 
régimes that have governed management of common property resources 
reasonably satisfactorily can become deeply problematic when external 
(climatic) circumstances alter significantly. Arrangements that have been in 
place for some time acquire the status of de facto ‘rights’ with all the moral 
freight that rights carry and all the potential for moral outrage when the rules of 
the game are changed. (Such moral outrage problems may be exacerbated if the 
Australian government gives voters an expectation that their sacrifices will 
actually solve the global problem.) 
• Resources deployed by the Australian government for tackling global warming 
are resources that could otherwise be used for tackling national environmental 
problems (such as water buy back). I want to emphasise this ‘resource 
competition’ both because I think it is empirically very important and because it 
is an aspect of things that economists are distinctive in recognising. 
Environmental scientists tend to think of environmental policy as a seamless 
web of interconnected relations. As Suzi Kerr put it in her presentation, methane 
gas emissions and nutrient leakage into lake water are similar because they 
involve the same source of pollution and the same ‘science’. But, as I have 
argued, they also have quite different status in policy terms. And there is a real 
choice about where we focus our efforts. 
• These ‘resources’ include, at the most general level, not just fiscal dollars (or 
GDP) but also the scarce attention of politicians and bureaucrats and for that 
matter, of citizen-voters. For policy purposes, this may be a yet more significant 
source of conflict. 
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Ultimately, my advice to the policy advisors, somewhat tentatively given as always, 
tracks my advice to students in relation to exam strategy: ‘start with the easy 
problems, the ones you think you can solve. Worry about the harder ones later’.6 
I do not of course pretend that domestic environmental problems are simple. But 
they are ultimately something we can actually do something about. And that seems 
to me to distinguish them from their global analogues. Domestic environmental 
problems are where I see the expected policy payoff to lie. For that reason, I think 
that the papers presented here today, focusing as they have on the domestic cases 
— at both practical and theoretical levels — have got the balance right. 
Australian policy should focus on domestic environmental issues — and on the 
global front, focus on optimal response to the fact of global warming rather than on 
Quixotic attempts at prevention. As David Parnell put it, the main game is 
adaptation, not mitigation. This is not because it is impossible to imagine that the 
world might luck into a kind of solution to the global emissions problem. I have 
tried to give reasons why that is not an inconceivable outcome. But I think it 
distinctly against the odds. 
                                                 
6 Of course, the exam advice comes in a setting where ‘all questions are of equal value’. That may 
not be the case in the environmental area. But I still think that it’s a fair rule of thumb not to 
spend all your effort on problems you are very unlikely to be able to do anything about! 
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General discussion  
Suzi Kerr commenced discussion with three comments: 
• the potential for linkages between systems in the post-Kyoto international 
framework, as described by Professor Stavins, should not be limited to the Clean 
Development Mechanism — countries should be free to both buy and sell carbon 
credits 
• there was evidence supporting Professor Brennan’s point that people will 
cooperate even when theory suggests it was not in their best interests 
• while a lot more work on adaptation should be undertaken, as the marginal costs 
of both adaptation and mitigation activities are initially low, we should be 
undertaking more of both. 
 Points raised by other participants included: 
• carbon trading from biodiversity plantings on farmland could provide a win-win 
situation for farmers, government and the corporate sector — although another 
participant noted that such win-wins may not be straightforward, for example, 
planting trees in the upper catchments of the Murray–Darling Basin can affect 
water availability for downstream users  
• people’s orientations may not be individualistic. 
The session chair, Gary Banks, then invited the panel to make some concluding 
comments. A selection follows.  
Professor Freebairn 
I would like to make two comments. The first is in relation to concerns about 
equity. We need to recognise that government intervention is a positive sum gain. 
There is no reason for intervention if it is not. But distribution is important in 
relation to the issue of whether tradeable permits are provided for free, or whether 
they are auctioned.    
Second, we need to identify the economic, rather than the statutory, incidence of a 
policy. That can be tricky. In simple partial equilibrium models it depends on the 
relative elasticities of supply and demand. The difficulty lies with traded products, 
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either export or import competing and particularly if Australia goes it alone. This 
will have exchange rate effects, so a general equilibrium model was required. 
Greenhouse policies are largely an origin-based tax falling on all Australian 
production. This will reduce Australian exports and increase imports and cause a 
currency depreciation. All these effects have to be taken together.  
The issue discussed by Suzi Kerr and Professor Libecap about the timing of reform 
was important. Suzi Kerr indicated that if there was no need for redistribution, 
reform was easier. On the other hand, Professor Libecap said that this won’t attract 
the attention of politicians. So there was a trade-off between political involvement 
and redistribution.   
A related issue is what is the most appropriate greenhouse tax base for Australia in 
the event that we go it alone? Are we going to use an origin base or a destination 
base, or exempt both imports and exports? Understanding all the potential effects of 
these options will require a general equilibrium model that includes exports and 
imports with different carbon intensities and exchange rate adjustments.  
Professor Libecap 
While Professor Brennan provided us with a division of the topics discussed today 
in terms of the size of the externality or the open access problem, another way to 
consider the issues was by mitigation versus adaptation. Cap-and-trade programs 
are an attempt to mitigate the size of global warming and its effects; whereas 
adaptation is about designing institutions to address a global environmental and 
resource problem.  
There is a question of whether early mitigation would reduce subsequent adaptation 
costs. I studied under Oliver Williamson so I'm always thinking about information 
costs and transactions costs. Initially, the information costs are so large that it's hard 
to know exactly what the nature of the problem is and how it should be addressed. 
Moreover, the collective action costs are high because parties aren't sure what the 
net economic gains will be from committing to a particular policy. Then, after a 
crisis occurs — fisheries collapse or water becomes scarce — we have better 
information about the issue, and collective action problems are reduced. 
If you include all the information and transactions costs, then early mitigation may 
not be socially or economically efficient. Since empirical observation supports this, 
it suggests there may be an underlying efficiency reason for such patterns of 
response. For this reason I'm quite optimistic about the likelihood of property rights 
regimes emerging in areas such as water, fisheries, and land use, because we are 
facing crises there, and the gains from a property rights regime are evident.  
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Professor Stavins 
The notion of focusing on the easy problems first was an interesting one. I happen 
to be a highly risk averse individual and so I tend to do that in my personal life. Of 
course, that's neither efficient nor wise. It can be a prescription for allowing the 
larger problems to become insurmountable.  
Having said that, is climate change the most important problem in the world? 
Absolutely not. Is climate change the most important environmental problem in the 
world? In my opinion, no. The environmental problems that are more important 
than climate change are located in the developing world, and they are indoor air 
pollution from cooking fires, and lack of potable water supplies.  
Obviously, a global commons problem means it is in the narrowly-defined interests 
of individual countries not to take action — that's why a cooperative arrangement of 
some kind is required. On the other hand, it's striking to observe that (perhaps 
foolishly) the European Union, and a number of other countries, are taking action. 
Even the state of California is adopting a unilateral global climate policy. The costs 
to California will be vastly greater than the benefits. The smaller the political 
jurisdiction, the greater this problem becomes.   
So it's happening and it will continue. In my opinion, by 2009 or 2010, the United 
States will have a meaningful cap-and-trade program, reducing emissions to 
50 per cent below 1990 levels by 2050. There are two caveats on this: a deep and 
prolonged recession does not occur; and a major terrorist incident does not take 
place on US soil. Either of those would push consideration of domestic climate 
policy off the political table. 
A border tax has tremendous political support in the United States. As I suggested, 
if the United States does introduce such a tax, Europe will do the same within six 
months, followed by the other industrialised countries. It is quite possible that the 
cure could be worse than the illness, unless such measures are carefully structured 
so as to act only as inducements for participation in the international climate 
regime. 
In relation to international climate policy, after the 2008 presidential election, the 
United States will re-engage with the world in various ways, particularly under the 
Framework Convention on Climate Change. The big question — and this is 
something Australia should worry about — is whether the United States will be 
ready to meaningfully participate in the United Nations Climate Change Conference 
in Copenhagen in December 2009, given how long it takes for political 
appointments in a new administration to be confirmed by the Senate. 
  
 
210 PROMOTING BETTER 
ENVIRONMENTAL 
OUTCOMES 
 
 
It may turn out that the post-Kyoto climate change architecture will emerge from 
the bottom up — for example, the linking of domestic and some regional 
cap-and-trade programs through emission reduction credit programs or other kinds 
of mechanisms. 
Finally, an important way to think about climate change is to recognise that as a 
policy problem it has less in common with issues such as stratospheric ozone 
depletion and chlorofluorocarbons, than it does with issues such as global 
democracy or economic development in poor countries. A single policy instrument, 
whether negotiated or unilaterally put in place, is not going to solve either of these 
latter problems. What matters is whether a policy increment taken by one country or 
regional grouping is helping or hurting. 
Having said that, it's also true that a key objective of the international process is to 
bring all major emitters on board, including the key developing countries. This is a 
huge challenge, and will require significant research in economics and good 
political thinking. Hence, my last comment is that there is plenty of work remaining 
for the Productivity Commission. 
Professor Brennan 
I think it is more appropriate to view Australia's unilateral global emissions plans as 
an act of international charity, rather than an attempt to play a role in solving a 
public goods problem. I would like to explore Professor Freebairn’s comment that if 
government is to be engaged in this activity, it has to be a positive sum activity. I 
don't see any empirical evidence of that. Governments do lots of things (including, 
for example, military adventurism) which are clearly not positive sum, even in the 
global sense. 
Second, when we talk about positive sum or win-win situations, we have to be 
careful to specify who the winners are. If they are not parties to the contracts — if 
they are not able to express the fact that they win — then whether it's a win or a loss 
is a second-order consideration. There are lots of win-win situations if you draw a 
small enough barrier — for example, cartels are win-win situations for the members 
of the cartel. You have to specify all the normatively relevant persons — these 
could be all the citizens of the world. If you do, then Australia's activity in reducing 
emissions is a morally appropriate thing to do. But economic tradition tells us to be 
sceptical about the extent to which people will pursue outcomes for purely moral 
reasons. 
It's very likely that by 2020 we will have solved the Murray-Darling problem, but 
I’m not so sure that the emissions problem will be solved. Obviously Professor 
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Stavins thinks there is good empirical evidence of an increasing commitment to 
solving the problem. My question is how long is this going to last? How robust will 
this commitment be when countries make significant sacrifices and the level of 
global carbon emissions continues to rise? I think it's difficult to be optimistic under 
those circumstances. 
Professor Freebairn 
In cases of market failure, if government interferes, it should do so only on the basis 
of a positive sum game, even though sometimes it will get it wrong. It is also true 
that government has a role in redistribution, which is not necessarily a positive sum 
game in efficiency terms. And government has a role to play in macroeconomic 
stability, which I guess it hopes is a positive sum game (but they usually aggravate 
the cycles rather than smooth them). So I will stick with my proposition, but with 
these qualifications. 
Concluding remarks: Gary Banks, Chairman, Productivity Commission 
One of the reasons why the Productivity Commission exists is to help overcome the 
gap between what government should do and what it actually can do in the political 
context. Professor Stavins observed that there was plenty of research work for the 
Commission in this area and I think all participants will have ideas for further work 
that have come out of today's very rich discussion. 
When we designed this conference some months ago, we weren't thinking that 
greenhouse issues would be the central focus. The fact that it featured so 
prominently in discussion indicates how important that issue is. Even if it's not the 
most significant environmental problem, it's probably the most important policy 
issue, particularly in countries, such as Australia and New Zealand, which are 
contemplating action in advance of other countries. 
The Commission is aiming to provide constructive support for an evidence-based 
approach to policy in this area. There is a clear need for more evidence to inform 
both government decision making and wider community opinion. A recent survey 
found that although a majority of the Australian population supported an emissions 
trading system, there was little understanding of what an emissions trading system 
was.  
There is plenty to do and a lot of ideas have been generated by today’s discussion. I 
would like especially to thank the overseas speakers who prepared papers and came 
to Australia for this one-day conference. Professor Libecap and Professor Stavins 
will also be presenting seminars at the Commission, so we will benefit further from 
their insights. It’s been a great day and I thank everyone who participated. 
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13 Lessons for climate policy from 
monetary history 
Dinner address 
Warwick McKibbin 
Australian National University 
It is difficult to say something new about climate change policy to a group of people 
who have a great deal of expertise in the area already. What I want to do in this talk 
is offer a way of thinking about climate policy from a perspective that is different 
from the usual. This presentation draws heavily on my recent 2007 Shann Lecture 
on A New Climate Strategy Beyond 2012: Lessons from Monetary History, and on a 
decade and a half of collaboration with Professor Peter Wilcoxen from Syracuse 
University. 
When someone is new to a policy debate they often look for insights from 
experience in other areas. In a number of countries, including Australia, there are 
well trained economists who start working on climate policy and immediately look 
to trade policy for an analogy. This can be good and it can be bad. While there are 
important lessons to be drawn from trade debates, there are some fundamental 
differences between climate policy and trade policy. If you are a trade policy expert 
you conceptualize the problem of emissions reductions as similar to the debate on 
tariff reductions. Reducing tariffs to zero will generate economywide gains with 
ultimately enough benefits to share around. It will not matter about the pain that is 
caused during the adjustment period because the gains will be larger than the losses 
for the majority, so it becomes a question of income distribution. All that is needed 
to reduce tariffs to zero is to push the vested interests out of the way. A similar 
argument is made about fossil fuel intensive industries in the carbon reduction 
debate. 
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13.1 Climate policy is not trade policy 
The trouble with climate policy is that it is not as easy as trade policy — nor are the 
lessons from the trade experience necessarily the most relevant for climate policy. 
First, in reducing carbon emissions we are talking about a transformation of the 
economy that is highly likely to be costly. So, instead of sharing benefits, 
policymakers need to worry about sharing costs. Second, the nature of the 
institutions in a trade policy world are not the type of institutions needed for 
implementing climate policy — consider, for example, the recent negotiations under 
the auspices of the WTO that have stalled in the Doha Round. This outcome is not 
what we need for credible climate policy. For most aspects of the climate policy 
issue, the trade policy approach is the wrong way to think about the problem. 
Unfortunately this mindset tends to drive the debate in Australia.  
I (together with my co-author Peter Wilcoxen) propose an alternative perspective on 
climate policy — one that is unconstrained by political promises or political 
compromises that tend to dominate political reports. It is useful to think about 
climate policy from the point of view of monetary history because we learn a lot 
from looking at the history of the evolution of international agreements and 
collaboration between countries in the monetary area. What I first want to do is 
briefly touch on what we know from climate science and how that should drive 
policy — probably in a different way to how most people think. I then want to draw 
out a couple of lessons for climate policy design from our experience with the 
global monetary system. It will be a mix of theoretical insights but with a large dose 
of practical reality.  
13.2 Lessons from monetary history 
There are several points to stress. First, we have learnt from monetary history that 
common currencies do not last, which suggests that maybe a common carbon 
market will not last (for the same reasons). Second, there is no gain from short-run 
interest rate volatility so perhaps, for the same reasons, there are no gains from 
short-run carbon price volatility. Third, time consistency really matters in designing 
policies. It is a very good idea to tie the hands of future governments to prevent 
them from re-optimising policy decisions after economic agents have committed to 
an investment strategy. This constraining of policy revision can be done by creating 
balancing constituencies within an economy to prevent the government from 
reneging every time they think it is in their own self interest.  
Fourth, it is really important to build independent institutions with clear goals to 
implement the policy. It is critical to get the institutional design right. It is not a 
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good idea to put climate policy in the hands of either Treasury, or the Climate 
Change Department. It should be put it in the hands of an independent institution 
like a central bank of carbon.  
Fifth, the whole debate in the 20th century about the transfer problem and the Dutch 
disease issues caused by attempting to transfer large amounts of wealth between 
economies is relevant for the climate issue. Mixing climate policy with big income 
transfers from one part of the world to another, or from one part of society to 
another, makes it very much harder to implement. It is critical to take the transfer 
problem into account when designing global and national policy. Attempting too 
many goals with a limited number of instruments is problematic. 
Finally, I want to discuss how climate policy should be designed, and deal directly 
with these issues. What I propose is not a perfect approach, but I think it is an 
approach that deals effectively with these core issues and does so better than 
recently published reports on climate policy design for Australia.  
The good news is there are no big models required to evaluate this approach in 
2050 or 2100 — there are no equations — but the unsurprising news is that the 
McKibbin–Wilcoxen hybrid will eventually emerge as the preferred approach.  
13.3 Climate science  
What do we know? We know quite a lot. We know that climate is a complex system 
that is always changing. This is not a situation that economists usually face. We are 
dealing with something that is continually changing and never reaches a steady 
state. This is a very difficult policy environment.  
Average temperatures have risen roughly 0.7 degrees in the past century. Both 
natural variability and human-induced climate change are occurring. Unravelling 
how much is human induced and how much is natural variability is a complex 
question. We also know that we are pumping enormous quantities of greenhouse 
gases into the atmosphere, more than 7 gigatonnes per year. This is unlikely to be 
sustainable.  
The problem is that there is an enormous vacuum in policy, globally and nationally 
in most countries, and this vacuum is causing significant economic losses. Even if 
you are a sceptic about human-induced climate change, the ‘do nothing’ option is 
costly because investment in energy infrastructure is not being undertaken due to 
the policy uncertainty. Everybody is waiting for the policy framework to be put in 
place. Even if you are a sceptic, it doesn’t mean do nothing is the best policy, 
because to do nothing actually costs. You need to take out insurance. 
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What else do we know from the climate science? First, scientists make it clear that 
it is not greenhouse gas emissions in any year that matter but the accumulation of 
these emissions in the atmosphere over time. These accumulations are known as 
concentrations. Science does not tell at what level concentrations of greenhouse 
gases should be to avoid dangerous climate change. There are different views 
among the scientific community as to the level of concentrations at which 
dangerous climate change occurs, but there is a pretty convincing argument that we 
should be heading towards concentrations of 450 parts per million. I should stress 
that this number has changed a lot since I started working in this area 18 years ago, 
but it is a good starting point.  
The bottom line is that science should guide policy formulation, but science can not 
tell us exactly what we should be doing. Suppose we did know the global 
concentration target. Suppose scientists agreed that we cannot go past 450 parts per 
million. Science does not tell us how precisely to get there — do we cut emissions 
or increase sequestration? How quickly should emissions be cut? The profile of 
emission reductions to meet a given concentration target is not a scientific question. 
Science does not tell us whether we should cut sharply now, and then do very little, 
or cut mostly later but then do a lot. The issue of costs and benefits of different 
strategies is an economic or moral question posed in the context of risk 
management. 
Science also tells us nothing about what a national emissions target should look 
like, because the way the global emissions pie is divided between countries is not a 
scientific decision. It is partly an economic decision. An economist would propose 
choosing the least cost emissions abatement opportunities to meet the global target. 
It is partly a moral or ethical question about who should bear the burden of the cuts. 
It is not a scientific question. Any national study which starts with the idea that 
science tells us that as a nation we have to cut emissions by a certain percentage is 
not based on any science that I am aware of. The climate change issue at the 
national level is an issue of not just science but of economics and morality, of 
politics, and a whole range of other issues, which makes it a very difficult policy 
debate.  
What are the implications of this complexity? Many economists who start working 
on climate policy start with the idea that a cap-and-trade emissions trading market 
would be a good approach. Cap and trade is based on the idea that we know what 
the annual cap should be, or we know what the cap should be over a period of time, 
but that’s really an assumption rather than an implication of science. We know from 
science what we need to do more broadly — we need an approach that moves 
towards a global concentration target that is uncertain. But this target is likely to 
vary over time as we obtain more information on the complex overall climate 
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system. Within the global concentration target, one of the key issues is to equalise 
the cost across countries, and minimise costs over time. This does not appear to be 
the current approach in international negotiations. The essence of the focus should 
be on how to design a global system that achieves the scientific goal but at 
minimum global and relative cost across countries. To stress again, science does not 
provide a national emissions target and timetable framework, but that tends to be 
the premise of the Garnaut and Stern Reviews and other studies.  
13.4 What should be the focus of climate policy? 
So what should climate change policy focus on? In my view it should focus on 
managing risk and dealing with climate uncertainty. That is the essence of the 
climate problem. We don’t know how much to cut, but we think we should be 
cutting significantly. We want to manage the risks to the environment, and to the 
economy, so we have to design systems — markets in particular — that let us deal 
with uncertainty. It is not about picking arbitrary targets and meeting the target no 
matter what. That is a political argument, not a scientific or economic argument. 
The focus should be on creating a system that enables society as a whole to manage 
risk — the government should not bear all the risk. We need to create markets so 
that individuals and corporations can make decisions using markets and other 
mechanisms to manage their own risk. That is important when we are dealing with 
the sort of energy system development and technology deployment that is needed. 
Creating long-term robust institutions, globally and nationally, which steer the 
global economy to a low emissions future, is fundamental.  
The institutional structures have to be thought about very carefully. When 
constructing a global system, starting from the top down and forcing countries to 
take action is not going to work. The starting point should be countries taking action 
that they see as in their own self interest, and then these national or regional policies 
can be knitted together into a global system with an overarching framework that 
helps sustain the national actions. The idea that you get uniform global agreement 
and consensus has not worked, and is unlikely to work in the future despite 
politicians’ optimism about the Copenhagen conference in December 2009. They 
were also optimistic in 1997 when the Kyoto Protocol was negotiated and global 
emissions are much higher today than almost anyone predicted. 
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13.5 Pricing carbon is a necessary but not sufficient 
condition 
A whole range of different policies are required. The carbon price needs to be at the 
core because it is a way of coordinating the carbon-emitting and carbon-abating 
decisions of all of the agents, all over the world. Yet the carbon price has to be 
designed and implemented carefully. There is no doubt that the short-term carbon 
price is a cost to the economy. If we change the price of carbon tomorrow, it will be 
costly. On the other hand, long-term carbon prices are, in my view, opportunities for 
the economy. People get these two time dimensions mixed up, either because they 
do not understand the key issue of investment incentives or because it is in their 
own self interest to confuse this point. Many argue that there should be a high 
carbon price today because that is the only way to stimulate renewable energy. My 
view is that a high initial carbon price is going to hurt the economy, and what 
matters for renewable energy sources is not the price of carbon today, it is the 
expected price of carbon over the next 20, 30 or 50 years. Everybody is focussing 
too much on the short run. We need to set very clear long-term carbon prices for the 
global economy that enable individual countries to manage their own domestic costs 
of carbon abatement to suit their own national and global self interest.  
There are many ways to put a price on carbon. One way is a carbon-trading market. 
First, you create a regulation that requires carbon emitters to obtain a permit to emit 
carbon. But there are different ways of creating a carbon-trading system. First, the 
government could limit the supply of permits, creating a fixed amount of carbon. 
The market determines the price because carbon permits are scarce. A cap on 
emissions is called a cap-and-trade permit system. There are different versions 
depending on whether banking and borrowing of permits is allowed so that the cap 
is not binding in a given year but is over a period of years. The alternative approach 
is to set a price at which you can buy permits from the government, and allow as 
many permits to be bought as required in a particular year. This approach is the 
equivalent of a tax. 
The advantage of the cap and trade approach is that once the cap is established, the 
environmental outcome is known. The disadvantage is that the cost is unknown, and 
there could be a lot of volatility in the short-term carbon market, because there is no 
flexibility in the supply. The advantage of a tax is that the carbon price is known —
but the emissions outcome in any one year is not.  
There are other differences between these approaches to pricing carbon which are of 
a long-term nature. The beauty of a carbon market where permits are allocated is 
that the allocation itself creates constituencies that change the nature of the 
interaction between the private sector and the government. The problem with a tax 
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is that if you are trying to generate a long-term carbon price, it is not clear what the 
tax will be in the future if the government has not credibly committed to the future 
tax profile.  
In relation to the differences between national and global markets, there are 
attractions from an economic point of view in allowing global permit markets to 
emerge. In our modelling, the Australian carbon price for a plausible carbon target 
tends to be much higher per unit of carbon than an American or Chinese carbon 
price. If there is only a national market in Australia, it could be very expensive to 
reduce carbon in the Australian economy, when permits could be bought from an 
offshore market and abatement costs therefore lowered by effectively paying for 
abatement elsewhere.  
The idea of using a global market to reduce the costs in Australia if it proves 
difficult to meet an annual emissions target, is the essence of the argument for a 
global market in the Garnaut Review and the Green Paper. Countries with high 
marginal abatement costs can buy permits from countries with low marginal 
abatement costs. This trading reduces costs within the national economy and a 
global market for carbon emerges with a common price. This is an efficient 
outcome. The price of carbon in any part of the world would end up the same.  
Trading is good in theory and in our modelling work we demonstrate that it can 
significantly reduce the costs of abatement, but it does not solve the problem of 
uncertainty. Even though a target for Australia can be selected, and if it turns out to 
be too expensive, the costs can be reduced by trading offshore, the global cost of the 
target is not reduced. In other words, global costs can be shifted around but can not 
be reduced overall under a standard cap-and-trade system.  
There are also problems associated with the allocation of permits. Trading permits 
across borders effectively transfers resources from one country to another through 
the trading mechanism. If an Australian buys a permit offshore they are transferring 
wealth to other markets. A third problem with trading across countries is that a lot 
of short-term price volatility is possible. The European trading system is a great 
example of how markets can trade from 36 Euros down to 2 Euros because some 
information is revealed to the market. Shocks in one market would be transmitted 
instantly to all linked markets. 
There are no gains from short-term permit price volatility — the gains and the price 
discovery are in the long term. Who gets the rights to emit in each trading period is 
critical. If a series of national markets are created, as in the European or Australian 
systems, with a five or ten year horizon, property rights are re-allocated 
continuously. This is a waste of resources in terms of rent seeking activity.  
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There are some historical lessons to be learnt about linking markets. First — this is 
a lesson from economic history in general — our modelling work in the mid-1990s 
indicated that the way permits were allocated was important. Once trading starts, if 
there are big transfers from one region of the world to another, this can lead to large 
fluctuations in real exchange rates and trade balances, which can destabilise world 
trade. These effects are related to the Dutch disease and the classic transfer problem 
debates.  
Trading permits is not just trading pieces of paper. Trading permits transfers 
resources from one part of the world to another. Why is that a problem? If you look 
at the experience of the United Kingdom when North Sea oil was discovered in the 
1970s, Britain suddenly had a comparative advantage in oil. Resources had to shift 
from the manufacturing sector to the oil sector, so UK manufacturing industries had 
to be restructured. The country was better off in aggregate because wealth increased 
overall, but there were serious adjustment problems getting the resources from the 
non-traded sectors to the oil industry. 
That would be a real problem if China or India were given an enormous volume of 
permits which are then bought by other countries, because this would change the 
comparative advantage of the Chinese and Indian economies from labour intensive 
manufacturing economies to carbon abating economies, which could be a very 
significant internal shock. Keynes wrote about this issue after World War I: how 
could German reparation payments be transferred out of Germany to the rest of the 
world without causing a major disruption to world trade? This may or may not be a 
problem in the climate change debate, depending on how permits are allocated. This 
depends on a lot of things — including how the world economy evolves, and how 
the price of carbon changes over time — which we are not good at predicting, but 
nothing can be ruled out.  
The second lesson relates to the fact that there is not a single world currency. 
Countries have tried periodically to move towards a single world currency but this 
has failed to varying degrees although there have been some notable regional 
successes. I believe that there is not going to be a single world permit market 
because emission permits are very similar to money. An emission permit is not a 
physical commodity like a pork belly. Permits are government promises to meet an 
emissions target in the same way that a unit of money is a government promise to 
maintain purchasing power. The value of that promise depends on the government’s 
credibility. Different governments in the world have different degrees of credibility 
and different incentives over time to debase their currencies, so problems may arise 
if governments renege on carbon-trading markets and debase the global currency. 
We have seen the consequences. The world tried to have a common global currency 
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after the end of the World War II under the Bretton Woods system, and when it 
unravelled in the early 1970s it was a significant shock to the global economy.  
The third lesson from monetary history is how many countries have converged in 
the way they run monetary policy. Economists used to think that you could target 
the quantity of money and then let short-term interest rates fluctuate and that would 
result in a good outcome with the quantity of money tying down the price level. 
Policymakers discovered very quickly that this nice theory did not work very well 
in practice. In addition, there were substantial costs from short-term interest rate (or 
price) volatility. The gains to policy came from tying down expectations about the 
policy goal. In different countries nowadays, the target for monetary policy tends to 
be inflation, or inflation over the cycle, or other nominal targets. The policy is 
implemented through manipulating the short-term price of money while gradually 
adjusting to the long-term goal. This is exactly the lesson that we should learn for 
climate policy.  
The carbon policy should have a short-run price goal, which is the price of carbon 
to the economy, and a long-run quantity goal, which is atmospheric carbon 
concentrations. Movements from the short term to the long term should occur in the 
same way that monetary policy works. Transparency, and flexibility in minimizing 
costs in transitioning from the short run to the long run are critical. We have learnt a 
lot about how to create a global monetary regime. You do not do it by having a big 
meeting every year where everyone makes a promise and then goes back to their 
own economies to run policy. You have national or regional monetary systems 
working in the national or regional self interest and you coordinate these across 
countries to internalise the global externalities. In the case of climate change, the 
externalities are orders of magnitude bigger than the externalities from monetary 
policy and these externalities are a large part of the climate policy story.  
It is clear from the discussion so far that climate policy is more like monetary policy 
than it is like trade policy. The world and Australia need a system where there are 
clear targets, not necessarily timetables. There should be an independent agency at 
the national level charged with reaching those targets and managing the costs of 
adjustment, free from political interference. There needs to be a very clear long-
term price for carbon, because, just as it is the long-term interest rate that drives 
investment, not the short-term interest rate, it is the long-term carbon price that will 
drive greenhouse-gas-reducing investment. It is the long-term carbon price that will 
drive technologies, not the short-term carbon price, but the short-term carbon price 
should be controlled in the same way that interest rates are controlled to minimise 
disruptions in the economy. The argument that if Australia does not have a carbon 
market today, at $35 per tonne, then you might as well forget it, is the wrong way to 
think about carbon pricing. I care much less about what the price of carbon is today. 
  
 
222 PROMOTING BETTER 
ENVIRONMENTAL 
OUTCOMES 
 
 
I care much more about what the market says the price of carbon will be in 
10, 20, 30 or 40 years into the future.  
13.6 The McKibbin–Wilcoxen hybrid: a monetary 
approach to climate policy 
So far I have drawn an analogy between climate policy and monetary policy but 
how can this be implemented? The answer is contained in a book and many articles 
I have authored jointly with Professor Peter Wilcoxen. The McKibbin–Wilcoxen 
hybrid (previously called the Blueprint until there where too many blueprints being 
proposed) is the monetary approach to climate change although it is usually 
described as a hybrid of emissions trading and carbon taxes. It is a cooperative 
approach based on a series of national systems that are plugged together. It could 
also be implemented as a global system if agreement from most countries was 
obtained.  
How does the McKibbin–Wilcoxen hybrid work? First, the aim is to impose a long-
term concentrations goal — we do not discard targets for emissions, only 
timetables. We argue for a particular concentrations target, but we are not sure when 
we are going to get there. We also propose a way to distribute this target across 
countries and across time. Second, we use this emissions commitment to determine 
a price, within a market, for a long-term carbon target within each national 
jurisdiction and that is what will drive energy investment decisions. At the same 
time, short-term costs are controlled. The problem of trading off the costs with the 
environmental benefits is at the core. We also want to create markets to enable 
corporations and households to manage their own climate risks. If a company wants 
to build a gas-fired power station in the LaTrobe Valley, using new technology, 
they can have a way of hedging that investment so they can proceed despite the 
risks. If the carbon price rises dramatically in the future because we need to cut 
emissions more quickly than expected, there is nothing to prevent closing that 
investment down and cashing in the long-term carbon rights, and moving to a 
different technology platform.  
13.7 Components of the McKibbin–Wilcoxen hybrid 
What are the components of the policy? First, we create what we call long-term 
permits. These long-term permits are a bundle of annual permits with different dates 
for each permit. The annual permits embodied in the long-term permits get smaller 
and smaller over time, so effectively the permits eventually disappear. The rights 
created are a diminishing right to a resource and the supply of these is fixed at the 
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national long-term target. The long-term permit reflects this target. They are 
allocated freely to households and to industry. The government gets no revenue 
from the allocation process. These rights are like real estate contracts, they are in 
the community owned by vested interests throughout society and they are traded in 
a long-term market. Why is that important? It’s important because you want to 
create a constituency that owns the rights to the carbon, and can offset any 
government backsliding on future policy commitment.  
The long-term permits can be thought of as a government bond which provides an 
annual coupon that gets smaller every year. As a company owning these emission 
rights, if you do nothing to change your emissions, you are going to run into a 
problem because long-term permits you have been given for free effectively 
disappear over time. The total initial emission for an economy in 2010 would be set 
10 per cent below current emissions, so there is already a shortage. There is scarcity 
in the market, and each one of these annual permits can only be used in the year for 
which it is issued. This gives you the long-term pre-committed ex-ante target of the 
Australian government. By 2100 these long-term permits are gone.  
The second component of the policy which is critical — and this is where the 
central bank of carbon comes in — is that the central bank of carbon can print 
annual permits to maintain a pre-announced price of carbon. This is the annual price 
that will apply for the next five years. If an emitter cannot get enough emissions 
from their long-term allocation, they can go to the central bank of carbon and get an 
annual permit for a fixed price.  
This means there is a permanent elastic supply of these annual permits at a fixed 
price. This acts like a safety valve. In the US debate, it is a safety valve. In the 
Australian debate, this is what I presume the government and the Green Paper and 
the Garnaut Review mean by holding the price fixed at a low rate initially, because I 
don’t know how you have a quantity target and a price target in a system unless you 
do it this way. This means that in any given year a company can reach their 
emissions allocation, either by using an annual coupon from the long-term permit or 
buying a coupon from the central bank. That’s why the policy is called a hybrid, 
because it involves permit trading of the long-term permits and effectively a carbon 
tax implemented as the annual permit — the payment to the central bank of carbon 
is a tax. Emissions targets can be satisfied from either source. Since there is scarcity 
in the long-term permits from the very beginning, the annual price of permits will 
be the fixed preannounced price of annual permits, unless there is a miraculous 
innovation that drives the price down below that annual price — which would be 
very good news given the deep cuts proposed in the target path.  
At a national level, the system controls the short-term cost because we do not know 
what the rest of the world is doing, and if the rest of the world has done nothing, we 
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can keep the price low forever. But if there was a global agreement and countries 
implemented policies to reach that agreement, there would be an international 
agreement to step up the short-term price over time, based on where global 
concentrations were heading. Thus, the price-stepping approach can be 
implemented either through national action or through a global agreement.  
What is the issue facing an innovator? Suppose you are making investment 
decisions about a technology that may be worthwhile to invest in now, but needs a 
threshold of $50 per tonne of carbon to be worthwhile. Looking out along the yield 
curve of carbon prices generated in the long-term market, and the associated 
derivative markets, you might see that by 2020 or 2040 the price of carbon is 
expected to be $80 per tonne. At this price that technology would be viable. At that 
future date, if the price is lower than expected, you can take a short position in this 
market to bankroll the technology, and if the price ends up collapsing you can close 
down the technology and trade in your assets, and still make money out of the 
venture. This encourages investment in alternative technologies because you are 
managing your own risk.  
More importantly, the value of long-term permits is the present value of the bundle 
of short-term permits contained in the long-term permit. Suppose that the annual 
permit price starts at $10 per tonne. A lot of people would say that at $10 per tonne 
nobody is going to do anything. But because these permits have been given out to 
all society, where you can reduce one tonne of carbon, in a standard carbon market 
you would save $10. In a McKibbin–Wilcoxen market you have that carbon right 
for a 100 years, you don’t save $10, you save possibly $1100 because the saving is 
the present value of something that has been saved forever. The hurdle rates of 
return by using these long time frames are transformational. This approach totally 
changes the cost/benefit analysis for all sorts of different technologies, significantly 
changing the incentives people have to reduce their abatement, because if you 
reduce a unit of carbon today, it is a permanent reduction in carbon and should be 
rewarded that way.  
The way I see the global system evolving is that each country will have their own 
system. It might be a carbon tax in a Scandinavian country, it could be the 
McKibbin–Wilcoxen hybrid in the United States and the European Union, but 
across the system there is a uniform price at the short end. Why is that an efficient 
outcome? Because there are no gains from trade in the way we have designed the 
system — a US company has no gains from buying a permit from a European 
company because they can buy the permits from their own government. You end up 
with an efficient market without cross-border transactions. Therefore you can 
partition policy in the United States, you can partition the European Union, you can 
partition Japan. Partitioning, or building firewalls between these permit markets, is 
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important because if there is a shock (for example, Japan pulls out of the system) it 
does not change the price of permits in the other systems. Under a global carbon 
market, you would destroy the market. Thus, a global permit market is more 
vulnerable to collapse from the actions of individual countries.  
13.8 Bringing in developing countries 
One of the big problems in negotiations is how to bring in developing countries, 
particularly when they are legitimately arguing that they do not want to bear the 
same costs as industrial countries. What can be done is to negotiate, in the 
international forum, a much larger allocation of long-term rights than a developing 
country currently emits. The short-term price of carbon in these economies would 
start at zero because they are not facing a constraint today, and the firewall between 
markets is binding. However, these countries would face a transparent constraint in 
the future. Thus the long-term carbon price in a developing economy will be non-
zero (it is the expected value of future prices). Eventually, the short-term price 
would rise over time until it is equal to the price of carbon in developed economies. 
This is differentiation based on the level of development, but the catch up in price is 
based on capacity to pay, which is determined by the allocation.  
13.9 Summary of difference between standard 
approaches and the hybrid 
There are several critical differences between the hybrid approach and the standard 
cap or taxes. First, as already discussed, the hybrid creates long-term returns for 
short-term actions. If you own the rights for carbon for 100 years and you change 
something you do today, the benefit is the present value of a 100 year benefit. That 
changes the hurdle rates and returns for different technologies. It also enables you to 
finance your own innovation because you can say to a bank or to a fund manager: 
‘Here is a technology, I can hedge the investment, lend me the money up front and 
the assets are in place to back the loan.’ 
Second, the hybrid is creating constituencies within the domestic economy who 
own the long-term rights to carbon in the economy. They are not owned by the 
Treasury, they are owned by a lot of corporations and individuals in superannuation 
funds. Any government that tries to tinker with the future of carbon policy would 
face the wrath of the voters. For example, governments in this country do not say 
they are going to take all real estate contracts and cancel them and reallocate the 
real estate. Thus, a constituent balance would be achieved that would not be 
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achieved in a taxed-based system or a carbon-allocation system, where you might 
get three to five years worth of pre-allocation, and after that who knows who is 
going to get the long-term rights.  
To sum up: climate change policy is a serious issue. Dealing with climate change 
uncertainty is what matters. Any effective policy will be a major change to the 
Australian economy. A new market has to be created. It is not a short-term carbon 
market. It is not a new tax. It is a long-term market in trading climate uncertainty, 
which is needed at the national and global level.  
The second point is that there is still a great deal of uncertainty about where the 
world is heading, so if a Garnaut-type approach is taken, where you commit to a 
precise target or a range of targets on the off-chance that you would be able to trade 
your way out of it by buying cheap permits offshore, and the permit market does not 
develop offshore, what do you do? You may have locked yourself into an 
international agreement with no safety valve. Relying on the development of a 
global trading system without a safety valve domestically is a very risky policy.  
The final point I want to make is that we need to get away from the idea that we 
know exactly where we want to go and that there are no trade-offs in getting there. 
That’s called religion. We have to deal with the trade-off between the 
environmental benefit of taking action, and the economic costs of getting there. If 
this is not acknowledged, international agreement will not occur, because it is over 
cost issues where the international negotiations are failing. Developing countries 
have bigger problems to deal with, from their own viewpoint, than climate change, 
but they are willing to be part of the international process if it is designed the right 
way.  
Monetary history has a lot to teach policymakers about how to design effective 
climate policy at the national level within a cooperative global agreement. It is time 
to move in the direction of building a transparent, credible, national or regionally-
focussed policy framework, with flexibility to adjust in a clear way over time 
towards a global concentrations goal. The almost religious focus on targets and 
timetables regardless of costs is the biggest hurdle to overcome in the climate 
change policy debate. There are better ways to generate carbon prices than what is 
currently proposed. One such better approach has been the focus of this 
presentation. 
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